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FOREWORD
Since the end of World War II, there has been a
stream of publications about the War in Europe, but
despite the volume of literature, interest in the topic
remains high. Given the significance of this conflict
and the interest in this campaign, the Strategic Studies Institute offers a fresh look at the campaign in Europe. This publication begins with an examination
of prewar planning for various contingencies, then
moves to the origins of “Germany first” in American
war planning. The authors then focus on the concept,
favored by both George C. Marshall and Dwight D.
Eisenhower, that the United States and its Allies had
to conduct a cross-channel attack and undertake an offensive aimed at the heartland of Germany. Following
the background provided in these initial chapters, the
remainder of the book provides a comprehensive discussion outlining how the European Campaign was
was carried out.
The authors, Dr. Samuel J. Newland and Dr.
Clayton K. S. Chun, conclude that American political leaders and war planners established logical and
achievable objectives for the nation’s military forces.
Conversely, in the campaign’s execution, American
military leaders were slow to put into practice what
would later be called operational level warfare. For
comparisons sake, an appendix is included that covers German efforts at war planning in the tumultuous
1920s and 1930s.
		
		
		
		

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
vii
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INTRODUCTION
As the world is moving rapidly into the 21st century, some might ask, why another history and analysis
of World War II’s European Campaign? After all, historians have continuously studied the war and the European Campaign since it ended in 1945. Why should
one look back to a time and conflict from the industrial
age when terrorism and insurgency are so prevalent
today? These questions become increasingly relevant
if contemporary military challenges are considered. In
particular, during the last 2 decades, America’s wars
have been limited to short wars against second-rate
powers, failed states and, most recently, insurgencies.
Since 1945, there has not been another World War IItype conflict. U.S. military forces developed war plans,
trained, and designed equipment for such a situation
for decades during the Cold War and continuing up
to today, but we have never used them. The only wars
this nation has waged since 1945 have been conflicts
against regional powers that had global implications,
but are nowhere near the magnitude of the events of
1941 to 1945. These recent conflicts are hardly comparable to World War II in terms of the scope, stakes,
and demands placed on the U.S. military, the economy, and the population. Thus, does yet another study
on World War II have any relevance, or is it merely an
interesting “fun” read for history buffs or students of
past military operations?
The authors contend that despite the passage of
time and the absence of major worldwide conflicts
comparable to World War II, additional studies of this
momentous war still have relevance, particularly to a
student of military affairs and strategy. For example,
World War II is a classic example of nations developing well-formulated goals, objectives, and strategies
1

to achieve those objectives. More importantly, World
War II illustrated how great powers adapted to a
changing strategic environment. Formulating America’s objectives and developing strategies to achieve
them was a formidable task for a nation that had spent
the interwar period wrapped in a shroud of isolation
and economic desolation. Faced by multiple majorpower adversaries, the nation’s leadership had a difficult task in preparing for war. The primary concern
for American politicians was domestic politics. In this
regard, World War II offers many significant insights
not only for today’s leaders, but for those in the future.
Even evaluating World War II military strategy
is a formidable task, at least without some type of
analytical framework. One framework to analyze the
strategy of that period is to use a simple model formulated by Colonel (Ret) Arthur F. Lykke, Jr. Lykke is a
former U.S. Army War College faculty member who
believed that military strategy should include three
main elements: ends, ways, and means.1 Each element
of this model affected the other two. Lykke illustrated
his approach by using a three-legged stool with each
leg representing an element, either the ends, ways, or
means. The challenge for a strategist is to keep these
three legs in equilibrium so that the stool will sit upright. The three-legged stool, like a strategy, should
be balanced. Two factors influence the end or strategic
objectives for a nation: ways, or courses of action; and
the means or the resources like people, funds, and materials. For example, a dearth of means could alter the
ways a nation could use its military and may cause the
ends of the strategy to be at risk. Without the necessary balance between the elements (or legs), military
strategy, like the stool in Lykke's illustration, could
become unbalanced and possibly fail.

2

World War II provides an excellent example of
a time when this nation had clear-cut ends (goals or
objectives) and the means, financial and industrial, to
achieve those objectives. The strategy, the way to accomplish those goals, through the exercise of military
power in the Western European Campaign was excellent. The path to achieving the goals was not without
problems, but fortunately for Allied military leaders,
the ends remained essentially unchanged from the
start to the finish of the conflict. The ultimate objective — the unconditional surrender of Germany—was
inherent in Allied planning. Events did force the national and military leadership to adjust the ways and
means throughout the war. At the onset of American
participation in the war, one of Washington’s means,
the industrial capacity to produce war materials, was
hardly adequate. However, once mobilized, American
industry proved capable of supplying the needs of its
military and assisting the Commonwealth Nations,
the Soviet Union, the Free French, and other Allies.
German actions and Allied interests affected the ends
and ways of American military policy. Thus, British
interests in the Mediterranean and other areas affected strategy, as did the goals and priorities of the
Soviet Union.
Examining how the United States created a strategic plan that focused first on defeating Germany and
then Japan provides a lucid example for the many issues that face national leaders today and will so in the
foreseeable future. Assessments and reevaluations of
a nation’s interests, the changing strategies of an opponent, the impact of senior leaders—both friendly
and enemy—and other factors forced the Allied nations to alter their military strategies throughout the
European Campaign.

3

World War II also provides classic lessons in the
art of leadership at the tactical, operational, and the
strategic levels. Consider, for example, the monumental tasks of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Commander General Dwight D. “Ike”
Eisenhower as he attempted to lead the multinational
alliance during the European Campaign. Today’s military leaders emphasize the necessity, in present and
future wars, of building coalitions and going to war
with allies instead of as a unilateral power. If one can
find lessons on how to wage war by studying military
history, then it would be difficult to find a better example of when multinational allies, bound by a common cause, successfully waged war against a very capable aggressor than during World War II in Europe.
Each alliance member had its own national interests
and possessed its own agenda, though all were united
in their dedication to the defeat Nazi Germany.
Complicating Ike’s task was the added problem
of personalities that were frequently in conflict. Commanding a large military organization and addressing
the opinions and interests of many significant personalities is still a critical skill for today’s leaders as
they wage alliance and coalition warfare. Eisenhower
had to address the differing priorities and often meddling of Prime Minister Winston Churchill, he had to
consider the demands of General Charles De Gaulle,
and he had to satisfy the requirements given to him by
General George C. Marshall and President Franklin D.
Roosevelt. Adding to the challenges of working with
the senior leadership, Ike had to address the challenges presented by difficult subordinates within his
own command like British Field Marshal Sir Bernard
Law Montgomery and U.S. General George S. Patton,
Jr. He also had to contend with inept leaders such as
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General J. C. H. Lee; Eisenhower wanted to relieve
him but could not, due to political considerations.
While Eisenhower had to overcome some obstacles, he also had a major advantage. The Allied
Combined Chiefs of Staff provided Eisenhower a
clear, unequivocal understanding of President Roosevelt’s priorities. Eisenhower held a key advantage
that many post-World War II leaders have not had; he
possessed a crystal-clear, unwavering mission statement, a focused end state, which remained unaltered
throughout the war. The Combined Chiefs of Staff issued the following directive to Eisenhower:
You will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake
operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces. The date for entering the
Continent is the month of May 1944. After adequate
Channel ports have been secured, exploitation will be
directed towards securing an area that will facilitate
both ground and air operations against the enemy.2

The consistency of this mission statement is in
stark contrast to the situation that future military
commanders faced in the soon to follow Korean and
Vietnam Wars. In Korea, the end state changed several times due to General Douglas MacArthur’s own
plans that developed in the euphoria of victory, with
the acquiescence of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and
the President. Then, the ground realities changed, MacArthur was relieved, and the President and the Combined Chiefs changed and re-changed the desired end
state. Military leaders faced more confusion in Vietnam with convoluted and contradictory missions and
objectives. A more recent example of this problem was
the vacillating definition of the end state to the first
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Persian Gulf War in 1991. The United States and its coalition partners set an initial goal of forcibly removing
Iraqi forces from Kuwait, and then flirted with the defeat of Iraq and the removal of Saddam Hussein. They
later returned to the initially agreed coalition goals.
The unequivocal mission statement and the consistent
end state provided Eisenhower with a luxury that
many commanders, since that time, have envied.
Since the task was clear, the question was what
type of campaign did the nation intend to fight in
pursuit of its goals? With the end state clearly enunciated, was a logical strategy developed to achieve it?
Were the means sufficient to meet the strategy? Prior
to America’s entry into the war, some students of military strategy and operations throughout the U.S. Army
proposed to engage in mobile offensive operations or
open warfare. American industry helped make this
type of warfare possible by producing large quantities
of dependable trucks, small arms, general-purpose
vehicles, aircraft, tanks, food, and other equipment
that was ultimately used by many Allied countries to
successfully win the European Campaign.3 Because
Americans were innovative, aggressive, and selfreliant, such an approach seemed to be the type of
warfare in which the U.S. Army would excel.4 After
the U.S. entry into the war, the quality and quantity
of equipment and supplies that were produced gave
the Western Allies the potential to function as a highly
mobile force. Did the Army incorporate this significant advantage appropriately? Did the United States
fight as a Blitzkrieg army across France, or did Washington fail to digest the concepts promoted by J. F. C.
Fuller and B. H. Liddell Hart?
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The Western Allies, especially the United States,
fought this campaign with the best-supplied military
force in World War II. American industry also facilitated control of the air by fielding the P-47 and P-51.
These two superb aircraft surpassed the Luftwaffe’s aging air fleet in quality and quantity.5 Dominance in the
air permitted the Army to wage combined operations
with sound cooperation between air and ground assets. This command of the air and dominance over the
necessary sea-lanes also allowed American military
forces to have sufficient logistical capability to conduct a modern war.6
What did this mean for the actual conduct of the
war? The highly respected historian, Martin Blumenson, in an article published in Parameters, questioned
the conduct of the European Campaign. Blumenson
notes that:
Surprisingly, the top Allied echelons only occasionally attempted to knock out the enemy. The basic Allied motive was, instead, geographical and territorial.
The intention was to overrun land and liberate towns.
In which direction were the Allies going? Toward the
enemy homelands, specifically, the capitals. Seizing
these cities, the Allies believed, was sure to win the
war.7

Blumenson is not alone in his criticisms. Williamson Murray and Allan Millet also note in their recent
study of World War II that there was:
. . . a general lack of preparation for War [in the Allied
armies] at the operational level. Throughout much of
1944, Allied generals focused on the immediate tactical problems of landing and buildup, without paying
attention to longer-range operational possibilities.
When Allied armies broke out in early August, senior

7

commanders had failed to think through the possibilities offered by a breakout.8

In fact, a recent generation of military historians
has called to question many decisions involving many
operations conducted in the European Campaign. For
example, these historians have focused on the operations that were conducted after the successful June 6,
1944, Normandy landings. A student of history might
wonder what the true purposes of some of these operations were. The tasking provided by the Combined
Chiefs of Staff directed a campaign that was aimed at
“the heart of Germany” and secondly, “the destruction of her (German) Armed forces,” but British and
American commanders all too often focused their
attention on the Rhine River, Berlin, or some other
geographical objective other than the destruction of
fielded German forces. 9 Unfortunately, examples of
this type of problem are all to numerous throughout
the campaign. General Omar Bradley exhibited far too
little drive to destroy the elite German forces following the Mortain offensive, until it was almost too late.
British General Brian Horrocks, commander of Montgomery’s XXXth Corps, failed to destroy the trapped
German XVth Army or secure the important terrain
leading to Antwerp, Belgium. He simply explained in
his memoirs, “my excuse is that my eyes were fixed
entirely on the Rhine, and everything else seemed to
be of subsidiary importance.”10 Horrock’s British forces had the opportunity to capture or kill over 80,000
Germans, but his focus on geography blinded him to
this opportunity. By far the best, or worst, example
for an American infantryman was the Hürtgen Forest.
American field commanders concentrated on taking
an insignificant and unnecessary piece of terrain that
overshadowed the destruction of the deployed German forces in the area.
8

These instances have caused historians like Blumenson and Murray to bemoan the failure of Allied
leaders to understand operational thinking and to
pursue operational type objectives. Some would say
that the criticism of the Allied leadership for failing
to understand operational warfare decades before
it began to emerge in American military doctrine is
unfair. On the other hand, the authors of this volume
contend that a key strategic objective reflects an ageold principle of war: to conduct operations aimed at
destroying the enemy’s military forces. Operational
thinking is merely a more efficient method of accomplishing this goal. In the European Campaign, all too
often British and American commanders aimed operations at achieving tactical or geographical benchmarks rather than focusing on enemy formations and
the enemy's ability to conduct military operations.
This focus caused the European Campaign, in the eyes
of several modern analysts, to appear like a series of
tactical events that were merely milestones on the
road to Germany’s heartland and victory. Certainly,
geographical objectives have relevance in military
operations, but one needs to question the wisdom of
making geographic or other superficial goals more of
a priority than the destruction of the ability of enemy
field forces to conduct war.
Questions about operations and the implementation of military strategy have caused critics of World
War II to focus on the issue of senior leadership. How
well did our senior leaders in the field do in pursuit of
their assigned mission, the end state? For this volume,
we focus on the Supreme Commander, Allied Forces
in Europe, and his immediate subordinate commanders. Obviously, these leaders won the war, but did
they undertake operations that quickly and efficiently
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accomplished the mission assigned by the Combined
Chiefs of Staff? Did the United States win the war by
swamping the Third Reich with a flood of materials,
superior strategy, or better leadership? Did the American military establishment still have much to learn
about waging modern war?
Thus, another look at the European Campaign is
relevant. Today, students of military history, as well
as military leaders, must reflect on how strategy was
developed, how a joint and combined campaign was
designed, how it was fought, the strengths and failings of the leaders, and the lessons that can be learned
from such a study by contemporary students of military history, and practitioners of the art of war.
ENDNOTES - INTRODUCTION
1. Arthur F Lykke Jr., “Toward an Understanding of Military
Strategy,” in U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy, Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb, Jr., eds., Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2001, p. 179. While Lykke is
credited with this approach, he noted in his writings that the idea
for ends, ways, and means originated from comments by General
Maxwell D. Taylor, during the latter’s visit to the Army War College in 1981.
2. “Directive to Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary
Force, issued 12 February 1944,” Report by The Supreme Commander
to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on Operations in Europe of the Allied
Expeditionary Force: 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945, Washington, DC:
Center of Military History, 1994, p. v. See Appendix II for the
complete directive.
3. This requires a caveat. The American M4 Sherman Tank
was not the best-fielded tank. It was undergunned, had insufficient armor, and used a gasoline power plant rather than diesel.
Nonetheless, it was dependable, much like the jeep and the twoand-a-half-ton truck. Additionally, this fighting vehicle was made
in vast quantities that far surpassed German tank production.
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4. Dennis Showalter, Patton and Rommel: Men of War in the
Twentieth Century, New York: The Berkley Publishing Group,
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accelerated the gain of nearly complete air superiority.
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Bridge Too Far, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1974, p. 61.
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CHAPTER 1
THE EUROPEAN CAMPAIGN:
ORIGINS
Before long I rediscovered the obvious: a journey can be
charted only with a destination in mind, and strategy can
be plotted only with goals or aims in mind.1
		

Albert Wedemeyer

Casual readers of military history often assume that
the U.S. Government approached World War II with a
set of clear and unambiguous objectives and that U.S.
national and military leaders had set a clear course
for victory. This is essentially true, but the paths that
led from neutrality to Western Alliance leadership
and the decision to wage a military campaign in Europe were not simple ones. One must understand the
planning processes and the national priorities of the
United States from the early part of the 20th century to
understand the European Campaign’s origin and how
the United States and Great Britain selected Europe as
the priority for the Allied exercise of military power.
The planning for joint military activities for possible wars had been part of America’s military tradition since 1903. Secretary of War Elihu Root had established several reforms; one was a joint Army and
Navy Planning Board.2 This board relied for help on
several organizations, to include students at the Army
and Navy War Colleges. The students and faculty
received practical problems that the General Staff of
the Army and the General Board of the Navy would
review, and if these two entities agreed, the Secretary
of War and the Secretary of the Navy were given the
plans for the two armed services to approve.3 This
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planning process continued through the early part of
the 20th century and was still in place on the eve of
World War II. The process was not without its problems. For example, on occasion military planners
sought advice and consultation with the State Department. Military planners sought needed information
on national policy in various regions of the world to
improve their planning. When planners requested
guidance and cooperation from the State Department,
these officers received little, if any, help. The State Department did not welcome military interest in national
policy, and they regarded such inquiries as unwanted
military interference into a civilian domain.4
Some U.S. planning was an exercise assigned as
part of the studies by students at the two war colleges. The students did not draft the plans in isolation.
For example, there was a close relationship between
the Army War College War Plans Department and
the Army’s War Plans Division. In the words of Dr.
Henry Gole, formerly a faculty member at the Army
War College, “Relations between the Army War College and the General Staff from 1919 to 1940 were
very close, with the War College enjoying the best of
two worlds.”5 The advantage of using War College
students in this fashion, as compared to plans developed by the Army War Plans Division, was that the
students could develop plans and concepts that were
original or totally “out of the box” rather than following specific concepts or scenarios outlined by senior
commanders. In short, plans developed by Army War
College students were unrestrained and original. The
War Plans Division received original “think pieces.”
Due to the high level of coordination, it should come
as no surprise that the planning process of the two
groups and their concepts had many similarities.6 In
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the early part of the 20th century, the United States developed a series of color-coded plans, the most famous
of which was War Plan Orange, which postulated war
with Japan in the Pacific.7 The Navy repeatedly used
Orange as a key element in its planning and in its war
gaming. The Army also factored Orange into its plans,
although without the same conviction since it was a
naval centric plan.
Even though the concept of joint planning and
joint operations seems to be a recent development to
today’s military culture, emerging as it did with the
1986 passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Joint
Army and Navy Planning Board was very active, particularly in the post-World War I period. In 1919, the
Army and Navy formed a planning committee to assist the Joint Army and Navy Planning Board with its
work. This committee consisted of eight officers, four
from the Army War Plans Division and four from the
Navy. This committee served as the working group
for the Joint Army and Navy Planning Board. The
committee and the board, to whom it was responsible,
worked on post-World War I plans with particular
attention to the possibility of war with Japan—a scenario that seemed the most likely in the 1920s—and
other potential conflicts.
In these planning sessions, Navy leaders tended
to be the most consistent, certain that the threat facing the nation was a maritime power like Japan. Their
angst over Japanese capabilities had begun to grow
in the wake of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05.
The U.S. Navy warily watched the growing military
power of the Japanese nation. Many naval officers
regarded Japan’s growing potential and intentions
with misgivings.8 The U.S. Navy's anxiety over Japan
did not diminish during the interwar years, but only
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heightened after the 1922 Washington Naval Conference that recognized Japan as a major naval power.
When the conference attendees agreed on the capital
ship building ratios, Japan ranked third, trailing only
the United States and Great Britain, the top global
maritime powers. This caused the U.S. Navy considerable concern, but diplomats brushed their objections
aside. Additionally, the post-war League of Nations
mandates that placed the former Imperial German
Pacific colonies of the Carolines, Marianas, and the
Marshall Islands under Japanese control, created even
more concern for U.S. war planners. This action made
Tokyo more powerful by giving it additional naval
bases in the Pacific.9
Some of the other plans developed from 1903
through the early 1920s were European centered,
while additional plans concerned the Western Hemisphere. By today’s standards, some seem curious
since they did not appear to focus on the most likely
aggressors.10 For example, although the United States
had regarded Britain as a potential aggressor against
the United States through most of the 19th century,
by the time of World War I, Britain no longer seemed
to be a serious threat. Nonetheless, military planners
working during the interwar period created War Plan
Red for a possible war with Britain and War Plan
Crimson for a war against Canada. Because of the porous southern border, War Plan Green was developed
for a potential war with Mexico as well as hyphenated plans like Black-Green, should Germany ally
with Mexico (like the Zimmerman telegram of World
War I advocated) and Black-Red, should the British
and Germans conclude an alliance that threatened
America. U.S. war planners assumed that the United
States would wage war independently rather than as a
member of an alliance. As the planners continued their
16

tasks, three likely scenarios emerged. First, situations
could develop in Latin America that would cause the
United States to go to war with its southern neighbors.
Second, a contingency could erupt somewhere on the
shores of the Atlantic that would result in American
military intervention. Third, the Japanese might make
an aggressive move against American interests in the
Pacific, resulting in a conflict there.
Through the first half of the 20th century, the German threat to the United States was a mercurial affair,
but the potential for Germany to threaten American
interests either through military, political, or economic means was often evident to both services. From the
1890s until 1918, the newly unified Germany had posed
a major threat to the United States due to its powerful
fleet and its large and well-trained army. Berlin’s aspirations in the Pacific, and particularly its meddling in
the politics of Latin America, underscored the threat to
American interests. At the conclusion of World War I,
the German threat receded since that nation lost most
of its armed forces through the Versailles Treaty. The
Imperial German Navy had become virtually nonexistent due to Versailles and the act of defiance by the
German naval personnel at Scapa Flow. In 1918, with
Germany no longer a threat, the focus of navy planning returned to a growing rival, Japan.
In short, while the United States had engaged in
joint war planning since the early part of the 20th century, there remained many issues on the eve of World
War II left to be resolved, despite the years of work
on the “color” plans. One of the most significant issues was the different service perceptions concerning
which nation posed the greatest threat to the United

17

States.11 As late as 1937, service interests and priorities
continued to cause fissures in the process. From 1937
to 1938, the Navy maintained a concentrated focus on
the Pacific and the danger posed there to American
economic interests by the Japanese Empire. This was a
logical concern for the U.S. Navy due to the size of the
Japanese Navy and that the United States did not have
sufficient military or naval forces to protect its Pacific
interests and its lines of communication.
Conversely, the emergence in 1933 of a bellicose
Third Reich under Adolf Hitler’s leadership, which
constituted the emergence of an accomplished land
power, caused the U.S. Army considerable concern.
Germany was primarily a land power. Army planners
tended to focus more on Europe and the defense of
the Western Hemisphere from any European-based
threat. The different opinions on the threat held by the
two services—whether the armed services should be
prepared to defend the nation and the Western Hemisphere from a European-based threat or undertake a
major campaign to defeat an enemy in the Western Pacific—were not easily resolvable. The inability of the
services to agree caused the Army and Navy members
of the Joint Planning Board to submit separate reports
in 1937.
The Navy consistently favored War Plan Orange.
This plan postulated war in the Pacific resulting from
the Japanese threat to American interests in China and
the Philippines. Naval strategists revised this plan in
1938 as the Japanese overran coastal China causing a
further deterioration of the world situation.12 The Joint
Planning Board, taking a cue from statements issued
by both Secretary of State Cordell Hull and President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, directed its planning committee to develop a plan that would be based on the
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United States working in concert with allies to fight a
two-ocean war against an enemy alliance.13
While joint planning was significant in shaping attitudes toward a future war, and where and how to
fight it, Roosevelt’s concern about the world situation
began to have more impact after 1937. This concern
was increasingly obvious in the latter part of 1938.
In a meeting held in the White House on November
14, 1938, Roosevelt stressed the necessity of expanding defense production. Of particular significance, he
stressed the need for more aircraft not only to supply
the necessary airplanes to defend the United States,
but to aid friendly powers against fascist aggression.14
This November 1938 guidance was forward-looking
because at that time, Germany, Italy, and Japan had
not consummated their Tripartite Alliance nor had the
German/Soviet Non-aggression pact been created.15 It
seems likely that even though the President was becoming increasingly concerned about the deteriorating world situation, the concept of expanding aircraft
production may have resulted from a meeting between the President and then Ambassador to France
William C. Bullit on October 13, 1938.16
As crises continued to occur with increasing
regularity, the Joint Planning Committee worked to
complete its most current report, which was ready
in April 1939. The committee assessed the likelihood
of war and analyzed potential threats to American
interests in both Europe and Asia. In many respects,
the most significant part of their product was that the
United States would wage war as a member of a coalition, fighting a totalitarian alliance or coalition.17 This
meant that by 1939, a distinct change in American policy was emerging since, in the years following the end
of World War I, Washington had distanced itself from
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any involvement in world affairs that might cause it
to exercise military power in support of any alliance
or coalition. Involvement in European squabbles, for
example 1917, was regarded as a mistake by many
American citizens. Equally significant, a substantial
number of the nation’s congressional representatives
were determined that American boys would never
again shed their blood for foreign interests or for the
war profits of American corporations. Granted, the
plans emerging in 1938-39 did not reflect a shift in
popular sentiment, but they did indicate the recognition that in a future war, the United States simply
could not go in alone.
As planners proceeded toward the now famous
Rainbow Plans in mid-1939, they agreed on the following assumptions:
1. Germany and Italy would take overt action in the
Western Hemisphere only if Great Britain and France
remained neutral or were defeated.
2. Japan would continue to expand into China and
Southeast Asia at the expense of Great Britain and the
United States, by peaceful means if possible, but by
force if necessary.
3. The three Axis powers would act together whenever the international situation seemed favorable. If
other countries, including the United States, reacted
promptly and vigorously to such action, then a general war might well follow.18

Planners used these assumptions to create five
plans, the Rainbow Plans, that would dominate prewar planning. They were far more focused, compared
to the previous color plans, because all were based on
the assumption that the United States would be faced
by aggression from Germany, Italy, or Japan in concert or as allies. These plans included:
20

1. Rainbow 1 assumed that the United States would
be at war without major allies. United States forces
would act jointly to prevent the violation of the Monroe Doctrine by protecting the territory of the Western
Hemisphere north of 10 degrees south latitude, from
which the vital interests of the United States might be
threatened.
2. Rainbow 2 assumed that the United States, Great
Britain, and France would be acting in concert, with
limited participation of American forces in continental
Europe and in the Atlantic. The United States could
undertake immediate offensive operations across the
Pacific to sustain the interests of democratic powers by
the defeat of enemy forces.
3. Rainbow 3 assumed the United States to be at war
without major allies. Hemispheric defense was to be
assured, as in Rainbow 1, but with early projection of
American forces from Hawaii to the western Pacific.
4. Rainbow 4 assumed the United States was to be at
war without major allies, employing its forces in defense of the whole of the Western Hemisphere, but also
with provision for the United States to send forces to
the southern portion of South America and to be used
in joint operations in eastern Atlantic areas. A strategic
defensive, as in Rainbow 1, was to be maintained in
the Pacific, until the situation in the Atlantic permitted
transfer of major naval forces for an offensive against
Japan.
5. Rainbow 5 assumed the United States, Great Britain,
and France to be acting in concert; hemisphere defense
was to be assured as in Rainbow 1 with early projection of American forces to the eastern Atlantic, and to
either or both the African and European Continents;
offensive operations were to be conducted, in concert
with British and allied forces, to affect the defeat of
Germany and Italy. A strategic defensive was to be
maintained in the Pacific until success against the European Axis powers permitted transfer of major forces
to the Pacific for an offensive against Japan. 19
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As the world situation continued to degenerate
from 1938 to 1939, it seemed that the United States
might have to execute either Rainbow 2 or 3. In the
end, even the casual reader can see that the United
States would ultimately base its response on the concepts included in Rainbow 5.
The prewar planning accomplished by the various
military entities seemed necessary, given the deteriorating world situation. In the last half of the 1930s,
the Japanese showed no tendency to cease their aggression in Asia. In Europe, Hitler had cast aside the
military restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles. Germany had remilitarized the Rhineland and by 1938
had taken both Czechoslovakia and Austria. Italy, a
junior though active participant in aggression, further
disturbed world peace by engaging in its own ventures beginning with the 1935 invasion of Ethiopia.
War had raged in Asia throughout the 1930s, and it
seemed likely that war would soon erupt in Europe.
Despite the world situation and the various plans
that called for a U.S. response to threats against its interests, the mood in the Washington remained clearly isolationistic. America’s eyes were focused elsewhere—
directly centered on domestic issues. Wall Street fell
on hard times during the October 1929 stock crash
that ushered in the Great Depression. The economic
crisis spread to Main Street and, by the 1936 general
election, employment and economic productivity had
still not returned to its pre-1929 figures, which meant
that domestic issues remained primary in the public’s mind. The President, while not oblivious to the
international situation, faced a nation in the midst of a
major economic crisis and that had an aversion to involvement in foreign wars. Its elected representatives
in both houses of Congress shared this aversion. The
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fact that neutrality was important to the nation and to
its elected representatives was evident by the passage
of the Neutrality Acts of 1935 and 1937.20 American
public attitudes were also evident through the lack
of military preparedness. Consider, for example, the
U.S. Army: In mid-1939, General George Marshall
estimated the Army’s strength at 170,000 adequately
armed and equipped Soldiers plus two mechanized
regiments. The U.S. Army Air Corps consisted of 56
squadrons.21 The military establishments of Germany,
Japan, and the Soviet Union overshadowed American
military forces on land and in the air. Still, with the
mood of the nation in the 1930s opposed to entanglements in overseas affairs, it did not seem likely that an
expansion of the military services would occur anytime soon.
In 1939 however, the international landscape began to change rapidly. On September 1, 1939, the
Germans launched their surprise attack on Poland.
After a brief interlude that was termed Sitzkrieg, or
the “phony war,” the Germans launched offensives
against Denmark, Norway, the Low Countries, and
France in the spring of 1940.22 In particular, the attack
on France, its subsequent fall, and the imminent threat
to the British Isles changed the strategic landscape.
While U.S. planners worked on the Rainbow plans,
they explored the concept that the nation would fight
future conflicts with American military forces being
a part of an alliance. In Rainbow plans 2 and 5, the
United States joined France and Britain, a familiar
scenario comparable to America’s entry into world affairs in 1917-18, but the events of May to June 1940
meant that France, existing only as a rump state, was
no longer a viable ally against the totalitarian powers.
In the spring of 1940, it had become a victim of Ger-
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man aggression, and what was left of that once proud
nation was the puppet state of Vichy France. Thus, by
the end of June, totalitarian leaders of Germany, Italy,
and Spain controlled Western Europe. Great Britain,
Hitler’s next obvious target, was also in danger of falling to the Nazi juggernaut.
Considering the spread of totalitarian rule throughout Western Europe in the last half of 1940 and subsequent events in 1941, planners feverishly worked to
address the new situation resulting from German successes in Europe. Two possible threatening scenarios
confronted military planners. First, there was a potential threat from Latin America. Throughout the joint
planning that was conducted in the early part of the
20th century, planners had considered threats posed
to the United States from unfriendly governments
and powers in Latin America. A potential foe intruding into America’s “backyard” had not been a serious
problem since the Civil War period when France, under Louis Napoleon, had installed a potentially threatening government in Mexico. A threat emanating from
Mexico was again an issue in 1914 and in 1916 when
the United States felt obligated to intervene, militarily, in Mexican affairs.23 In 1940, the possibility of a
threat from the south emerged, because it was feared
that German agents, who were in fact active in Latin
America, might make substantial inroads in that area.
Thus, a situation could result where unfriendly governments, supported by totalitarian countries, would
emerge on America’s southern border.
The second and equally threatening scenario concerned a possible increase in German naval power.
With France’s defeat, the question remained, what
would happen to that nation’s navy? The Vichy government controlled the French Navy, and that government hardly demonstrated that it was a neutral na24

tion. Thus, even though the German Navy in terms
of surface ships was in its infancy, if augmented with
French ships it could pose a serious threat to freedom
of navigation in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean.
Worse yet, the Italian fleet could support the German
and French ships, making a serious threat to freedom
on the seas.
American planners in general, and Navy planners
in particular, had long looked at Japan and the Pacific
as the area where the greatest potential threat to American interests existed. The expansion of the Japanese
Navy and the consistent pattern of Tokyo’s aggression
in China throughout the 1930s fed this perception. The
fall of Western Europe to German domination caused
an abrupt shift in American threat perception by the
national leadership since, in a period of weeks, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, and
France were conquered in lightning-like succession.
Given the situation of a beleaguered Britain, American military planners considered the possibility that
Britain too might fall, and that the United States could
face a Europe totally controlled by totalitarian powers. Due to the lack of American military power when
Germany attacked France, American policymakers
recognized that the United States could not prevent
the German occupation of France. Worse yet, it was
theorized that if the Germans attacked the British Isles
with their combined forces and, if U.S. forces entered
the war, any U.S. effort at that time would be insufficient to prevent the defeat and occupation of the British Isles.
In many respects, the German failure to establish
aerial superiority over the British Isles and to launch
Operation SEALION in August-September 1940 provided the United States a respite, an opportunity, to
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prepare both in terms of policy and militarily for any
future aggressions. This was extremely important
because even though Army and Navy planners had
been working on war plans and strategies for several
decades, such plans were strictly from the military
perspective and were not the priority of the American
populace or, for that matter, its elective representatives. Events beginning with Poland in 1939, and later
in Western Europe, had gotten the American public’s
attention, but this did not translate to an acceptance
for the entry into another conflict in Europe. As Europe and Asia went to war, many Americans and
their elected representatives continued to believe that
America was merely a regional power whose attention had to be focused on events at home and in its
sphere of influence, the Western Hemisphere.
In 1940, however, several things occurred that reflected America’s growing concern over world events,
particularly Hitler’s aggression in Europe. On September 16, 1940, the Burke-Wadsworth Bill was passed in
Congress, the first peacetime conscription in American
history. This followed another joint resolution passed
by Congress on August 27 that activated the National
Guard and the Reserves for 1 year of training. This did
not mean that the United States was actively preparing
for war against the Third Reich or the Japanese Empire; it meant that the mood of the nation had shifted
from neutrality to armed neutrality.24 The American
populace accepted expansion of its military, given the
worsening world situation. Planning for hypothetical
wars had been, up until this point, largely formed by
military minds. In the late 1930s, as the world situation continued to deteriorate, the changing plans and
priorities of President Roosevelt began to emerge.
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From 1932 until 1938, Roosevelt’s attention centered on domestic issues, specifically how to lead
the nation out of the Great Depression and restore
America’s economic vitality. Roosevelt watched with
great concern as the prospects for global peace evaporated under a steady stream of totalitarian aggression.
However, the President was not anxious to lead the
country into another foreign war in either Europe or
Asia. Even if he had been so inclined, he faced a Congress led by a large neutrality faction that was determined to keep the country out of war. Nonetheless,
by 1938 Roosevelt had begun laying plans to assist
nations that were victims of fascist aggression. At the
same time, he avoided unduly alarming elements in
Congress and in the population as a whole that were
wary of any type of U.S. involvement in foreign wars.
Thus in 1938, Roosevelt began turning his attention increasingly to international affairs and defense because
he believed that the United States was a global power
with worldwide responsibilities.25
Given the President’s interest or intent as described above, and the aggression that occurred between 1939 and 1940, the United States was obliged to
reconsider its prewar planning. The color-coded and
the Rainbow plans had allowed members of several
Army War College classes and officers assigned to the
War Plans Division to consider what the basic priorities would be in the event of war. The plans however,
were skeletal ones and provided only basic information for waging a war. Several military boards and
committees had identified potential enemies and estimated general priorities. Planners did not compute
or analyze the force composition, the necessary industrial output, and the sacrifices that the nation might
have to endure for a future conflict. Future military
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staff planning would have to create detailed plans before the United States would go to war. By 1940, the
War Plans Division could no longer depend on the
assistance of Army War College staff groups to assist
them; the school had been closed that same year and
its personnel reassigned, actions that indicated the
gravity of the situation.
By 1940, the expanding pattern of fascist aggression continued to force the President’s attention on
matters of national security and the commitment of
materials to those countries fighting fascism. Perhaps
the most significant factor was the recognition by the
President and his key advisors that the nation might
once again be pulled into a war as a part of an alliance, a decided change in the government’s position,
given the post-World War I attitudes toward alliance warfare.26 Roosevelt indicated his administration’s support for America’s former allies by a plan
for expanding military aircraft production. As early
as November 14, 1938, the President announced his
desire to build 20,000 aircraft, some of which would
be available to Britain and France.27 In the fall of 1940,
the United States Government traded 50 surplus and
obsolete destroyers to the British for naval bases in
Newfoundland, the Bahamas, Bermuda, British Guiana, Antigua, Trinidad, St. Lucia, and Jamaica. This
was hardly a neutral act, a fact recognized by both the
American public and the Axis governments.28 Later,
in March 1941, Roosevelt signed the Lend-Lease Act,
which pledged American materials to “any country
whose defense the President deems vital to the security of the U.S.”29 Increasingly tying the defense of the
United States to the continuance of Great Britain as a
free and independent nation added another element
to the planning processes.
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Working with the British in defense matters was
an increasingly important policy from 1938 to 1940,
but the American public did not share Roosevelt’s
concerns. While Rainbow Plans 2 and 5 had proposed
fighting a war as part of an alliance with Britain and
France, the public’s attitude toward participating in a
foreign war as a member of an alliance made such a
concept a future possibility rather than a realistic plan.
Simply, Rainbow Plans 2 and 5 did not reflect the public sentiment, neither did the President’s drift from
neutrality. Still, American intentions, at least within
the government, became very clear when Roosevelt’s
Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, met with the two
service chiefs, General George C. Marshall and Admiral Harold R. Stark, along with Secretary of the Navy
Frank Knox on December 16, 1940. The consensus at
that meeting was that eventually the United States
would enter into the war.
With a future war increasingly viewed as a coalition or alliance operation, planning and coordination
with the British entered a serious phase in late spring
1940. The fall of France and the Low Countries made
Britain the next likely target for German aggression.
Despite its Pacific focus, the U.S. Navy was an early
participant in alliance oriented planning. As early as
December 1937, the Navy staff began discussions with
their British counterparts regarding the new construction of naval vessels. They also discussed what type
of cooperation with other nations might be possible
in the Pacific in the event of a war with the Japanese.30
U.S. Navy senior officers continued their contacts
with their British peers into early 1938, with the January meetings referred to as the Anglo-American Naval
conversations.
From this point forward, even predating the crises of 1939-40, American and British officers met and
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shared thoughts on future military demands.31 The
U.S. Navy’s leadership also began moving toward
an increased emphasis on European affairs, given the
seriousness of the German threat to Britain. A clear
proposal for what American plans should be regarding British-American cooperation was drafted in a
memorandum by Chief of Naval Operations Admiral
Harold R. Stark on November 4, 1940 (and revised November 12). Stark proposed several courses of action.
He preferred a plan that the United States, in concert
with Britain, undertake a strong offensive in the Atlantic, while at the same time be on the defensive in
the Pacific.32 The realization, at least within the American government, that the country was rapidly drifting
toward war became very clear during the previously
mentioned December 16, 1940, meeting. Stimson,
Marshal, Stark, and Knox increasingly believed that
eventually the United States would be drawn into the
war. It was much easier to recognize the drift toward
war as soon as the election of 1940 was over and the
issue of American participation in a foreign war was
less sensitive for the political leadership.
American and British delegates also discussed
military cooperation in London during August and
September 1940 at the Anglo-American Standardization Committee meetings. Even more significant were
the American British Staff Conversations (ABC) held
between January and March 1941. Officials from the
two countries agreed that: (1) Germany was the main
adversary; (2) in the event of American participation
in the war, a coalition between the two nations would
focus efforts on that principal enemy with the ultimate
goal, the unconditional surrender of Germany; and (3)
it was agreed that if a two-front war was to develop,
the United States would contain the Japanese until
the principle enemy, Nazi Germany, was defeated.33
30

As noted by one writer, however, the British strategy emphasized the use of sea and air power rather
than directly engaging the enemy with large ground
forces. Such an approach—an indirect or peripheral
approach—was an attritional effort to wear down the
enemy’s strength, which would mean a longer war.
The American strategy, while it included both air and
sea power, promoted massing the material strength
of the nation and more rapidly employing substantial
ground forces to win the war as quickly as possible.34
These priorities were established not so much because the Germans or their regime were regarded as
the most odious; rather, it was because a key element
of Roosevelt’s policies was the survival of a free and
independent Great Britain. The greatest threat to Britain was clearly Nazi Germany. Even if viewed solely
from the standpoint of American interests, Britain’s
survival was vital. If the United States was to wage
war against Germany, then the best platform from
which American military forces could project power
was the British Isles. Britain was a power projection
platform that Washington could not do without for
either an amphibious invasion of the continent or an
aerial offensive against the German heartland. Additionally, one of the key elements in maintaining the
freedom of navigation in the Atlantic was the continued existence of the British fleet. If Great Britain were
to fall under the heel of German aggression, the Atlantic would become a dangerous area where Berlin
could interdict American shipping or strike targets in
the Western Hemisphere. Britain, already at war with
Germany, was clearly the next target for German aggression. Finally, the Caribbean and Latin America
were key long-term American interests. The threat to
this region came from Germany, not Japan.

31

The growing crises prompted an even closer look
at America’s military forces. Perhaps no one in uniform was more cognizant of the problems facing the
military services than George Marshall. The first issue
facing Marshall was serious, not hypothetical, war
plans. Army officers had created student-authored
papers, staff generated think pieces, and other works
throughout the 1920s and 1930s, but they were not
fully developed war plans for the nation’s immediate
use. As noted by Charles Kirkpatrick, even the current
Rainbow Plans “were actually contingencies that allowed the U.S. to respond to foreign aggression and
then to react purely in a military way.”35 Although the
nation’s military leadership had created a series of notional plans for a number of different possibilities for a
future war, they still needed to develop the details for
waging an actual war.
The President had to confront conflicting demands
on the nation’s industrial base due to his desire to assist the British and at the same time rebuild America’s
armed forces. The nation needed a cohesive plan to develop a strategy that would help prioritize resources.
Sensing this need, Marshall ordered Brigadier General
Leonard T. Gerow, Chief of the War Plans Division,
to formulate a long-range strategic plan for the Army
since it seemed to be on the eve of war. A national
military strategy did not exist. Gerow had a vital task
to accomplish that would shape the future of the war.
By today’s standards, it was unique. He tasked Army
Major Albert C. Wedemeyer to develop the plan. Gerow gave Wedemeyer 90 days in which to complete
the plan.

32

Source: U.S. Army Military History Institute.

Lieutenant General Albert Wedemeyer, who as a
major, drafted what has been called the Victory
Plan.
Wedemeyer, by today’s standards, initially had
an undistinguished career. He was a West Pointer
who graduated early due to the demands of World
War I. Despite his early graduation, he missed combat in World War I. His career seemed at an end in
1922 when his superiors court martialed him due to a
drinking incident. Fortunately, this serious disciplinary action did not affect his career. He managed to
avoid an abrupt end to his military service and served
in a rather nondescript series of assignments in the infantry branch. Aside from company level, command
eluded him. Instead, he served an aide-de-camp and
in various staff capacities. Prior to his assignment in
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the War Plans office, the first time he actually did anything particularly notable was the academic record
he established during his 1934 attendance at the U.S.
Army Command and General Staff College at Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas. There, surprisingly, this previously nondescript officer was the honor graduate of
the 2-year course. Given his outstanding academic
credentials, the Commandant selected him to be the
College’s exchange student at the prestigious German
military school in Berlin, Germany, the Kriegsakademie.
In this rigorous 2-year course, Wedemeyer had
excelled. He studied a wide variety of topics including contemporary military thought in the rapidly expanding German Army. He moved easily through the
German military society of the late 1930s, becoming
proficient in his host nation’s language and German
military thought. He even commanded a German antitank company in one of the obligatory Kriegsakademie
maneuvers. When he returned to the United States in
1938, he provided a detailed report of his observations
on the German Army.36 This report caught the eye of
then Brigadier General Marshall who was serving as
the Chief of the War Plans Division. Thus, even before
Wedemeyer’s assignment to the War Plans Division,
Marshall already had a positive impression of him.
Marshall and Gerow’s confidence in Wedemeyer’s
abilities was not misplaced. Wedemeyer produced an
insightful 14-page plan that still merits consideration
by planners today. The particular merit of his so-called
“Victory Plan of 1941” centers on its methodology. In a
direct and analytical manner, he approached the problem of preparing a plan by asking a series of questions.
By his own admission, he worked like a journalist trying to construct a good newspaper “lead.” Thus, his
framework focused on answering the questions “who,
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what, where, how, when, and why.”37 With this methodology, he sought answers to four important specific
questions:
1. What is the national objective of the United
States?
2. What military strategy will be devised to accomplish the national objective?
3. What military forces must be raised in order to
execute that military strategy?
4. How will those military forces be constituted,
equipped, and trained? 38
The establishment of a national objective seemed
to be a logical step, but the fact remains that it did not
exist. Although Roosevelt had been moving increasingly toward involvement in Europe since 1938, no
national objective had been formulated as it related
to the relentless advance of totalitarian aggression.
Wedemeyer took the initiative and drafted a proposal
stating that the U.S. objective should be: “To eliminate
totalitarianism from Europe and, in the process, to be
an ally of Great Britain; further to deny the Japanese
undisputed control of the Western Pacific.”39 By this
statement, Wedemeyer established the goal of the U.S.
Government for the coming war.40 He had created the
“end” state similar to Lykke’s model.
The next step in his system was developing the
appropriate military strategy—Lykke’s “way”—to
achieve this end. While Wedemeyer recognized that
exactly planned military operations could not feasibly
be arranged at that particular time, a strategy could
be developed that would provide the basis for such
operations. Rather than becoming bogged down in
details for a war that was still on the horizon, Wedemeyer essentially followed the basic concepts—the
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strategy—outlined in Rainbow 5. This plan proposed
that the nation focus its attention on the defeat of Germany and Italy, and do this in an alliance with Great
Britain.41 At the same time, Washington would pursue a strategic defense in the Pacific until the defeat
of these two totalitarian nations had been completed.
There was nothing new or novel about this concept
since “Europe first” in one form or another had been
alive and well, at least in Army circles, since the 1930s.
Given the rapidity of German expansion and the lethality of their army, it seemed only logical. The next
step for Wedemeyer was to determine the "means" to
support the "ways" that would ultimately achieve the
U.S. goals of the war.
Wedemeyer researched the question concerning how large and what force composition the Army
would need to achieve its objective. In so doing, he
used the resources of the Library of Congress to examine appropriate historical cases, the experiences of
other nations at war, and recent demographical data
from studies undertaken by Princeton University. In
his “Ultimate Requirements Study,” Wedemeyer determined that 12-14 million men in uniform would be
necessary for the United States to accomplish its goals.
The U.S. Army would need 215 divisions, including
61 armored and 61 mechanized divisions. During the
plan’s development in the summer of 1941, Wedemeyer used data supplied by the Army G-2’s (Intelligence)
German section that significantly influenced his conclusions. Germany was at the apex of its military successes, and the United States was just beginning to
mobilize. In retrospect, Wedemeyer grossly exaggerated the number and types of divisions that would be
required to win the war. This has led some to criticize
his work and question his importance to prewar planning. In fairness however, at the time the study was
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completed, the fate of the Soviet Army was in doubt,
considering their losses in the summer of 1941. Had
the Soviet Union lost the war or the Axis powers been
more successful, his original planning figure might
have been too low. In his own defense, Wedemeyer
later noted, “the victory plan was never static.”42
The planning task given to Wedemeyer had to
go beyond the Army’s traditional ground forces; it
also had to include the newest branch, the Army Air
Forces (AAF). Through his studies at the Kriegsakadamie Wedemeyer clearly understood the importance
of airpower, particularly as it related to close air support. He was not however, familiar enough with air
power to plan for the AAF. Fortunately, the AAF
had the capabilities to accomplish this study due to a
March 1941 reorganization approved by General Marshall that authorized a Deputy Chief of Staff for Air.
In the summer of 1941, General Henry “Hap” Arnold
became Chief of the AAF, and his new office included
a plans section that he had authorized to develop AAF
branch specific plans and itemize requirements for an
annex to the war plan.43 The annex to the proposed
plan was christened “Munitions Requirements of the
AAF for the Defeat of our Potential Enemies” or Air
War Plans Division/1 (AWPD/1). This plan provided
not only a set of long-range production requirements,
but proposed a strategy that AAF officers could use to
conduct air operations in Europe and the Pacific.
The AWPD/1 drafters had to maintain a delicate
balance between supporting the overall Victory Plan
while at the same time pursuing one of their more
controversial provisions, strategic bombardment as a
means to defeat Germany. The air planners sought to
promote their favored strategy but, at the same time,
they wanted to avoid any political clash within the
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War Department’s General Staff.44 The air planners
wanted—actually needed—to avoid any such clash.45
Air Force doctrine and strategy during the interwar
period reflected theories rooted in the value of strategic
bombardment to reduce an enemy’s ability and will to
fight. The concept of strategic bombardment, the basis of the AAF’s future European Combined Bomber
Offensive, rested on concepts advanced by the Italian
theorist Guilio Douhet and the American, Billy Mitchell. The key concepts advanced by such theorists called
for the emerging air arm to be an independent branch
of service. According to such theorists, a significant
element in future wars would be strategic bombardment delivered by a large fleet of four-engine bombers. Some of America’s air power advocates, like their
colleagues in other nations, believed that a strategic
air campaign could defeat the enemy without the need
for major land campaigns, but any claims minimizing
other services would decidedly cause conflict with the
War Department’s General Staff. Thus, air power advocates had to advance their concepts with a degree of
prudence. The proposed plan also provided sufficient
resources to support an invasion of the Continent and
subsequent ground operations to conquer Germany.
Developing the type and number of aircraft and personnel needed to fight the air war provided the perfect
avenue to shape a force structure that would reflect
this AAF view on strategy.
AWPD/1 allowed AAF leadership to argue its
ability to conduct strategic bombardment and conceptually test their prewar theories about defeating
an industrial nation by attacking vital economic centers. American airmen espoused the industrial web
theory that postulated that the demands of a modern
war would force an industrial nation to operate its
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economy at maximum capacity. The destruction of
certain targets could force the collapse of an economy
and cause the entire country to falter.46 If strategic
bombing could create these conditions, then the will
of workers and civilians would degrade to such an
extent that surrender would become imminent. The
key to the theory was to identify and successfully attack the appropriate targets. If the AWPD/1 planners
were correct, then a strategic bombardment campaign
could reduce German opposition to a minimum and
create conditions where an invasion would not be as
costly. At best, strategic bombardment alone might
cause Berlin to capitulate.
Although AWPD/1 planners believed that strategic bombardment would work, the AAF would
still need adequate aircraft to provide close air support and interdiction for an invasion and subsequent
ground operations. Additionally, the AAF would need
an interim force while it created an appropriate strategic bombardment capability and to conduct other
operations. The interim force would allow the United
States to carry out military operations while American industry produced the requisite number of heavy
bombers to strike Germany’s economy. The AAF’s
plan focused on conducting a strategic bombardment
campaign against Germany in preparation for an invasion; providing close air support for land forces after
the invasion; defending the Western Hemisphere; sustaining a strategic defense against Japan; and staging
a strategic air offensive against Japan after Germany’s
capitulation.
The AWPD/1 planners called for a massive increase in AAF resources. Then Major Haywood S.
Hansell, one of AWPD/1’s authors, recalled that the
air component would expand to 2,165,000 personnel
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and 61,800 aircraft in 3 years.47 Hansell forecasted a
need for almost 11,000 four-engine heavy bombers
alone, with combat replacements of 770 planes per
month. This effort would expend a large portion of
funds, material, industrial capacity, and people from
the country’s economic and population base. The AAF
strength in 1940 numbered 51,000 officers and enlisted
members, and AAF squadrons only contained 6,000
aircraft. If approved, AWPD/1 positioned the AAF to
fulfill its goal of demonstrating the value of victory
through air power in general, and strategic bombardment in particular.
A critical element for the air plan’s success in disrupting the German economy was the selection of appropriate targets. AAF planners needed information
on German industrial plants, but obtaining accurate
information proved difficult. The AAF did receive
copies of Royal Air Force (RAF) target folders and
reports, but intelligence officers needed more details.
Fortunately, many of Germany’s construction projects from 1925-37 had received funding via American
banking loans. Blueprints of the newly constructed
plants were located in a New York bank vault. These
plans contained specifications and locations of critical
equipment within the buildings. AAF officers used
the RAF and these bank plans to assemble a list of 154
targets. The target list included 30 aircraft assembly
and assorted metal production firms. The other locations involved 50 electrical generating or switching
plants, 47 key transportation nodes, and 27 synthetic
petroleum plants.48
The success of AAF bombing plans depended on
several crucial assumptions. First, bombers would
have to provide precision bombing. This would be a
difficult task since the bombing technology of that era
allowed only a 5 percent chance of hitting a target 100
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square feet in size from an aircraft at an altitude of 3
miles.49 The AAF would need a massive numbers of
bombers to assure destruction of the target. For example, up to 220 bombers would be needed to destroy a
small plant in good flying weather. AAF officers could
not assure Washington that flying conditions over
Germany would have perfect weather conditions.
Second, AAF officers also assumed that the bombers would escape unscathed through enemy air defenses. Unfortunately, as early as 1940, the RAF had
proven that unescorted or poorly defended bombers
were easy targets. RAF fighter pilots had blunted the
Luftwaffe bombing campaign in the Battle of Britain by
using a well-led fighter force against inadequately escorted German bombers.50 Despite the recent RAF experience, AAF officers thought the proposed bomber
fleet had sufficient defensive firepower, greater speed,
flew higher, and their sheer number of bombers might
allow the AAF to bomb Berlin or the Ruhr essentially
unmolested.51 Large numbers of German fighter units,
however, could still pose a problem, thus AWPD/1
proposed the destruction of the Luftwaffe by destroying aircraft plants and by the general degradation of
the economy through the bombing campaign. This
prerequisite to the strategic bombardment campaign
would ensure that the AAF could concentrate its effort
to destroy the German economy. Shortages of replacement aircraft, spare parts, and fuel would ground existing Luftwaffe units. AAF bombers would ensure air
superiority rather than using fighters.
Third, AWPD/1 did not make room for major
deviations from the focused strategic bombardment
campaign.52 If Washington diverted bombers to conduct tactical air support or to the Pacific theater, then
efforts would likely be diluted and delay victory. AAF
pilots might not have the luxury of bombing German
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industrial plants independently, but instead might be
required to conduct operations in conjunction with
other forces.
Fourth, the plan also assumed that AAF officers
understood the inner workings of the German economy at war. While the Wehrmacht was trying to conquer
the Soviet Union in 1941, AAF observers and other experts believed the German government had fully mobilized the economy. In fact, the German government
and industry had only partially mobilized the economy through 1942.53 AAF planners believed that bombers would attack the most vulnerable and difficult to
replace economic targets as the easiest means to wreck
the economy.54 The AWPD/1 authors concentrated on
electrical power plants since the planners assumed
they were the key to economic production. Transportation, especially railroads, and petroleum followed
in priority. A force of bombers could attack selected
targets and paralyze the entire nation. This strategy
was supposed to distress the populace and curtail its
will to fight. However, the AWPD/1 planners did not
have sufficient time to conduct a thorough appraisal
of the German economy.55 The impact of a target’s destruction and its effect on the total economy is difficult
to assess, even today.
Despite AWPD/1’s limitations and concerns, Marshall and Stimson approved the annex in September
1941. The Joint Board also agreed to AWPD/1, despite
AAF fears of Navy protests over its resource requirements. Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy
supported approval of AWPD/1 in part based on
the offensive nature of the plan, instead of relying on
hemispheric defenses. 56 The AAF offered one of the
first opportunities to strike back at Germany. Along
with a naval blockade, the AAF’s strategic bombardment campaign could soften up Germany and divert
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resources away from its Eastern Front to try to stop
the bombing campaign. AWPD/1 provided an opening that AAF officers could use to press the case of
an independent strategic effort. Fears of relegating
aircraft to “flying artillery” for ground forces, transportation of men and material, or reconnaissance, motivated AWPD/1 to develop a strategic concept and
build an air plan to avoid this fate.57 Although AAF
planners would modify AWPD/1 during the war, its
basic intent never changed.
Although much of the planning of the late 1930s
and early 1940s was service specific, a thread of continuity is evident in terms of key priorities for waging
the war. First, if a war started, it would be Europe—or
Germany—first. One might argue that this priority occurred because many American citizens were of European origin or that the President was an Anglophile,
but this is not the case. Since Washington enacted the
Monroe Doctrine, Latin America and the Caribbean
were key American interests. In the 1930s, the threat to
these areas did not come from the Pacific; it came from
the Atlantic. Secondly, if war spread or was initiated
in the Pacific due to aggression by the Japanese, the
Pacific would be a secondary or defensive effort until
the adversary in Europe was defeated. Some revisionists and postwar analysts have questioned the “Europe
first” decision. After all, for most American citizens
Japan had initiated the war with the United States by
attacking Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on the morning of December 7, 1941. This line of thought however, ignores
Roosevelt’s concern for the survival of Great Britain as
a free and independent entity that was an extremely
important interest for Washington, particularly after
France collapsed. Additionally, the United States had
consistently drifted away from neutrality and toward
close military cooperation with Great Britain.
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The drift from neutrality, to armed neutrality, and
finally to active participation became evident beginning in the last half of 1940 as weapons from American stores were supplied to the British in the wake of
Dunkirk. This was followed in September by the agreement that provided 50 overage destroyers to the British Navy, in exchange for bases in the British Empire
throughout the Western Hemisphere. The Lend-Lease
Act, enacted in March 1941, exacerbated the slide toward American participation although it focused on
supplying war materials rather than troops. By the fall
of 1941 the United States was actually engaged in warlike activities against Germany with American naval
vessels taking an increasingly war-like path to include
escorting vessels in the Atlantic that were menaced by
German submarines. Thus, Washington consistently
promoted Germany as the first priority through prewar planning, particularly in the 4 years leading up
to the war. As a result of the aggressive actions of the
Axis countries and the increasing involvement of the
Roosevelt administration in world affairs, during 1940
and 1941, the United States began to slowly but consistently edge toward an active role in the war.
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CHAPTER 2
WAS EUROPE FIRST?
Our first major offensive should be Germany.1
Dwight D. Eisenhower

As the fall of 1941 turned into winter, Washington
teetered on the brink of war. Throughout the year, the
United States had been bolstering its armed neutrality status, preparing for war if those efforts failed. The
Roosevelt administration in 1940 had orchestrated the
first peacetime draft in American history despite some
congressional reservations. Roosevelt also placed the
National Guard and Army Reserve on a year of active
duty for training. The draft expansion of the armed
forces increased the size of the U.S. Army from its prewar strength of 280,000 to 1,638,086. These increases
were however, only for one year.2 In August 1941 the
administration asked to extend the term of the 1-year
draftees. Congress was uncertain of America’s need
for such a large military force. The vote extending the
reservists’ service only passed by a vote of 203-202
in the House of Representatives.3 Furthermore, the
President seemed uncomfortable with the possibility
that the United States might again require American soldiers to give their lives for another European
war. Instead, he preferred to strengthen the forces of
freedom-loving nations (though the inclusion of the
Soviet Union into this fraternity was clearly a stretch)
with military equipment and supplies, rather than
sending America’s sons into foreign wars. Hesitant to
employ American troops overseas, Roosevelt intended to gradually demobilize 18 National Guard Divisions beginning in February 1942. Marshall advised
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against this demobilization, but the President ignored
this advice and continued to formulate plans to cut
back American forces.
America’s goals, as enumerated in Chapter 1, remained constant, but the feasibility of the President’s
ways and means were rapidly becoming questionable.
President Roosevelt clearly preferred the United States
to serve as the “Arsenal of Democracy,” but events of
1941, like the invasion of the Soviet Union, seemed to
indicate that this strategy alone would not stop any
European or Asian Axis aggression. According to one
study, Roosevelt was a president “who still cherished
the hope that the United States could escape with
something less than full participation. He still hoped
that the American contribution could be restricted to
naval and air support and material assistance.”4 Even
as the Lend-Lease Act provided supplies to Soviet
Russia, China, and Great Britain, Roosevelt sought
to avoid direct conflict, while German U-boats were
diligently working to cut Britain’s Atlantic lifeline. As
the late fall turned to winter, German troops ringed
Leningrad and moved ever closer to Moscow and the
fate of Russia’s continued existence was uncertain. To
make matters worse, China, a traditional area of U.S.
interest, had already lost its industrial coastal areas
to Japanese aggression. The battle for the control of
China and its vast resources continued unabated.
An equally serious problem was the effect that
the Lend-Lease Act—Roosevelt’s preferred strategic “way”— had on America’s military forces. The
amount of aid offered to those fighting fascist aggression by the United States clearly had a detrimental effect on the effort to supply the rapidly expanding U.S.
military forces.5 This situation became obvious in the
September 1941 Louisiana Maneuvers when Ameri-
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can soldiers, in greater numbers than in 1940, had to
use cardboard and plywood cutouts for tanks and
trucks, while using stovepipes for mortars and cannons. American military units simply did not possess
the necessary equipment to adequately supply American Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines. In many
American training areas, broomsticks had to suffice
for close order drill, but these would be no match
for German Mauser rifles or, for that matter, Japanese Arisakas if the war became “hot” for the United
States.6 Lend-Lease Act priorities forced industry to
supply Great Britain, Russia, and China with military
supplies before the U.S. Army and Navy. American
forces faced equipment shortages or had to use obsolete equipment into 1943.7 For the nation’s military
leadership, too few products from American industry
were destined for its own military, but instead they
were supplied to other nations that were fighting fascist aggression.8
The problem of equipment shortages encompassed
all types of materiel, but the root of the problem was
not merely the Lend-Lease Act drain. American industry was still on a peacetime path, rather than a
wartime mobilization footing. 9 With the nation slowly moving out of the Depression, many people again
had jobs and money to spend. Consumer goods were
in high demand, and industries were attempting to
fulfill those demands. Ford, General Motors, and numerous other automobile manufacturers were already
shipping out their new car models. Business was good
and was getting better all the time.
This situation drastically changed on Sunday
morning, December 7, 1941. The Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor and the declaration of war on the United
States by Germany and Italy on December 11 meant
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that Washington’s adversaries had, in effect, determined the level of American participation in this war.
Several questions, however, remained. First and most
importantly, how long would it take for the American
government and industry to mobilize its considerable
resources and work with allied countries to achieve
victory over the aggressor nations? Second, had
American goals, our objective/ends changed? Third,
what sort of revisions needed to be made to prewar
planning considering the events of the first 2 weeks of
December 1941?
The objectives—or the ends—developed by Albert
Wedemeyer, remained in keeping with Roosevelt’s
overall goals, and they remained the key U.S. objectives throughout the conflict. To reiterate, they were
“To eliminate totalitarianism from Europe and, in the
process, to be an ally of Great Britain; further to deny
the Japanese undisputed control of the Western Pacific.”10 The war for the United States began with Japanese aggression against American forces in the Pacific,
and the Japanese onslaught would continue unabated
well into 1942. Nevertheless, Europe remained the
focus of American attention. Furthermore, as Wedemeyer’s planning for the war tended to follow the basic concepts included in Rainbow 5, so did the initial
plans to prosecute the war. This view required Washington to maintain American forces on the defensive
in the Pacific and to develop projections for early
movement of units to the North Atlantic. When Army
officials could buildup sufficient military strength for
an invasion of the European Continent, Washington
could consider launching an invasion, in concert with
the British. The primary objective remained the defeat
of fascist Germany and Italy.
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The gap between objectives, plans, and reality,
however, was enormous. American public opinion
from 1939 through 1941 concerning American participation in another foreign war, the reticence of elected
representatives to commit funds or American soldiers to such a conflict, and Roosevelt’s vacillations
on the size and use of the U.S. military forces meant
that America, though it had a clear objective, lacked
the means to achieve a quick victory.11 For example,
in 1941 as Albert Wedemeyer developed his so-called
Victory Plan, he postulated that the Army should consist of 8,795,658 men or, in terms of force structure, a
whopping 215 divisions.12 While ultimately the Army
only required 89 divisions to achieve victory, when
the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the recently expanded Army only had 37 divisions. Equally serious,
only a few units were fully trained or equipped and
thus ready to face any task.13 The Army’s strength had
increased, but its equipment levels were far below
what was necessary. The Army could not, at any time
in the near future, execute its plans to defeat the European Axis powers. The events of December 1941 and
early 1942 further eroded inventories and capabilities.
The materials necessary to win the war that the
U.S. had recently entered was a difficult task in itself.
As mentioned, in 1940-41, the nation had just begun
moving out of the Great Depression and demand for
consumer goods of all types was rapidly growing.
Now that America was at war, it was imperative that
industry convert the civilian oriented production, in
particular the transportation sector, to wartime needs.
This was necessary since the automobile industry consumed 51 percent of the country’s annual production
of malleable iron, 34 percent of its lead production,
and 80 percent of its rubber production.14 Washing-
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ton also needed to reorient the aircraft and ship construction industries. On January 16, 1942, by executive
order, the President established the War Production
Board led by Donald Nelson. Nelson’s first action was
to cease civilian automobile production, which went
into effect on February 10, 1942. The impact of this one
action, as it relates to the means for the war, is apparent through the wartime production figures. About 20
percent of the nation’s wartime production came from
the automobile industry; that included 50 percent of
the aircraft engines, 80 percent of all tanks and tank
parts, 100 percent of the trucks, and most of the B-24
bombers, one of the main airframes for strategic bombardment.15
The resource issue for a larger Army was only
one part of a wider conflict involving military leaders. The Army as an institution focused primarily on
land power, but the AAF in its AWPD/1 report called
for a massive increase in manpower, aircraft, equipment, and infrastructure. No other country’s air force
had proposed the scope of aerial warfare to the extent
of the AAF. Arnold’s requirements for forces and the
commitment to a massive strategic bombardment were
unprecedented. The use of strategic bombardment to
defeat an enemy nation was largely unproven and
was inherently a rival to the other branches of service.
The theory that strategic bombardment could destroy
an enemy’s economy and will in a relatively short
period of time without the aid of surface forces, was
an immediate hit with AAF officers looking to revolutionize warfare.16 Thus, within the Army, ground and
air officers disagreed about the necessary allocation of
funds, manpower, and material for the coming war.
After Pearl Harbor and the string of seemingly uninterrupted Allied defeats, the AAF’s leadership had to
reconsider its priorities. AWPD/1 required revisions.
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At the same time, the U.S. Navy’s quest for preeminence through building a two-ocean force was also a
significant resource rival to the Army’s plans, as well
as to the air leaders’ efforts to build an air force capable of strategic bombardment. Like the fledgling AAF,
the Navy had its own internal battle concerning what
would be the major weapon system in that service’s
arsenal. Since the early 1920s, the Navy’s emerging
aviation branch pressed hard for its claim that any
future war’s outcome would depend on the aircraft
carrier and carrier borne aircraft. Traditionalists, however, were certain that, despite the virtual inactivity of
battle fleets in World War I, the battleship would be
the decisive weapon system, particularly in the Pacific
where the Navy traditionally assumed a war would
occur. Immediately following World War I, carrier
advocates faced an uphill battle against traditionalists
who wanted the battleship and cruiser to retain their
prominence. The Navy’s leadership ultimately came
to recognize the importance of the aircraft carrier. By
December 7, 1941, the Navy had seven carriers in its
inventory, and it had begun building advanced Essex
class carriers.
The U-boat problem was an important lesson from
World War I that the American and British military
leadership had forgotten or ignored. In World War I,
German submarine operations had blockaded Great
Britain and created food and material shortages. Britain needed foodstuffs and raw materials from other
regions of the world, because without these raw materials, it would collapse. During World War I, German naval commanders estimated that if the U-boat
fleet could sink 600,000 tons of shipping per month,
starting in February 1917, the German Imperial Navy
could cause the British to surrender by June 1917.17 A
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concentrated submarine offensive would cause neutral country merchant marines to terminate commerce
with Britain, and this, together with heavy losses of
commercial shipping, would starve the British into
submission. Fortunately, in 1917 this strategy failed,
but the possibility that such a strategy could succeed
was still very real. If U-boats ruled the Atlantic, then
Britain, the base for a cross-channel invasion, could be
lost. Planning in Washington had largely ignored any
type of significant naval threat by Germany.
Certain elements in the German Navy, however,
had not forgotten the lessons of World War I. The Uboat faction led by Karl Dönitz, himself a World War I
submarine officer, knew that these underwater weapons had almost brought Britain to its knees in 1917.18
Although they had a relatively small U-boat fleet in
1939, the German leadership began to quickly expand
this arm and disrupt commercial shipping in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, shipping that was necessary for the survival of Britain and the Soviet Union.19
Obviously, the U-boat threat did not affect all military
forces. The AAF could still move its aircraft over the
Atlantic to Britain and conduct its favored strategic
bombardment campaign, but merchant marine vessels had to carry the bombs and aviation fuel used by
strategic bombers to England. Troops and foodstuffs
would not get through unless the Navy silenced the
U-boat threat. If German submarine forces could sink
sufficient cargo and tanker ships, then they could also
paralyze the Soviet Union, which needed weapons,
food, and raw materials from the Western Allies.
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Source: Author’s Collection.

Admiral Karl Dönitz, strong proponent of U-Boat
warfare, at work planning operations against the
Allies.
In a replay of a World War I strategy, the Kreigsmarine again sought to turn the tables on Britain. Despite
the British advantage in capital ships, Great Britain
was still vulnerable to an effective U-boat campaign.
Before any combined Anglo-American strategy resulting in an invasion of the continent of Europe could
succeed, Allied navies would have to defeat the Uboats. The Battle of the Atlantic would determine if
the Germans could isolate and starve Britain or if the
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American and Royal Navies could find a way to ensure safe transport across the Atlantic. In 1942, the fate
of America being able to execute its military strategy
for a European campaign hinged on its ability to undercut the effectiveness of German submarine operations. Adolf Hitler commented in April 1942, “Victory
depends on destroying the greatest amount of Allied
tonnage . . .” by the Kreigsmarine’s U-boat campaign in
the Atlantic.20
Germany had a few advantages in conducting
a concentrated U-boat campaign against the Allies.
Unlike World War I, the Germans had access to naval bases from Norway to France, rather than just the
North Sea, and refueling capabilities in Spain as well.
This advantage allowed U-boats to strike Allied shipping from several areas that included not only the
North Atlantic, but also the entire Atlantic Ocean and
the Mediterranean. Additionally, U-boat commanders could proceed to East Africa and disrupt merchant
shipping from British colonies in Asia, which could
also affect events in the Pacific. The German leadership hoped that its U-boat campaign would destroy
a large enough number of ships that the losses would
exceed the replacement capabilities of British shipyards. In this early portion of the war at sea, the British did not have sufficient long-range aircraft nor
escort capability to thwart submarine attacks. Thus,
despite American vessels escorting convoys even before December 1941, German submarines were able
to take a significant toll on merchant shipping. In
August 1941, German U-boat commanders sank 56
ships, representing a total of 267,618 tons. October’s
toll of Allied ships from Kreigsmarine torpedoes was
63 ships that displaced 352,407 tons.21 American entry
into the war greatly increased naval resources to com-
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bat U-boat operations, but immediately after the U.S.
entry the Navy was definitely not prepared to defeat
the U-boat threat. Naval officers had to create strategies to defeat experienced U-boat commanders, strategies that would ultimately require resources from
both the Navy and the AAF. The Navy would have to
train merchant mariners to avoid U-boat attacks, since
merchantmen still operated fully illuminated ships at
night close to shore and generally without escorts.22
The Navy also had to divide its limited assets to numerous Atlantic routes that rapidly became a killing
zone for the U-boats.
Dönitz, commander of the German U-boat fleet,
believed that American defenses were so weak that
the Eastern seaboard was an unexpected windfall for
training inexperienced crews on how to attack shipping.23 Dönitz saw the potential for U-boat warfare
and implored the Naval High Command to build a
fleet of at least 300 U-boats to blockade Britain and
starve the English, but limited resources consistently
forced Germany to restrict U-boat production and operations. Dönitz continued to fight diehard German
surface warfare officers who insisted that more ships
were necessary for the High Seas Fleet, despite the
Royal Navy’s quantitative and qualitative superiority.
Throughout the war, the miniscule German High Seas
Fleet stayed in port at Norwegian or Baltic locations
and was never able to challenge the British or American surface fleets, repeating the experiences of World
War I.
American Naval leaders also had to contend with
advocates for the submarine. The Navy’s first significant challenge in the Atlantic, which began before
American entry into the war, was neither contesting
enemy battleships nor carriers; its first task was coun-
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tering German submarines. In the “Battle of the Atlantic,” U-boats attacked the economic lifeline between
the Western Hemisphere and Britain and the Soviet
Union,24 and despite Dönitz's failure to get all the Uboats he wanted, the German submarine fleet wreaked
considerable havoc on Allied shipping. From January
14 to March 14, 1942, German submarines sank 1.2
ships per day off the Eastern seaboard. Later, from
March 15 to April 20, the toll increased to 2.2 ships per
day.25 Without control of the seas, the United States
and its primary ally Great Britain could not hope to
ship the requisite men and supplies to consider waging a campaign designed to wrest Europe from Nazi
domination.
Despite increasing effort to introduce methods to
increase merchant ship protection, like using a convoy system and providing better naval escorts, losses
continued to mount. The growing German submarine
menace off the Atlantic coast caused the AAF to advocate a role in countering this threat in reaction to
the Navy’s increased role in anti-submarine activities. The AAF pushed the use of heavy and medium
range bombers (up to 640) to conduct anti-submarine
and long-range patrol activities from North and South
America, Iceland, and the Azores. This, of course,
would divert bomber resources to this secondary activity, rather than their preferred strategic bombing
campaign. The new Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, bristled at the suggestion that the
AAF could conduct anti-submarine warfare. King opposed a larger role by the AAF in anti-submarine operations and ultimately exerted pressure to force the
AAF to transfer many of these aircraft to the Navy.
King also believed that the increased focus on aircraft
production would draw limited resources away from
needed ship construction. More aircraft under AAF
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command also clashed with his plans to promote a
larger role in U.S. strategy for the Pacific Theater.
American involvement in prewar convoy duty was
limited to escort operations by surface vessels, but experience soon proved that effective anti-submarine
operations also required long-range aerial search and
patrol. This new technique forced the AAF and Navy
to dedicate joint resources to conduct effective operations. Thus, the AAF was required to divert aircraft
and personnel from its bombardment mission to conduct anti-submarine operations, a requirement that
was not in keeping with Air Force plans. At the same
time, the Navy believed counter U-boat operations belonged exclusively to it. Interservice rivalry erupted
from the start, and Navy and AAF commanders faced
numerous practical problems, such as different service
procedures, in their attempts to accomplish this mission. AAF leaders saw their Navy colleagues pressing to employ more defensive convoy escort measures
that shied away from using aircraft in a hunter-killer
role.26 King suggested that the best path for the U.S.
Navy was to provide escort operations for convoys.
The Royal Navy vehemently disagreed based on its
experience and beliefs about the offensive nature of
military forces. British naval commanders wanted
to use long-range air power to defeat the Germans.27
The British and the AAF were successful in advocating the increased role of air power to combat the Uboat forces and the AAF and the U.S. Navy ultimately
established the Joint Control and Information Center
in New York to conduct anti-submarine operations,
including air patrols.28 The use of aircraft improved
anti-submarine operations, but the toll of German
submarines increased. Navy leaders improved their
operations by the use a fleet of small escort carriers to
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conduct anti-submarine warfare activities in their convoy duties. Ultimately, AAF leaders transferred their
anti-submarine aircraft to the U.S. Navy, allowing the
AAF to concentrate on its strategic bombardment mission.
Prior to Pearl Harbor, the only area where American property and lives seem to be under attack was in
the Atlantic. American forces were not under direct
attack by the Germans, but an undeclared war opened
up between the U.S. Navy and U-boats by August
1941. During this undeclared naval war, U-boats sank
two American destroyers, the Kearny and the Reuben
James, in addition to merchant ships, before a formal
declaration of war between Germany and the United
States existed.
For Washington, the early war period began in a
fashion that confounded the nation’s military leaders,
because Roosevelt directed strategies that seemed to
contradict prewar planning. While the commitment to
“Europe first” did not waver as the accepted strategy,
the initial progress of the war caused American participation to proceed in an entirely different path than
initially envisioned. For the United States, the war
was initially in the Pacific where American forces tried
to halt the ongoing Japanese onslaught. After Pearl
Harbor, the Japanese advanced into Southeast Asia,
besieging the Philippines, Hong Kong, Wake Island,
Guam, and other areas. Later, the Imperial Japanese
Navy would attempt (and fail) to take Midway. They,
not the Germans, also brought the war to the Western Hemisphere by attacking the Aleutian Islands,
occupying both Attu and Kiska. Imperial forces came
dangerously close to Australia and began conducting
bombing raids against Australian installations. Because of the immediacy of the Japanese threat, plans
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for the necessary buildup of men and supplies for operations in Europe were delayed in order to deal with
the deteriorating situation in the Pacific. The strategy
did not change, but the circumstances did, causing national priorities to temporarily shift. U.S. Navy leaders were pleased with the increased emphasis on the
Pacific.
The level of military operations and troop strengths
in 1942-43 clearly reflected the urgency of the situation in Asia and the Pacific. Even though Roosevelt
did not waver from the Europe first strategy, by the
end of 1942 over half of the Army’s existent divisions
and more than one-third of America’s air groups were
in the Pacific. As late as December 31, 1943, only 6
months away from the Normandy invasion in Europe,
American national and military leaders had employed
1,878,152 members of the nation’s armed forces against
the Japanese, but assigned only 1,810,367 for operations against Germany.29 The balance would rapidly
shift in 1944, but from 1942-43 the direct threat to the
nation seemed to center in the Pacific. As a contributing factor, two strong personalities from two different
services, General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral
King, consistently pressed for a higher priority for the
Pacific and were successful in achieving at least some
of their goals to this point.
Even as circumstances were becoming increasingly grim in the Pacific during the first half of 1942,
there were two favorable signs in Europe. The stubborn resistance of the British people, coupled with a
steady flow of American supplies, meant that by the
end of 1941 the survivability of Britain had improved
considerably. U-boats threatened this supply line, but
the inability of the Germans to mount an invasion
of the British Isles and deprive the United States of
its bridge to Europe made future plans for an Allied
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invasion —the European Campaign—more feasible.
Furthermore, Russian military forces stopped the
German advance into the Soviet Union at the gates of
Moscow. The Soviet Army had rolled back the Wehrmacht, inflicting heavy casualties by grinding down
the blitzkrieg designed force with a slow campaign of
attrition. American presence in the Pacific however,
was tenuous. Thus, Washington shipped the preponderance of American forces to the Pacific. The immensity of the Pacific theater required significant ship construction, employment of large numbers of aircraft,
and troops trained for both conventional ground operations and amphibious landings. Before any type of
operations against the heartland of Europe could occur, the American War Production Board would have
to complete the drastic shift of American industry to
wartime production; Washington would have to create and train multiple ground divisions, and Japanese
aggression in the Pacific would have to be stopped,
and perhaps even rolled back.
Despite increased attention to the U-boat problem,
the unseen battles under the Atlantic were a significant problem for future Allied plans. U-boats had the
potential of starving the British Isles. If the German
naval strategy of blockade had worked, then Washington would have to face the potential issue of a negotiated peace between London and Berlin. Had Britain
folded, American planners would have had a more
complicated task in attempting to liberate Western
Europe and fight a war against Japan alone (Australia and New Zealand excepted). Long-range strategic
bombardment against Germany would have been difficult, if not impossible, with the existing AAF bomber
fleet.30 Control of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean
was critical, because of the vast logistical require-
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ments necessary to buildup the Allied base in Britain
in order to stage an invasion of occupied France. Ironically, German inadequacies in waging the U-boat war
may have saved the British. In September 1939, the
Germans only had 56 U-boats.31 Had their fleet been
more robust, the United States might have had to concentrate its attacks only on North Africa and into Italy
or southern France, rather than opening fronts against
Germany simultaneously from the Mediterranean and
Britain. Without the massive supply of weapons and
food transported across the Atlantic from America,
the Soviet Union could have collapsed, or Stalin might
have sought a separate peace with Hitler. Allied planners had to create the conditions necessary to implement their combined military strategy before they
could even start any feasible planning or operations
to conquer Germany.
The campaigns to neutralize the U-boat threat and
the AAF proposed strategic bombardment of Hitler’s
Germany were important, but throughout most of
1942 the pressure for employing ground forces against
the German Army was a major issue. From the onset of
planning, an integral part of America’s war effort was
alliance building. This alliance was firmly committed
to the same goal, the destruction of Nazi Germany. At
the same time, the alliance had to focus first on the immediate needs—in fact the survival—of its two main
allies: Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Britain was
a primary concern because it could and did serve as
the American staging area for both ground and air operations in Europe. Fortunately, ties with the United
States were of long duration and ran very deep. Both
nations were firm in their resolve to defeat Nazi tyranny and liberate Europe from German oppression.
Even so, the interests of Britain and the United States
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were decidedly different, as were their experiences.
Britain, a highly industrialized and mercantile nation,
had a worldwide empire to consider and they had not
forgotten the terrible casualties of the World War I, its
last significant military venture.
On the other hand, the Soviet Union had been a pariah among the major nations due to its noxious Marxist ideology and, most recently, through its active role
in the 1939 dismemberment of Poland, and its subsequent aggression against Finland. Its acceptance into
the alliance against Nazi Germany was a marriage of
convenience, because the Soviets, above all, sought
to survive. The Western Allies desperately needed
the Soviet Union to survive, because the Soviets were
exacting significant casualties from German armed
forces and were tying down Wehrmacht resources that
could have caused the Western Allies major problems.
Conversely, though the immediate goals of the Eastern and Western members of the alliance were comparable, the values and long-term goals and interests of
the Soviet Union were diametrically opposed to those
of Britain and the United States. In fact, Soviet goals
had much more in common with National Socialist
Germany than its Western Allies. Still, the continued
existence of the Soviet Union with its immense military forces was important for Allied success.
In 1942, the German Army had exerted great pressure on both Great Britain and the Soviet Union. For
the Soviet Union, the situation was critical. Since
mid-1941, the Soviets had been engaged in a life and
death struggle with the German Wehrmacht. By any
standard, the German commitment to this campaign
was staggering. On June 22, 1941, the Germans had
thrown 149 divisions, (about 3,000,000 men), 3,332
armored vehicles, and 1,930 aircraft into what was
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called Operation BARBAROSSA.32 With great effort,
on December 5, 1941, the Red Army launched a counterattack against the overextended Wehrmacht that literally stopped the Germans at Moscow’s suburbs and
hurled them back. The strain on the Soviets however,
was still immense, and the spring of 1942 brought no
respite; only a renewed German offensive. Most of
European Russia was in German hands, the Soviets
lost over three million soldiers killed or captured, and
the Soviet Air Force had taken staggering losses. The
Soviet Union desperately needed help, and the Allies
needed that nation as a part of the war effort.
As the Russian military battled German forces, the
situation for Britain had improved. Although it was
still struggling with the U-boat menace and aerial
bombings by the Luftwaffe, it no longer faced the likelihood of a full-scale German invasion. The survival of
the island nation was crucial for American plans since
it was the launching pad for future American operations. A more secure Britain gave the United States
the opportunity to begin building the necessary support structure on the British Isles for air and ground
operations against the German heartland. Without
the necessary men, equipment, and aerial superiority,
the likelihood of American military forces conducting
a cross-channel invasion of the European continent
would be a campaign for the long term, and not the
immediate future. Without any impending threat by
American ground forces on the European continent,
the focus of German operations would continue toward the destruction of what Nazi ideologues called
“the home of Jewish Bolshevism,” the Soviet Union.
To stage a European campaign and achieve its
goals, the redirection of America’s industrial priorities was imperative. In the first few months of 1942,
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plying the equipment-starved U.S. Army. Even as it
was moving production to a wartime mode, events of
the war eroded the likelihood of conducting any kind
of a campaign on the European continent in the near
term. The priorities for war envisioned by Roosevelt
and Wedemeyer’s Victory Plan called for a strategic
defense in the Pacific and priority for U.S. effort in
Europe. Yet from December 1941 through May 1942,
American defense in the Pacific was, by necessity, a priority because in the first 5 months of the war, the Japanese advance had consistently pushed American and
Allied defenders back toward Australia and Hawaii.
This meant that the Pacific was a significant drain on
American resources, both manpower and equipment.
The fall of the Philippines alone, which was the major
American base in the Pacific other than Pearl Harbor,
resulted in the loss of almost all of America's Pacificbased B-17 bombers and the bulk of its P-40 fighters.
Japan’s conquest also resulted in the capture of 12,000
Americans and 60,000 Filipino military members.
The logistics to fight a Pacific war were radically
different from one in Europe concerning time and
space. For example, a freighter leaving New York
could reach Liverpool in 17 days. However, a freighter leaving San Francisco and proceeding to Guadalcanal took 26 days, or 28 days to Sydney, Australia.33
Freighters, of course, also required naval escorts. It
was not until June 1942, when Allied victories at sea
in the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway stopped
Japanese advances, that the Pacific front was finally
stabilized. But the resource drain continued and actually increased. Rather than maintain a mere defensive
posture, on August 7, 1942, American forces went on
the offensive with an invasion of Guadalcanal. Offensive operations on this island and in its vicinity assur-
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edly detracted from the Europe first plans throughout
1942.
Despite the operations conducted by American
forces in the Pacific and the pressure of a determined
U-boat campaign in the Atlantic, the adopted American and Allied strategy continued to demand the presence of United States ground troops in the war against
Hitler’s Germany. A major factor requiring American
operations in Europe was the continued crisis facing the Soviet Union. In the summer and fall of 1942,
the survival of the Soviet Union was still in doubt.
German units had resumed their advance across the
southern steppes, inflicting defeat after defeat on the
Soviet Army, but Stalin did not capitulate. Operations
by the Western Allies to relieve the beleaguered Soviet
Army were crucial.
American plans envisioned a cross-channel assault
against Hitler’s “Fortress Europe” using Britain as a
springboard, but three significant problems emerged
for the way to achieve the desired end. First was the
problem of resources: With the drain on resources due
to the war in the Pacific and the fact that American industry was slowly switching from civilian to military
oriented production, a cross-channel attack in 1942
was hardly feasible. Second, throughout most of 1942,
the American Army was in the process of formation.
Training for large unit maneuvers (corps level) had
not really gotten started until the spring of 1940. In late
summer 1940, the U.S. Army extended training on this
level to joint Regular Army and National Guard maneuvers. Army leaders tried to establish realistic training despite shortages of equipment and ammunition,
at least in part due to Lend-Lease Act requirements.
Third, the U-boat campaign continued to undercut the
buildup of men and material on the British Isles.
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Washington could carry the war to Europe, even
at this early stage, through an air campaign. A major
goal of the AAF’s leadership was to initiate daylight
precision attacks on the German economy rather than
night area bombing, as practiced by the RAF. At the
same time, to establish bases in Britain and prepare
crews and aircraft for a campaign required time. The
initial American bombing raids on occupied Europe
did not begin until August 17, 1942. The first targets
were not in Germany but against targets in Rouen,
France. The changing strategic environments, rival
missions, and other limitations forced President Roosevelt to reassess AWPD/1’s requirements in light of
naval and ground force demands. On August 24, Roosevelt asked Arnold to estimate the total number of
aircraft to gain “complete air ascendancy over the enemy.”34 Arnold directed many of the original authors
of AWPD/1 to reexamine AAF needs for the task.
Military, political, and economic factors challenged
the AAF officers to create: “Requirements for Air Ascendancy” or AWPD/42. Like its predecessor, the authors worked frantically to develop the plan and they
completed it on September 9, 1942.
AWPD/42’s first task was to conduct an air offensive to render the Luftwaffe impotent, which would free
the Allied air forces to conduct an unrestricted bombing campaign. In 1942, the Luftwaffe was a capable adversary that took a deadly toll on American aircrews.
The authors of the AWPD/42 were also required to
add a new, higher priority target—German submarine
construction yards—to assist with the raging battle of
the Atlantic. The major campaign however, that the
AAF sought to conduct was strategic bombardment
designed to destroy the German economy. Although
the AAF officers understood the theoretical basis for
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strategic bombardment, there was little basis for the
planners to estimate the economic underpinnings of
their operational strategy. Additionally, the AWPD/42
authors did not possess any extensive experience conducting a strategic bombardment campaign, nor did
they have higher-level practice in coordinating joint
or coalition warfare. The authors also lacked firm intelligence data on proposed targeting.35 Nonetheless,
AWPD/42 had to forecast aircraft requirements that
represented an official statement of what was necessary to fight the Axis powers from 1943 to early 1944.
Competing demands confronted AAF planners
and diverted attention away from continental Europe
and the planned strategic bombing campaign. In addition to strategic bombing missions, there was also
the need to provide air support for ground operations
that the Allies could stage in late 1942. AAF leadership
also had to contend with the requirements for Pacific
operations and the eventual need to establish bases
and develop a longer-range bomber for a final offensive against Japan. These issues added to the need for
more resources. The AAF also had another significant
mission, defending the Western Hemisphere to include aircraft patrols to counter German submarine
activities. These activities encouraged AAF officers to
request 130,906 aircraft. The AAF projected a need of
75,416 aircraft for their service, about 33,050 for the
Navy, and 22,440 for America’s allies.36 The AWPD/42
authors did not coordinate the plan with the Navy,
but only estimated their requirements based on AAF
projections. AWPD/42 was hardly a strategy that was
jointly developed.
AWPD/42 produced a new strategic vision for the
AAF. The AAF authors had to reexamine the value
of strategic bombardment. In AWPD/1, the military
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value of strategic bombardment centered on its ability to force Germany’s collapse solely by dismembering its economy. It offered the hope that long-range
bombers could possibly end the war independent of
any surface forces or alliance. By the time planners
had completed AWPD/42, the focus of this new plan
changed to supporting an invasion only if the strategic bombardment campaign could weaken enemy
forces.37 The AAF now proposed to attack 177 targets
with over 66,000 bombers, which they hoped would
destroy the Luftwaffe, disrupt U-boat activities, and
disable the economy. The authors of AWPD/42 envisioned that a possible European invasion would take
place by late 1944. Additionally, the AAF slowed provisions for intercontinental bomber production. Instead of conducting bombing operations against Germany from the United States, which would have been
difficult considering the range of aircraft, the AAF
now planned to use B-17 and B-24 units stationed in
Britain. Pacific air bases could eventually strike Japan
with a newer airframe, the B-29.
Target priorities also changed. AWPD/42 emphasized the immediate objective of attacking aircraft
assembly plants and engine factories to neutralize
the Luftwaffe. In addition to submarine construction
yards, the AAF viewed aluminum and synthetic rubber production facilities as vital targets. Aluminum
sources supported aircraft production. The RAF held
a different view. The British Bureau of Economic Warfare believed synthetic rubber was the “bottleneck” to
transportation of economic production.38 If the RAF
disrupted rubber supplies, then the German transportation network would screech to a halt. AWPD/42
authors still only guessed at the so-called “centers of
gravity” for the German economy, but the strategic
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vision was finally coming into focus. President Roosevelt, who as early as 1938 had promoted aircraft
production, compromised with the AAF’s plans as
outlined in AWPD/42. The President decided to build
107,000 aircraft and devote more resources for naval
shipbuilding.39 These presidential mandates put additional pressure on the American economy.
The use of air offensives against Hitler’s Fortress
Europe was important because it demonstrated an
American commitment to the European Theater. Conversely, air raids did little to satisfy either of America’s major allies, the Soviet Union or Great Britain, because these allies needed American manpower on the
ground to erode the strength of the German Army. The
need became more pressing once the spring of 1942
arrived, because both of America’s allies faced German offensives. In May, the German Army, refreshed
and revived after the bitter winter of 1941-42, expertly
handled a Soviet offensive centered on Kharkov. Once
they blunted the Soviet offensive, they counterattacked, encircling the Soviet 57th Army and inflicting
massive losses on the Soviets. The German encirclement cost the Soviets 170,958 killed, missing, or taken
prisoner, and 106,232 wounded. Soviet tank losses
totaled 1,200. In addition, 2,600 artillery pieces were
lost. In the succeeding weeks ,the Germans continued
to exact substantial casualties from the Soviet Army,
and on June 28, 1942 the German Army launched
its summer offensive, which sent German, Hungarian, Rumanian and Italian units streaming eastward
toward the Caucasus and the Volga. At roughly the
same time, from May 26-27, Generalfeldmarschall Erwin
Rommel began another offensive in North Africa that
sent the British and their Free French allies reeling.
The German North African offensive threw the Allies
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into retreat and resulted in Tobruk’s fall.40 The combined German-Italian force then crossed the border
into Egypt.
Stakes were high for the Soviets, who were defending their homeland, but they were also high for the
British who were fighting the Axis powers in an area
of their long-term interest, the Mediterranean. Britain
and the Soviet Union needed immediate help. Marshall commented succinctly that, “the initiative at this
time lay wholly in the hands of the Axis.” 41
Unfortunately, there was little Washington could
do to relieve the pressure on the Soviet Union other
than to send supplies and make future promises for
more assistance. In 1942, this was not an easy task. A
major lifeline for Lend-Lease supplies ran north along
the “Murmansk Run” which subjected Allied shipping to a German manned gauntlet. This route caused
unmerciful poundings of Allied shipping from both
the Norwegian based Luftwaffe and from the U-boat
fleet. Another potential supply route existed through
the Persian Gulf region in Iran and into southern Russia. As German forces pushed into the Caucasus in
late summer 1942, even this route seemed unlikely.
Good intentions aside, through most of 1942 neither the United States nor Great Britain were ready to
embark on major combat operations against the main
body of the German Army on Soviet soil or elsewhere.
Even if they had been, Western Allied troops were not
welcome on Soviet soil. The Soviets allied themselves
with Imperial Britain and the capitalist United States,
but the Soviet ruling elites were paranoid about the
danger posed by Westerners adversely influencing
their citizens with destabilizing ideas like democracy
and freedom of expression.42 Large numbers of Western troops on Soviet soil were not likely and, at the
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same time, they would be difficult to supply. Other
than assistance provided through Lend-Lease, Russia
would have to go it alone and depend on Roosevelt’s
“Arsenal of Democracy” in lieu of a full-scale invasion.
As these crises developed in mid-1942, minor fissures emerged between the Allies over the strategy
necessary to defeat Germany. These fissures were evident as early as the end of 1941 in the first real wartime
strategy conference between the two Western powers.
Code-named Arcadia, conference participants came
to Washington from December 22, 1941 to January 14,
1942. The attendees were Churchill and his chiefs of
staff. Roosevelt and his comparable military advisors
hosted the meeting. On the table was the preferred
American strategy, or the way to destroy Hitler’s regime. This conference and subsequent negotiations
between the two Western Allies provides a student of
coalition warfare with an excellent case study on alliance politics. The American way to defeat Germany
consisted of building up forces and materials for a
cross-channel attack that would aim Allied forces at
the heartland of Europe. The plan endorsed by the
American leadership, code named Operation BOLERO-ROUNDUP, proposed to muster all available resources on the British Isles for an amphibious operation in the spring of 1943. BOLERO was the codename
for the buildup of forces and supplies on the British
Isles. American planners designated ROUNDUP as
the actual invasion.
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Source: U.S. Army Military History Institute.

U.S. Army General Dwight Eisenhower with
Members of the War Department, Operations and
War Plans Division, 1941.
At this time during the war, operational planning was the responsibility of a rapidly rising officer,
Dwight D. Eisenhower. He was a significant new face
at Arcadia having reported for this new assignment
only a week earlier. As a new staffer in the War Plans
Division, Eisenhower described his role at Arcadia as
one of the “unimportant” staff officers on the periphery of the conference.43 American planners, with Eisenhower carrying the flag, became enthusiastic about
taking the war directly to the heartland of Europe. The
prospects of such a venture seemed feasible since the
British seemed initially comfortable with the plan. In
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his memoirs, Eisenhower notes that there were three
options for American military action in 1942:
1. Direct reinforcement of the British Armies in the
Middle East.
2. Prepare amphibious forces to seize northwest Africa with the idea of undertaking later operations to
the eastward to catch Rommel.
3. Undertake a limited operation on the northwest
coast of France . . . capture of an area that could be
held against a German attack and which would later
form a bridgehead for use in the large scale invasion
agreed upon as the ultimate objective.44

Although he noted the options, Eisenhower’s preferred plan, and that of Marshall, was a cross-channel
attack. In addition to ROUNDUP, another plan favored by the U.S. Army’s leadership was SLEDGEHAMMER, a proposed assault across the channel
in September 1942. It was Marshall’s belief that the
United States and Britain had to do something in 1942
to relieve the pressure on the beleaguered Russians.
Since the American entry in the war, the Soviets appeared to be on the verge of collapse. If the Allies
could launch SLEDGEHAMMER, it would relieve the
pressure on the Russians and serve the Allied cause
by keeping them in the war.
In the meetings that followed, there was no disagreement between the two allies concerning the “Germany first” concept or that Berlin’s defeat was the preeminent goal. Once this goal was accomplished, the
defeat of Italy and Japan would follow as secondary
goals. The agreements reached at Arcadia were:
1. Germany was regarded as the most dangerous Axis
adversary and would be the primary target, while
holding the Japanese in a defensive war.
2. A ring or noose was to be drawn around the Axis
powers to wear them down, and tighten this ring as
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resources mounted. Where limited offensives could
be mounted, this too would contribute to weakening
German resistance.
3. The ways to attack the most dangerous adversary
were clearly in keeping with British thinking. Thus,
strategic bombing, continuing military aid to the Russians, encouraging and supplying resistance groups in
occupied countries and gaining mastery of the seas,
all would weaken the Germans until the Allies could
deliver a death blow to Germany.45

While “Germany first” was the overriding principle, the key issue that escaped resolution at this conference concerned the timing and location for bringing
ground forces to bear against the German Army in the
conduct of a Western European campaign. A positive
accomplishment, however, was the establishment of
the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCOS), composed of
the service chiefs of both nations who were to meet on
a regular basis and develop the strategic priorities for
the Western Allies.46
For American military planners, there was little
enthusiasm for the results of the Arcadia meeting.
American planners wanted a definitive approval by
Roosevelt and Churchill to buildup forces and supplies on the British Isles. After this buildup, these
military planners expected to deliver a direct attack
on the heartland of Europe through an amphibious
cross-channel assault. The British did not show much
interest in the plan. Churchill and the British military did not want an immediate invasion. Marshall,
in attendance with the U.S. delegation, was extremely
disappointed and, at the same time, irritated. In Marshall’s mind, any commitment of forces in and around
Europe needed to focus on the cross-channel attack.
Through such an attack, Allied forces could push
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across German occupied Western Europe and deliver
a deathblow to Nazi Germany. Marshall, representing the Army’s military establishment, was firmly
convinced that the war effort needed an amphibious
attack. His thoughts, included in what was termed the
“Marshall Memorandum” (April 1, 1942), were clear
and unambiguous. This memorandum, developed in
the War Plans Division of the War Department General
Staff and written by Eisenhower and Colonel Thomas
T. Hardy, clearly stated that a European campaign,
including an invasion of France, was “the only place
in which the bulk of the British ground forces can be
committed to a general offensive in cooperation with
U.S. forces” 47
The Marshall Memorandum proposed a landing
of 30 American divisions, with a total of 1,000,000
American servicemen, supplemented with 18 British
divisions, in an area between ‘Etretat (just north of Le
Havre) and Boulogne. The initial assault wave was to
consist of 77,000 soldiers on a six-division front. Approximately 2,250 tanks, 18,000 vehicles, and 5,800
aircraft (3,250 of which would be American) would
support the invasion. The target date was April 1,
1943. Roosevelt approved the plan. Marshall and Roosevelt’s confident, Harry Hopkins, were directed to
hand carry this plan to London to get the approval of
the British military leadership.
The reception for this ambitious plan proposed by
the American military leadership was polite. On April
14, 1942, the British Chiefs of Staff accepted the Marshall Memorandum, but in principle only. The British
could, in fact, have been more forthcoming with their
misgivings about scheduling such an ambitious undertaking so early in the war. For example, in his diary Field Marshall Lord Alanbrooke noted, “With the
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situation prevailing at that time, it was not possible
to take Marshall’s ‘castles in the air’ too seriously! It
must be remembered that we were at that time hanging on by our eyelids.”48
In 1942, Eisenhower and Marshall pushed
hard for a ground campaign in Europe, but the
British were at best reticent about the concept of
SLEDGEHAMMER. They were even more convinced
that a full-scale cross-channel operation in the spring
of 1943 was simply beyond Allied capabilities. The
British did not immediately point out the problems
with the favored American plan; they withheld their
reservations about the proposed time schedule for the
invasion of the continent.49
It was not until early July 1942 that the British Cabinet clearly stated that it was opposed to any type of
cross-channel operation, even a limited one. The true
British position on an early cross-channel attack came
when King, Marshall, and Hopkins traveled to London to get British agreement about the time and place
of the invasion. This admission motivated Marshall
and King, in meetings held between July 17-22, to propose that if there was no determination on the part
of the British to engage in a cross-channel operation
against France, then the United States should shift its
emphasis and prepare for decisive operations in the
Pacific against the Japanese.50 Roosevelt emphatically
vetoed any such idea. It was still to be Europe first; the
question was not if, but when.
In retrospect, the British were right. Without aerial
superiority (not achievable until early 1944), with a
shortage of amphibious invasion ships, plus a strong
Wehrmacht force in several theaters of war, an invasion of the continent would have been a very risky
venture. Furthermore, the Germans, with a rather
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limited effort, could contain an invasion in a location like the Cotentin Peninsula. An amphibious assault is a direct frontal assault that even with full surprise is a rather risky operation. If the Allies staged
SLEDGEHAMMER, as Marshall proposed in order
to reduce the pressure on the Russians, then it would
likely fail. Failure would likely have resulted in 1942
for many reasons. The U-Boat menace was still present, the Allies were far from achieving aerial superiority in the area where landings were proposed, and an
extremely capable enemy had an excellent chance of
pushing an invading force into the sea. Still, in terms
of good alliance relations, the British should have
been much more direct and early in voicing their misgivings.
Since the British totally opposed a 1942 landing
along the French coast, Marshall, knowing the British preference for a North Africa operation, drafted a
plan for invading North Africa. He discussed the option with King. With King agreeing to the rough draft,
the plan for Operation TORCH (the invasion of North
Africa) appeared to be on schedule for the first American land operation against the Germans. Marshall
scratched SLEDGEHAMMER and postponed BOLERO-ROUNDUP, scheduled for the spring of 1943.
Marshall, returning to Washington, hoped he could
convince Roosevelt to help reverse this British position, and that the United States could continue plans
and preparations for an early invasion in France. On
the evening of July 30, in a meeting at the White House,
the President made it clear that the Allies should execute TORCH at the earliest possible moment, and the
principal objective of the Combined Chiefs of Staff
was to assemble the necessary resources to complete
the operation. 51
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The predictable reaction to the President’s decision
from the U.S. military leadership was that Roosevelt’s
decision was purely political—that politics had overruled military logic. In a sense, they were right, but
it was not merely the President bowing to the logic
of the British prime minister. Domestic politics also
pushed Roosevelt to commit American forces to a
military operation against the Germans before the
end of 1942. SLEDGEHAMMER was only logical if it
prevented the collapse of Russia, but it was acknowledged that it would likely be a failure for American
and British forces. This could have been difficult for
Roosevelt, given the scheduled November congressional elections.
The British were not adverse to a cross-channel
attack, but in their opinion such an operation at this
stage in the war boded more for failure than success.
Staging a cross-channel attack was still the ultimate
plan, agreed to by both the United States and Great
Britain, but a limited 1942 invasion as promoted by
American military planners and a full-scale 1943 invasion became casualties due to stiffening British opposition. The cross-channel attack favored by Marshall
and Eisenhower had to wait.52 Critics have castigated
Roosevelt for the decision to scrap an early crosschannel operation, but even Eisenhower, looking at
the decision in retrospect, admitted that “those who
held the SLEDGEHAMMER operation to be unwise
at the moment were correct in the evaluation of the
problem.”53
From the British perspective, the Allies had to exercise caution about scheduling any amphibious landing too early in the war. At least some of the caution
by Churchill came from his experience in 1915 at the
Gallipoli failure, the only major amphibious operation
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in World War I. This had been, by any measure, an
unmitigated disaster.54 Adding to this embarrassment,
when World War II started, the British Army suffered
a humbling experience at Dunkirk in 1940 when the
Germans shoved them off the continent. Their Dunkirk
experience, and that of the Battle of Britain in August
1940, made them well aware of German capabilities.
The British respect for German defensive capabilities
increased when a largely Canadian force landed at the
French seaport of Dieppe on August 19, 1942. This raid
occurred when, under pressure due to the degenerating course of events in the war, the British decided to
stage some raids along the French coast. They focused
their raid on Dieppe, a location that they thought was
lightly defended by the Germans. Instead, German
defenses were well prepared, and the Canadian forces
took heavy casualties. The Germans also pushed them
off the continent, giving yet another defeat to British
forces.55
The British remained in agreement with the Europe
first concept, but in planning military operations, they
had to consider what was necessary to best serve the
interests of Great Britain and guarantee the continued
existence of the worldwide British Empire. The United States however, only had to consider the security
of North America and its national interests. For both
countries, the new factor was the entry of Japan into
the war and its impact on affected American and British territories. Even though British and U.S. representatives had met repeatedly since 1938 and discussed
cooperation, the prewar committees that focused
on the possibility of a two-front war, with Germany
first, did not anticipate the rapid Japanese drive into
the Southwest Pacific. In addition, there were many
questions: How would the Allies define a defensive
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war in the Pacific, what would be the limitations for
such a war, and what would it cost to contain the Japanese? No one could answer these difficult questions.
The British, though holding fast to Europe first, were
deeply concerned about Australia, New Zealand and,
in early 1942, Singapore.56 The Allies needed to devise
a defensive strategy for the Pacific; they formed a unified command to protect the interests of both countries. The major issues however, were whether American assets were to be used to bolster the defense of
Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand; and the size
of the minimum force necessary for defending Pacific
interests while preparing to defeat Germany.
In terms of the European war, the British were
much more interested in the Mediterranean where
Britain already had a ground campaign in progress
and where they had long-term interests, including the
Suez Canal and oil. Since 1941, British and Axis forces
grappled across North Africa in a seesaw campaign,
each with the hopes of delivering a coup de grace to the
other army. The British felt that the correct strategy to
defeat Germany was a peripheral one. Thus, the Allies should aggressively pursue the war around the
fringes of Germany’s Fortress Europe, rather than an
attack directly at the heartland. As part of this strategic concept, Churchill believed that there was a “soft
underbelly” to Europe exploitable through military
action.
There were elements of the British peripheral concept that American planners could easily accept. A
bomber offensive to destroy the German economy and
bring the war to its leaders and citizens was acceptable
on both sides of the Atlantic. It also fit well with the
AAF’s plans. Another element of the peripheral strategy in which both Western powers could agree was the
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supply and encouragement of the resistance movements that had sprung up all over Europe and other
areas. Finally, both nations understood that the combined power of the American and British navies were
necessary to remove the U-boat menace that would
also contribute to the erosion of German strength. In
all, rather than direct assaults against Fortress Europe,
the Allies should strike where weaknesses appeared
in the German armor. Such attacks, pressure on the
fringes, would wear down Berlin’s strength, albeit at a
slower pace than those in Washington wanted. When
this strategy weakened the once mighty Wehrmacht,
the Allies could attack the European heartland and
drive a stake into the heart of the German beast.
This British approach, conditioned by a lack of resources and the memories of the horrendous losses of
World War I, did little to satisfy the needs of the Soviet Union. The British were not fighting a substantial
part of the German Army, but were fighting the Germans and their Italian Allies in a theater that Hitler
considered a sideshow. The Afrika Korps, and particularly its commander, Rommel, thrilled the German
media and many of the citizenry with its audacity on
the tactical battlefield. However, North Africa was a
campaign borne of Italian failures rather than German
designs.57 In mid-1941, Hitler’s eyes and the resources
of his military were focused on the Soviet Union and
the Führer’s desire to destroy Jewish Bolshevism and
the Slavic state that was its home. Hitler’s war was on
the Russian steppes, the Eurasian heartland, not the
hot, desolate North African sands.
Thus, as 1941 faded into 1942, Russia entered a second year of the war virtually alone; a war where each
side seldom gave quarter. Stalin wanted and needed
help through the establishment of another major
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front. A second front would force the German military to dedicate forces to counter another threat and,
as a consequence, drain the strength of the German
Wehrmacht. According to Churchill, the proposal for
a second front began as early as July 18, 1941. A message from Stalin to Churchill stated:
It seems to me therefore that the military situation of
the Soviet Union as well as Great Britain, would be
considerably improved if there could be established a
front against Hitler in the west—northern France, and
in the North—the Arctic.58

According to Stalin’s message, the dictator found
1941 to be the “most propitious moment” for the establishment of such a front. From the onset however,
Churchill noted the immense problems that were inherent in an amphibious landing in northern France.
Limited British forces would face up to 40 German divisions in well-prepared defenses, and would lack the
necessary air superiority. The British had faced a similar quandary in 1939 when they pondered how to help
Poland, a problem they and their French allies never
resolved. Still, as noted by Churchill, this theme, the
call for a second front, would “recur throughout our
subsequent relations with monotonous disregard, except in the Far North, for physical facts.”59
Considering this early, but cordial exchange between Churchill and Stalin, it seems evident that from
the earliest discussions there were differing priorities
about how and where the Allies could win the European war. From the onset of what Churchill called
the Grand Alliance, the Soviet leadership felt that
Russia, both a participant and a battleground for the
European war, was not receiving sufficient support
from first the British and later the United States. The
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absence of another major front to stretch German capabilities, and the inclination of Stalin to distrust two
of the world’s largest capitalistic countries, led to considerable resentment on the part of Stalin against the
Western Allies. Since the second front did not occur
until June 6, 1944, Stalin’s resentment had a long time
to build.
Granted, Stalin was disappointed, but in many
respects, this situation merely reinforced his long
preconceived distrust of Western democracies and
their capitalistic governments. The landings along the
North African coast—Operation TORCH—beginning
November 8, 1942, were an unqualified success, but
they were hardly what Stalin hoped for, since the attack initially focused on the Vichy French forces and
never had the potential of tying down large numbers
of German units which was the desire of the Soviet
dictator. In many respects, the success of TORCH
only exacerbated the problem for both the Soviets and
the key American strategists that promoted an attack
aimed at northern France. For now, the Western Allies
fought Axis forces in operations in the Mediterranean,
not in France. From the Soviet perspective, the Mediterranean would become a vortex, using more Allied
resources, but not tying down sufficient numbers of
German divisions. The Allies and Axis powers would
not witness a European campaign with any ground
actions focusing on northern France in 1942.
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CHAPTER 3
1943:
FRUSTRATIONS AND SUCCESSES
We’ve got to go to Europe and fight—and we’ve got to
quit wasting resources all over the world.1
				

Dwight D. Eisenhower

In the euphoria of the North Africa landings and
subsequent defeat of German forces, Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and the Combined Chiefs
of Staff (CCOS) met in the newly liberated Moroccan
city of Casablanca in January 1943.2 At the time of
the meeting, the North African campaign was not yet
over, but it appeared that the campaign would be a
success—the ignominious American defeat at Kasserine Pass would not occur until mid February. Both the
British and American leadership agreed without dissention on several issues. First, both agreed about the
necessity of pressing forward with an expanded strategic bombing campaign in 1943, although the British
and Americans had decidedly different viewpoints
concerning how the offensive should be staged.3 A
second and equally important problem was the pressing need to erase the U-boat menace so that American men and supplies could reach Britain and Eastern
Europe. Without secure lines of communication, the
Allies could not undertake a major buildup of men
and materiel for significant operations. The third and
closely related issue for obvious agreement was the
need to continue a solid stream of supplies to support
the Soviet Army in the field. The Soviet ability to tie
down a substantial part of Germany’s elite divisions
was critical for the plans of the Western Allies. Fourth,
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Roosevelt announced a policy of unconditional surrender that would tie all of the Allies to the total defeat of Germany. This policy provided a demonstrated
commitment to Stalin.
Aside from these readily agreed to concepts, two
things were obvious. First, the proposed American operations SLEDGEHAMMER and BOLEROROUNDUP were the preferred operations for the
Americans who had set their sights on a cross-channel attack. George Marshall, Albert Wedemeyer, and
Dwight Eisenhower had agreed that this was the logical path to victory over Nazi Germany. Other than
the cross-channel attack, they had no alternate plan,
no fall back options on how to attack the Germans
once the campaign in North Africa was over.4 As far
as the British were concerned, it was simply too early
in the war for an invasion of Northern Europe. The
Germans were far too strong for the Allies to stage a
direct assault on Fortress Europe. At this stage in the
war, such an operation was still too risky. The British leadership believed the logical place for the Allies
to continue their offensive was in the Mediterranean.
Continued attacks in this region could solidify Allied control of the Mediterranean and fully open the
sea lanes to Allied shipping. Allied planners did consider other alternatives for a follow up to North Africa including operations against Crete, Greece, the
Balkans, the islands of Sardinia and Corsica, or, better
yet, Sicily. Due to the British interest in the mythical
soft underbelly of Europe, they centered their arguments on the value of Sicily.5 If British and American
forces could take the island, then it could provide a
logical bridge to Italy. A successful Sicilian campaign
would allow Allied forces to begin working their way
up the Italian peninsula, then a war weary Italy would
most likely drop out of the conflict.
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General George C. Marshall, the key figure in the
U.S. military buildup before World War II.
As could be expected, Marshall was opposed to any
plan that would delay landings in northern France—
the cross-channel attack. He considered taking the
offense against Germany as being the most desirable
option to retain the initiative once the North African
campaign was over. When asked by Roosevelt when
the Sicilian or other option might occur, Eisenhower
off the cuff responded, “May 1943,” an assessment
due more to luck rather than actual insight.6 Although
Marshall consistently pressed Allied leadership for an
attack on northern France, it was again Churchill and
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his military advisors who carried the day. Consequently, once the North African campaign was over, the
Allies (beginning to refer to themselves as the United
Nations) would invade Sicily, firming up Allied control over the Mediterranean. Operation HUSKY, the
invasion of Sicily, not BOLERO-ROUNDUP, would be
the next Allied operation. In the eyes of some American planners, this was pinprick warfare or pecking
around the periphery, the preferred British strategy.
Nonetheless, the Western Allies acknowledged that a
cross-channel invasion of France would finally occur;
the issue still unresolved was exactly when.
For Marshall and Eisenhower, the failure of the
British to agree to some type of military action in Europe in late 1942 to early 1943 remained a bitter pill.
In their opinion, the only logical way to bring about a
quick and decisive defeat of the Wehrmacht was a direct attack through France culminating in the destruction of the ability of the German nation to wage war. It
seemed that committing American forces to additional
action in the Mediterranean was wrong from two perspectives: first, it seemed to commit American forces
to support primarily British interests; and second, the
selection seemed to support the favored British peripheral strategy, rather than a concentrated attack
against the main body of the German military in Western Europe. Still, for perhaps the wrong reasons, the
British were right. The German Army, despite the impending disasters at Stalingrad and Tunisia, remained
a potent force in the field, as Generalfeldmarschall Erich
von Manstein’s famous “backhand” directed against
the Soviet Army in February and March 1943 would
show.7 The Luftwaffe was still an extremely capable
force and the AAF and RAF would need another year
to reduce it as an effective fighting force. Thus, the
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fact that, in this instance, the President overrode the
favored plans of his military advisors was fortuitous.
Neither Marshall nor Eisenhower ever wavered
from the strategy that the appropriate route to victory
was using the British Isles as a base to buildup the supplies and an appropriate number of troops and then
launch a cross-channel attack into northern France.
Eisenhower reflected on his firm beliefs on what actions the Allies had to take by commenting, “We can’t
win by sitting on our fannies and giving our stuff in
driblets all over the world, with no theater getting
enough.”8 Yet in his opinion, and that of Marshall, the
latter was, in fact, occurring.
Many regard the two key decisions of the Casablanca Conference to have been the postponement of
the cross-channel attack and the decision to invade
Sicily.9 In many respects, they were. Conversely, often overlooked is a subtle yet significant expansion of
the Pacific option. After considerable wrangling about
strategy and priorities by the representatives of the
two sides, British Air Marshall Sir John Slessor developed a compromise that stated:
Operations in the Pacific and Far East shall continue
with the forces allocated, with the objective of maintaining pressure on Japan, retaining the initiative and
attaining a position of readiness for the full scale offensive against Japan by the United Nations as soon as
Germany is defeated. These operations must be kept
within such limits as will not, in the opinion of the
Combined Chiefs of Staff, prejudice the capacity of the
United Nations to take any opportunity that may present itself for the decisive defeat of Germany in 1943.
[Later a provision was added authorizing plans and
preparations, after the capture of Rabaul, for invading
the Marshall and Caroline Islands, provided that this
did not interfere with an invasion of Burma.]10
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The bracketed provision, added later, proved to
be yet another detractor from landings in northern
France, in that it played directly into the hands of
Admiral Ernest King. The latter, though acknowledging the necessity of an invasion of northern France,
was also a proponent for the expansion of major combat operations in the Pacific. King believed that the
strength of American industry could provide the necessary materials to support offensives in both theaters.
He felt that a drive across the central Pacific could cut
the Japanese off from their sources of raw materials
in Southeast Asia, with a minimal commitment of additional resources. Through such a move, the United
States could seriously erode the strength of the Japanese economy and military. The statement in and of
itself did not directly call for a Pacific offensive, but
the latitude was there. Plans to expand operations in
the Pacific also added to the certainty that landings
in northern France in 1943 would not occur, only the
continuance of the intent to do so.

106

Source: U.S. Army Military History Institute.

Admiral Ernest King, Naval Strategist, a major
proponent for shifting more emphasis to the Pacific
Theater.
American participation in the Mediterranean war,
which had begun with Operation TORCH, continued
to grow with the invasion of Sicily followed by landings in Italy. The commitment of men and material to
this theater continued into January 1944, when American forces executed an amphibious assault at Anzio,
that was designed as a classic turning movement.11 At
the same time, King began pursuing his Pacific strategy, driving through the Pacific Mandates controlled
by the Japanese and initiating landings on the Makin
Islands and a successful, though costly, amphibious
landing at Tarawa.12 Douglas MacArthur also moved
through the Southwest Pacific. The war, for American
forces, was spreading, but not yet to northern France.
107

Despite the bitter pill of postponing the 1943 invasion of France, the Mediterranean operations had a
strong supporter, Roosevelt. From almost the beginning of what Churchill called the “Grand Alliance,”
some military officers expressed concern that the
President was under the influence of Churchill. Wedemeyer best summarized the rationale of this criticism
when he stated, “the virtuoso Churchill led the AngloAmerican orchestra, although we furnished practically all of the instruments and most of the musicians.”13
These criticisms grew during the various summits
held between the leaders of the two nations, culminating in the bitter disappointment at Casablanca when
Roosevelt supported the British proposal for continuing operations in the Mediterranean, rather than holding out for the preferred American solution, an invasion of northern France.
Even though the decision to invade Sicily was a
clear disappointment for American Army planners,
Eisenhower came away from his private conversations with Roosevelt with optimism. At Casablanca,
Eisenhower believed that the President was firmly
committed to “our basic concept of European strategy, namely the cross-channel invasion.”14 Roosevelt’s
commitment to this concept became increasingly
evident as the year proceeded. While the President
supported the concept, he consistently coordinated
actions with Churchill who publicly supported the
preferred American strategy, but who, together with
his military leadership, dragged his feet on its early
implementation. Their preference was to continue the
British peripheral strategy, coupled with the bombing
campaign, which would wear down German strength,
a prerequisite for the planned invasion. U.S. Secretary
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of War Henry L. Stimson, spent a week in Britain in
July 1943, and came home convinced that:
. . . no attempt to cross the channel and ‘come to grips
with our German enemy’ was ever going to be made
under British auspices. The heads of their government
oppose it; the shadows of Dunkirk and the Somme fell
too darkly across their minds. ‘Though they have rendered lip service to the operation,’ Stimson wrote to
Roosevelt, ‘their hearts are not in it and it will require
more independence, more faith, and more vigor than
it is reasonable to expect we can find in any British
commander.’15

Stimson’s conversations with Churchill during his
week in London cemented his belief about the British
reticence. Upon his return to Washington, he urged
the President to exert personal leadership in ensuring
that the cross-channel attack remained key to the Allied strategy, and that a commander should be named
who whole-heartedly supported this operation.
Stimson’s preference was Marshall. The President
concurred with Stimson’s conclusions, and in a subsequent meeting held on August 10, 1943, Roosevelt
strongly supported the cross-channel attack. According to one writer, “The cross-channel attack had at last
become wholly his own.”16
For U.S. Army planners, Roosevelt’s commitment
as a strong proponent of the cross-channel attack was
a major coup. But Army planners still had to consider
other actions before a campaign in northern France
could occur and have a chance to succeed. A prerequisite to wage a European campaign, and one on which
the Western Allies agreed, was winning the Battle of
the Atlantic. Even though by this stage in the war the
Germans posed no major threat through what was
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left of their miniscule surface fleet, the U-boat menace
remained a serious peril. By early 1943, however, the
Allies had reached a turning point in the Battle of the
Atlantic. Several factors contributed to the defeat of
Germany in the Atlantic: superior Allied intelligence
capabilities; changes in Allied tactics, advancements
in technology; and better organization in addressing
the U-boat menace, all began to have their impact.
Building on information developed by Polish cryptographers, British intelligence sources had unlocked
the German Enigma encrypting device. Allied intelligence analysts would rely on information from this
source, which they called ULTRA. It was a goldmine
of military information. Through ULTRA, London had
access to message traffic from German military higher
headquarters to include U-boat operations. This was
originally a boon to Allied planners, but in February
1942, the German naval authorities altered their Enigma machines by adding another rotor, thereby changing the code.17 For 10 months, most of 1942, the Allies
were unable to decipher Enigma coded messages. The
loss of ULTRA intercepts reduced London and Washington’s abilities to reroute convoys, thus avoiding
“wolf packs,” and to send hunter-killer teams to destroy the submarines. From February until the end of
the year, German U-boat commanders inflicted their
highest number of casualties on the Allied merchant
fleet.18 Once the new Enigma code was cracked, however, merchant ship losses began to fall and U-boat
casualties began to soar.
Other Allied innovations also helped defeat Uboat operations. The Allied navies used improved microwave surface radar; employed magnetic anomaly
detectors to find submerged submarines; deployed
radio sonobuoy devices; and employed advanced
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adjustable depth charges. Destroyer commanders
employed high-frequency direction finding equipment that would fix the position of a submarine after
it made a radio transmission.19 The U.S. Navy began
employing AAF long-range aircraft to spot U-boats a
factor that dramatically improved its search patterns.

Source: Jim Haley Collection.

Somewhere in the Atlantic, a U-Boat seeks its prey.
Although German commanders moved operations
from the Eastern seaboard into the Gulf of Mexico and
the Caribbean, the U.S. Navy’s tactics became more
effective and efficient in both escort duty and conducting anti-submarine operations. The effect of the Allied
anti-U-boat offensive in the Atlantic was devastating
to the German submarine fleet. Kreigsmarine crews
manned 1,175 submarines, but of that number, a total
of 781 failed to return to their bases. Over 28,000 U-boat
crewmembers died in combat operations, and Allied
navies captured another 5,000. These casualties came
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from a total force of 42,000 men.20 Germany attempted
to counter Allied successes. Submarines started to use
radar detectors, and operations were moved out of
coastal waters to an area called the “Black Pit,” an area
south of Greenland and midway between Newfoundland and Great Britain. U-boat commanders formed
picket lines and used their typical group attack tactics
in an attempt to regain the initiative.
Still, B-24 anti-submarine patrols, enhanced submarine countermeasures, improved communications
intelligence, and attacks by RAF Coastal Command
against French-based German submarines transiting
the Bay of Biscay caused increased losses of submarines. In August 1943, Allied forces sank 41 submarines in the Bay of Biscay and total losses for the year
reached 237 boats.21 By January 1944, Germany had
largely abandoned operations west of Great Britain,
and only single U-boats attempted attacks on convoys.22 Despite the cost, German U-boat operations
proved very effective since throughout the war they
sank over 2,603 merchant ships and 175 naval vessels.
More than 30,000 British merchantmen lost their lives
due to these attacks.23 Allied casualties amounted to
more than 50,000.24 Winning the battle of the Atlantic
in 1943 was crucial for the Allies because it meant that
merchant shipping could begin the buildup of forces
for a ground invasion of France.
A second and equally important preparatory campaign, necessary for the invasion of Europe, was a
successful air campaign to reduce a number of German capabilities. AWPD/42 had proposed the accomplishment of one significant task in preparation for a
successful invasion—achieving aerial superiority over
the continent. This proved to be a difficult task for
the Allies, because initially the Germans had made a
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heavy investment in aviation. The Allies hoped that
by attacking the production facilities for airframes
and aviation power plants, the AAF and RAF could
reduce the Luftwaffe’s effectiveness. At the end of 1942,
however, the German Air Force was still a potent adversary. Under pressure to assess the effectiveness of
air power, on March 8, 1943, General “Hap” Arnold
formed the Committee of Operations Analysts (COA).
COA members included former Secretary of the War
Elihu Root, Jr.; Edward Mead Earle, military historian
from Princeton University; Edward S. Mason, Office
of Strategic Services’ Research and Analysis; Fowler
Hamilton, Chief of the Board of Economic Warfare;
and a prominent New York lawyer, Thomas W.
Lamont. The committee made a 2-week effort to study
German industry. They used specialists that included
experts from the Departments of State and Commerce,
economists, industrialists, financiers, individuals who
had worked in German plants, and assorted others to
create a targeting list of 19 key industries.
The study dropped electrical power as a priority,
because the Germans used a network of production
facilities. The study members believed that disrupting
power originating along the Rhine, Ruhr, and central
Germany was too difficult.25 Transportation was also
a vital target, but here too significant disruption was
hard to achieve. Like AWPD/42, the COA study recognized aircraft, especially plants producing fighters,
as the most vital priority. The second most important
target was anti-friction ball bearing factories. If the
American air power could destroy ball bearing plants,
then German industry as well as the Wehrmacht would
come to a halt.
This new target list forced a change in emphasis
for the AAF’s strategic bombardment campaign. In
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keeping with these new priorities, in the summer of
1943 AAF aircraft staged bombing raids on the Rumanian oil fields in Ploesti, German ball bearing plants
at Schweinfurt, and the Messerschmitt aircraft plant
at Regensburg, making the Luftwaffe’s destruction a
key priority. Although the AAF attacks did create a
disruption of the German economy, it proved to be
only temporary. Repair, dispersion, and purchases
from foreign sources quickly replaced the damaged
capacity. The most serious problem resulting from
these raids for the Allies was the cost in trained personnel and aircraft. In the August 17, 1943, attacks on
Schweinfurt and Regensburg, unescorted American
bombers lost 60 of the 306 B-17s that reached the targets. An additional 27 airplanes suffered serious damage.26 A second attack on Schweinfurt lost a further 60
B-17s out of 291 aircraft. The AAF unescorted bomber
attacks against Luftwaffe production facilities proved
disastrous.27
Without long-range escort fighters, victory
through strategic bombardment would not come
fast, nor would it be cheap. From necessity, American air power advocates had to change strategy again.
The AWPD/42 planners had to change their focus to
that of destroying the Luftwaffe itself as the key priority, and thus forcing a restructuring of American aircraft production. American industry had to increase
the manufacture of long-range fighters to escort the
bombers and to defeat and destroy German fighters.
Additionally, the AAF had to go after German aircraft bases and industries like airplane engine plants.
These U.S. fighters would be critical for both escort
duties in support of strategic bombardment and for
a less favorite mission, conducting tactical operations
in support of ground forces. This change diverted

114

more resources away from the manufacture of bombers and training pilots for such missions. In short, the
AAF had to move in two different directions by the
demand for aircraft and pilots. The preferred mission,
strategic bombing—and the pilots and airframes to
support it—had to compete with the need for fighters
for both escort aircraft and close air support.
An additional issue facing air planners was the
different methodologies used by the AAF and RAF in
conducting their Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO).
The AAF generally operated during the daylight
hours in an attempt to destroy their targets with accurate bombing raids, thereby limiting collateral damage. Airmen desired precision, but despite the great
effort by AAF aircrews, measured bomb accuracy was
in miles rather than feet.28 The RAF viewed the strategic air offensive through an entirely different lens.
Britain’s war planners were in agreement with their
American peers about the desired ends, the destruction
of the National Socialist state. Much like the AAF, the
RAF did not initially possess long-range escort fighters
to protect its bombers. Most of the RAF’s fighter force
was composed of short-range interceptors—Spitfires
and Hurricanes—aircraft that had served as the backbone of the island kingdom’s defense during the Battle of Britain. Defense of the British Empire also forced
the assignment of fighters throughout the world from
Great Britain to the Far East. When the RAF conducted the initial bombing raids over German territory,
unescorted bombers made the attacks. Lacking fighter
support, the Luftwaffe made the lightly armed, slow
RAF bombers pay dearly for the raids. RAF officers
recognized the folly of using daylight bombardment
missions when faced by a dedicated fighter force.
Their solution was to attack at night. Night attacks
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resulted in far fewer losses, but accuracy suffered as
British bombers continued attacks on industrial centers and cities. RAF bombers would eventually have a
host of guidance systems to assist their planes in finding targets, but this process was still less accurate than
the American daylight raids. RAF officers advocated
that their raids should concentrate on two targets: oil
and morale.29 Fortunately, for the British, despite the
strength of German fighter forces, German air defenders did not have a centralized control system like the
RAF did, nor at the war’s onset did Berlin possess effective night fighters.30
The AAF and RAF were both convinced that a
strategic bombing offensive would irreparably harm
the German economy and its military capabilities, and
would result in the collapse of the German population’s will. Although the AAF realized that it needed to attain air superiority to accomplish its goal of
destroying Germany, the lack of long-range fighters
forced changes to its prewar plans. The AAF leadership recognized that it would have to target airfields
and aircraft production centers as part of the strategic
bombardment campaign; however, the realization of
a more dedicated Luftwaffe fighter force, massed antiaircraft artillery, improved radar, and the continental
nature of the air defenses forced the AAF to put more
emphasis on gaining air superiority than was originally planned. The limited number of aircraft devoted to
the AAF’s bombardment could not suffer additional
losses at the hands of enemy air defenses. Additionally, with bombers and fighters diverted to North Africa
in late 1942 to early 1943, many AAF officers found it
increasingly difficult to gain air superiority.
RAF leadership pushed attacks on targets that
were much different in terms of priority and scope
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from their AAF allies. Their primary focus was on
area attacks, delivered at night, to undermine German
morale. The RAF did target the petroleum industry,
since British intelligence sources estimated that oil
was the primary ingredient that powered the economy and military transportation. Unfortunately, the
RAF had a difficult time in targeting petroleum plants
because of the distance and the inherent inaccuracy
of night bombing. The AAF and RAF also differed in
their theoretical outlook for a strategic bombardment
campaign. While the AAF used Air Corps Tactical
School concepts to guide its strategy, RAF officers
stressed concepts favored by a senior British officer,
Air Marshal Hugh Trenchard.31 He stressed that attacking targets that could undermine German morale
was 20 times more effective than those that focused on
material damage.32
Prominent RAF officials, like Sir Charles Portal
and Trenchard, mistakenly thought that the German
population had much less stamina and resilience to
bombing than the British population.33 If aircrews
conducted sufficient bombing, townspeople and their
officials would pressure Hitler’s government to capitulate. Thus, the RAF would still target industrial
centers as a part of its nighttime bombing campaign,
however inaccurately, but the preferred target was the
destruction of the German morale. Churchill allowed
attacks on German cities which observers described as
“absolutely devastating, exterminating attacks.”34 This
focus on the population and its morale might have
worked on more liberal, democratic governments, but
advocates of surrender or accommodation would not
have fared well under the Nazi regime.
The RAF methodology of night area bombing
meant that the RAF did not need to develop a pre-
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cision aiming system, only sufficient navigational
expertise to drop its ordinance on a general targeted
area. Once pathfinder aircraft preceded the main body
of British bombers and marked the general area of the
city, precision was not necessary. Anything in the area
was vulnerable. Additionally, the British did not have
the necessary aircraft resources to focus precision attacks on economic targets. The British attempted to
use night attacks on cities to destroy workers’ housing, morale and, of course, the workers as well, all of
which would hinder German industrial strength.35
Indirectly, through these attacks, the RAF could test
Trenchard’s ideas and at the same time support attacks on industrial power. Some RAF officers also suggested that bombing industrial targets or cities would
result in retribution by the Luftwaffe with chemical or
biological weapons. Fortunately, this did not occur.
Later in the war, the RAF would be required to add
silencing German V-1 and V-2 facilities to its bombing campaign, targets that would require much more
precision than mere area bombing.

118

Source: U.S. Air Force.

A work horse of the Combined Bomber
Offensive in Europe was the American B-17.
Capable of carrying a healthy bomb load and
extremely tough, the B-17 was a superb aircraft.
The AAF and RAF leadership sought to focus their
efforts on the strategic bombardment mission as the
primary means to make continual direct attacks on
Germany. However, they faced increased demands
for fighters, medium bombers, and heavy bombers for
tactical roles. Tactical aircraft operations were a part
of AWPD/1 and later plans for the AAF to support
forces after an invasion, but the clear focus for immediate American plans was to produce and employ
strategic bombers. The RAF had a different experience. Although RAF Bomber Command had staged
numerous raids on German cities, it had the added
pressure of conducting operations on German and
Italian ground forces in the Mediterranean. RAF tactical aviation had demonstrated its great value by sup-
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porting major operations in the highly mobile warfare
of North Africa. British tactical air and ground forces
cooperated as equal partners to conduct operations
against Rommel’s vaunted Afrika Korps.36
The RAF had organized its air power based on
function. RAF tactical aviation activities relied on
a fighter command to defend the British Isles, with
bomber, coastal, and other commands for their specific missions.37 In contrast, the AAF organized its forces
under a single commander, who was under the direction of the supported theater commander. Early in the
war, RAF and British Army cooperation did exist, but
the relationship focused on artillery spotting, reconnaissance, and limited battlefield bombing. Beginning
with the Battle of Britain and followed by the initiation of the strategic bombardment campaign and the
growing aerial anti-submarine activities, competition
for limited air resources began. During the Battle of
Britain, the RAF tactical role languished, at least temporarily. Once the RAF was successful in thwarting
German aerial efforts to defeat Britain, therefore the
interceptor role was not as heavy a drain, improved
close air support to ground forces became more important. Additionally, with the reduction of Luftwaffe
raids and the infusion of American industrial production, more aircraft were becoming available.
The RAF initiated a policy to provide “Direct Air
Support” by tactical aviation for ground units in September 1941. 38 Although many issues involving coordination and control of aircraft remained unanswered,
the RAF and British ground forces would evolve into
a model of air-ground cooperation that the AAF tactical aviation forces would later adapt for their use.
The November 1942 invasion of Morocco and
Algeria under Operation TORCH, provided United
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States military forces with needed tactical experience.
In North Africa, AAF units operated under British
command to gain their necessary experience. The British RAF had an air commander who exercised centralized control of operations and who could prioritize
and direct missions to include close air support, air
superiority fighter sweeps, interdiction of supply and
troop movements, attacking lines of communication,
and making long-range attacks. This was in contrast
to the scattering of AAF units under command of a
ground theater commander. This experience of working under British command would result in the AAF
organization evolving into more of a British model
where tactical aircraft operations involved one of cooperation and improved support of ground forces.
This would ultimately affect AAF operations in North
Africa, Italy, and Western Europe.39 Fighter and tactical bomber aircraft staged strikes against German and
Italian forces in North Africa working with ground
commanders. Although disputes about the priority of
targets continued, tactical aircraft operations became
a key element of military activities. Away from European industrial type targets, AAF fighters and medium bombers directly supported surface operations
that provided invaluable services to ground forces.
Tactical aircraft operations in the Mediterranean
started to force changes in how best to use air power to
defeat Axis military forces. The results of employing
tactical air power had an immediate and visible impact
in the theater as compared to the strategic bombardment campaign, a strategy whose results were more
difficult to assess in the short term. As the AAF and
RAF gained air superiority over the Luftwaffe and the
Italian Regia Aeronautica, Allied air operations could
concentrate on defeating German and Italian ground
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units in detail. Rather than merely subordinating air
forces to ground commanders, a general command
structure to fight the war as a joint and combined team
evolved which proved more effective in the conduct
of the Mediterranean war.40
Still, the diversion of aircraft to battlefield support
and interdiction missions was not popular with many
AAF and RAF officers who were devoted to strategic
bombardment. For example, in preparation for the
Normandy invasion, Eisenhower and his subordinate
invasion force commanders wanted to divert heavy
bombers from their preferred mission to support activities in the invasion and breakout of Allied forces
in Normandy. Eisenhower’s staff wanted to drop
more than 45,000 tons of bombs on 101 rail centers in
France.41 This bombing would limit the rail movement
of reserve forces and supplies headed toward Normandy to relieve German defenders and force them
to use roads or travel farther to reach the invasion site.
Tactical air forces alone, both American and British,
did not have the capacity to deliver sufficient bomb
loads; they needed heavy bomber support. If the Germans moved their military forces on roads in daylight,
they would be subject to ruinous strafing and bombing since the Allies would have uncontested air superiority by this time.
Despite the critical nature of this air offensive that
would affect the liberation of France and subsequent
campaigns in Western Europe, some AAF and RAF
commanders balked at the request. These commanders believed the use of strategic resources for ground
support was “tragically wasteful.”42 After all, AAF
officers had overseen the design and production of
medium and heavy bombers to conduct an aerial campaign in the heartland of German occupied Europe to
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destroy the civilian, military, and industrial infrastructure of Germany. Given the contention over tactical
versus strategic employment of airpower, Eisenhower
ultimately compromised by planning for coordinated
attacks by both strategic and tactical airpower. The
conflicts regarding control of the air offensive and the
philosophical debate on the appropriate use of airpower at times seemed ready to derail key missions
planned in preparation for the Normandy invasion,
but in the end Eisenhower’s personal leadership and
the capability of American industry to produce large
numbers of aircraft allowed both types of missions.
The philosophical debate over the appropriate use of
airpower, however, remained contentious.
After the Normandy invasion, the extended use of
tactical air operations posed several new problems for
the Allies. Unexpected weather, the need to gain bases
close to the battlefield, the coordination of attacks with
heavy-bomber support, mechanical problems, logistics, and other concerns created the potential for the
accidental bombing of British and American ground
forces.43 Additionally, like the strategic bombardment efforts, many aircrews in tactical aviation units
lacked detailed information about targets. Despite
these problems, air and ground officers developed airground coordination teams with some success. Aerial
photography provided some relief to this problem,
but this type of intelligence was more fleeting than
with strategic targets. Planning attacks against mobile
formations or smaller, camouflaged locations was difficult to accomplish. Heavy vegetation often obscured
the landscape. Air and ground commanders had to establish proper timing to coordinate aerial and surface
fire to avoid wasting limited fire support and ensure
maneuver elements could accomplish their objectives
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without delay. Proper coordination would also reduce
fratricide of Allied ground forces by the AAF and RAF.
Throughout the European Campaign, tactical air
operations would support ground operations. The
joint efforts by air and ground assets were an unbeatable combination. In Normandy, when tactical air
power was available, German maneuver was limited
and Allied tactical air power was an invaluable key
to victory.44 Allied leadership had to adjust strategic
concepts throughout the war regarding its air forces.
Although AAF and RAF commanders made several
changes to force structure and operations, the flexible
nature of employing air power allowed these modifications. Despite the diversion of strategic bombardment efforts, the AAF and RAF tactical forces gave
Allied commanders a host of capabilities including
close air support, interdiction, and gaining air superiority. Aerial operations complemented the Allied rapid movement in the European Campaign by creating
greater momentum and improved tactical mobility.45
Ground and air leaders had to amend the means and
ways to make these changes work.
A consistent issue that plagued those who promoted the strategic bombing campaign was the material
and personnel demands for strategic airpower; it was
resource and time intensive for both the Americans
and the British. Conducting the CBO was initially
impossible for the British because in January 1941,
the RAF had no heavy four-engine bombers.46 By
midyear, the RAF could only muster 31 heavy bombers. This limited number of aircraft could only initiate the process of bringing the German nation to its
knees. As the war proceeded, however, from 1941 to
1945 the British aircraft industry was able to produce
14,306 heavy bombers.47 The American aircraft indus-
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try was even more robust and proved capable of outproducing both the British and German industries.
In January 1939, before Washington’s entry into the
war, American aircraft companies were able to field
more B-17s, either on contract or completed (52 airplanes), than the RAF flew even after 1 1/2 years into
of war.48 As the United States approached the war,
production continued to build with American industry slated to produce 220 B-17s, in the last 6 months of
1941.49 Washington transferred some of these planes
to supplement RAF forces. Even with a two-front war,
American aircraft firms assembled bombers not only
for the strategic bombardment effort, but also for antisubmarine and tactical air operations. During World
War II, U.S. aircraft plants built a total of 30,865 B-17
and B-24 aircraft.50 Aircraft plants around the nation
manufactured more B-24s than any American aircraft
type in the conflict. The AAF procured 18,190 B-24s as
well as the second most numerous plane, 15,863 P-47
fighters.51 At the same time, the AAF was also developing and building its B-29 Superfortress that was
used to attack the Japanese home islands.
American industry could and did replace the
AAF’s damaged or destroyed planes despite bomber
losses. The AAF and the nation had the resources and
the industrial base to conduct the strategic bombardment campaign. Washington could have changed its
priority from four-engine bombers to tactical aircraft.
Instead, U.S. decisionmakers chose to focus primarily
on bomber production, given the AAF’s emphasis on
bombardment. Retaining the emphasis on four-engine
bombers was expensive since the average cost of a B-24
bomber was $304,391 as compared to a P-47 fighter
at $105,594.52 AAF planners could have built almost
three P-47s for the cost of a single B-24. By 1944, at
peak production for each aircraft, the ratio was 2.51:1.
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Aircrews were another story. Producing qualified
crews took time and effort. Both the B-17 and the B-24
required a crew of 10 as compared to a fighter, which
required only the pilot. Thus, the AAF suffered even
heavier personnel losses than just the aircraft losses of
1943. Since American airspace was under control, aircrew training was never an issue. With skies safe from
enemy attacks, the AAF trained more than 193,000 pilots, 45,000 bombardiers, 297,000 gunners, and 50,000
navigators for the war.53 Pilot training was so successful that by December 1943, the United States was
overproducing aircrews. By that time, the AAF had
over 74,000 pilots in uniform.54 Pilot training slowed
in 1944, despite the massive CBO activities, but the
AAF could and did produce more than enough flight
crews.
Despite differences in strategic, operational, and
tactical approaches, the CBO remained a major element in the AAF’s offensive against Germany and its
forces in the European Theater. The AAF and RAF
began CBO attacks in January 1943 and continued to
the last days of the war in Europe in May 1945. The
RAF never strayed from its reliance on night attacks
even though immature radio and radar guidance resulted in inaccurate bombing. Despite the inherent
inaccuracy, the RAF’s area bombings began to immolate cities and the weight of British efforts did affect
German capabilities. Even though the RAF regarded
night attacks as safer than daylight missions, the Germans countered with improved German air defenses
and developed a robust night fighter capability. From
January 1943 to March 1944, the RAF Bomber Command lost 5,881 aircraft, either due to anti-aircraft flak
artillery or night fighters.55
The AAF continued daylight raids, but at a much
heavier price. By the spring of 1943, the Luftwaffe com126

manders assigned over 70 percent of their fighters
to the West.56 The myth that heavily armed bombers
could survive missions without fighter escorts over
German defenses quickly evaporated. Early in the
war, AAF leadership believed strongly in a strategic
bombing campaign with self-defending aircraft that
did not require fighter escorts. Bomber units quickly
found this belief to be erroneous. As the pace of Allied
bombing increased, Luftwaffe fighter and anti-aircraft
artillery units took a heavy toll on unescorted daylight
bomber raids. Bomber losses over heavily defended
industrial targets like Schweinfurt, Regensburg, and
others compelled the AAF and RAF to modify their
strategy: First, American fighters, initially P-47 Thunderbolts and ultimately P-51 Mustangs, were fitted
with long-range fuel tanks and escorted four-engine
bombers into the heartland of Germany where they
effectively engaged German fighters. Even with the
introduction of long-range fighter escorts, bomber
losses were significant. Secondly, Allied fighter production increased to higher levels to gain control over
European skies allowing a continuation of the bomber
offensive as well as providing support over the future
battlefields in Western Europe. Third, the AAF started
to attack and defeat the Luftwaffe in the air and on the
ground with its improved tactical aviation forces.
From February 20 to 25, 1944, AAF leaders concentrated their efforts on the enemy’s aviation industry
under an offensive titled Operation ARGUMENT.
The AAF designed this campaign to reduce the Luftwaffe’s ability to defend the Reich and challenge Allied
air power. The 8th Air Force from England and the
15th Air Force in Italy struck German, Austrian, and
other aircraft manufacturing and component plants.
The RAF supported this “Big Week” by hitting cities
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at night where aircraft factories were located. At least
3,800 AAF bomber sorties supported by 3,500 fighter
escort sorties dropped 10,000 tons of bombs on targets. This effort destroyed some factories and forced
dispersal of the German aviation industry, inhibiting its ability to supply aircraft and maintain existing
fighter forces. Further, German aircraft manufacturers
could not maintain production schedules and plans
to introduce modified or new weapons, like the Me262 jet fighter. Coupled with the increasing strength
and quality of Allied long-range fighters, dwindling
oil supplies and the lack of a stable training base to
replace heavy casualties among aircrews forced the
Luftwaffe into a tail spin from which it would never
recover.57 The Big Week destroyed almost 75 percent
of the industrial facilities that sustained 90 percent of
German aircraft production.58
All of this was possible because the United States
had the population and training base to replace losses and to supply more crews into the European and
Pacific Theaters. For example, in September 1943,
the AAF had 373 combat ready heavy bomber crews
operating in Western Europe; by June 1944, the effective strength grew to 1,855 crews, despite significant
losses.59 Increased emphasis on employing fighters
to escort bombers allowed the Allies to continue the
CBO. Additionally, more pilots and airframes later
provided invaluable assets to tactical forces conducting close air support and interdiction missions when
Allied forces invaded France.
Despite high losses, the CBO provided other dimensions to the Allied offensive against the Luftwaffe:
The continual bombing diverted great numbers of
Luftwaffe aircraft away from the Eastern Front and other theaters in order to protect German cities. German
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aircraft losses and expanded defensive requirements
forced German officials to reallocate their dwindling
economic resources to produce additional weapons
for the air war instead of tanks, vehicles, artillery, or
other armaments. From June to December 1941, Germany lost 3,157 aircraft of all types, which represented
55.8 percent of its force. During January to June 1944,
the Luftwaffe lost another 10,137 aircraft, an astounding 137.1 percent of authorized aircraft strength.60 Experienced crews became a rarity that forced increased
training demands and even higher losses as the AAF
and RAF grew in strength and skill. Anti-aircraft artillery requirements also ballooned, increasing from
791 batteries deployed in the Reich in 1940 to 2,132 in
1943. Without the CBO, Germany could have released
these assets for use by ground forces.61
The losses to the German economy and the impact
on its morale caused by the CBO are difficult to measure, but there was an impact. Airpower theory developed in the wake of World War I’s trench warfare
carnage, postulated that wars could be won by using
strategic bombardment to destroy infrastructure and
morale. The AAF and RAF devoted vast resources and
effort into turning their prewar concepts of strategic
bombardment into an air campaign, but results in
both the Battle of Britain and the CBO leave the accuracy of the strategic airpower theory open to question.
One can only estimate the potential loss of economic
production. Reductions in German economic efficiency by disrupting working schedules and dispersion of
industries certainly had an impact. The American and
British air campaign, which commenced in 1943, did
affect German production, but determining the total
effect on the economy is difficult. Berlin had not fully
mobilized the economy until well after the start of
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the war. German industrial production accelerated in
1943 and actually reached its peak in August 1944. Diversion of resources to higher priorities also skewed
production. Conversely, attacks on petroleum and
transportation networks did slow German military
activities. The impact of the CBO on German morale
is more difficult to measure, but as any G.I. fighting
in the spring of 1945 would attest, it was not decisive.
Despite the emphasis on building four-engine,
long-range bombers, the AAF and RAF had to support a number of ongoing operations worldwide,
build and train an adequate force, and wait until conditions were suitable to begin striking at the heart of
Germany. Although the CBO did not achieve its prewar predictions of swiftly defeating Germany, it did
add an essential dimension to the Allied campaign.
The campaign contributed to the softening up of the
Germans, aided the European ground campaign, and
added pressure on the German production capability.
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CHAPTER 4
D-DAY:
PLANNING AND EXECUTION
Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen of the Allied Expeditionary Force. You are about to embark on the great
crusade towards which we have striven these many
months.1
		

Dwight D. Eisenhower, June 6, 1944

A cross-channel attack to initiate the European
Campaign remained the linchpin of American strategy
for taking the war to Germany and defeating its armies
in the field. This approach remained the centerpiece of
Allied strategy despite the feared casualty rate from a
dedicated German resistance, and the fact that the neither the British allies nor U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt would support an early implementation of this
plan as originally proposed in mid-1942. Thus, American and British military leaders had to delay the invasion from 1943 until the spring of 1944. Participants
at the January 1943 Casablanca conference reaffirmed
the commitment to this event, even though in some of
the meetings Admiral Ernest King continued to press
for greater emphasis on Pacific operations.2 At Casablanca, a significant decision was made: the necessity
of establishing a joint Anglo-American planning staff,
to be located in London. In actuality, the first significant Allied planning group had been the Allied Force
Headquarters (AFHQ) commanded by then Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower. In a dual-hatted
role, Eisenhower had been responsible for conducting
the Operation TORCH invasion and, at the same time,
he commanded the European Theater of Operations,
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United States Army (ETOUSA), a headquarters that
was responsible for all American forces stationed in
Great Britain. While Eisenhower was absorbed with
command of Operation TORCH, it was necessary for
him to have a deputy to actually run the British operations. Once Operation TORCH had succeeded, Eisenhower’s span of responsibility increased considerably.
He split these two functions, retaining command of
AFHQ while delegating the actual control of ETOUSA
to Lieutenant General Frank M. Andrews.
Another important strategic decision from the Casablanca conference was the role of strategic airpower
in the European Campaign. Even prior to Casablanca,
Allied leaders determined that a necessary preparatory phase for a successful European ground campaign
was “the heaviest possible air offensive against the
German war effort.”3 Beyond this general statement,
a number of questions remained. For example, what
were the priorities of such an offensive? Would it be
directly coordinated with ground forces operations or
would it be a largely independent operation? Finally,
what would be the level of coordination between the
AAF and the RAF, and whose tactics would be used to
pursue this air offensive? British Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s support settled the latter issue: The
RAF would have the ability to pursue its nighttime
area bombing campaign, while the AAF would pursue its controversial daylight precision bombing campaign.4 Air operations emanating from Britain would
be under the overall control of the RAF, but each air
force would have the latitude to pursue the bombing
campaign, using its own nationally determined tactics. General targeting concepts were agreed upon.
Since no Allied ground troops were on the main body
of the continent, the preparatory phase for the cam-
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paign would be independent of, and not coordinated
with, ground forces. At the same time, per agreements
between General George Marshall and RAF Air Chief
Marshal Sir Charles Portal, the air emphasis would
switch to the support of ground operations when the
invasion started.5
The necessity to appoint a staff clearly tasked to
focus on planning for an invasion, rather than provide
this function as an additional duty, was evident, given
the size and importance of the task. The establishment
of a new allied command was initially a slow process
at least in part due to the vague nature of its charter
at Casablanca. Nonetheless, the process of putting together a staff started in early 1943. Allied leadership
appointed Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Morgan
as the commander. A highly respected British officer, Morgan’s task was to build a planning staff that
would lay the foundation for the cross-channel attack.
Morgan’s actual title was Chief of Staff to the Supreme
Allied Commander (COSSAC). American and British
leaders had not appointed a supreme commander
for the campaign yet, but in his role as Chief of Staff,
Morgan had the responsibility of planning the actual
attack.6 Morgan arrived in March 1943 and received
a less than an enthusiastic overview of his duties:
Chief of the Imperial General Staff Field Marshal Alanbrooke gave the overview, summarized Morgan’s
task, and concluded with the statement, “Well, there it
is. It won’t work, but you must bloody well make it.”7
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Source: U.S. Army Military History Institute.

Frederick Morgan was one of the original planners
for a cross channel attack. He is shown here (on the
left) with Admiral Sir Harold Burrough in May 1945
in Reims, France.
As Morgan formed his staff, his goal was to achieve
a good balance by using both British and American
officers. He believed that the supreme commander
would be British and thus had the basic command
structure set up on a British model with a British Chief
of Staff. Under this command umbrella, he envisioned
having British, Canadian, and American headquarters
that would handle the administrative work for their
respective armies. Morgan had an American, Brigadier General Ray W. Barker, as his Deputy Chief of
Staff. For air operations, he secured the services of
American Carl Spaatz and from the Royal Air Force,
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Air Marshal Arthur Travers Harris, as well as Air
Chief Marshal Sir Trafford L. Leigh-Mallory. While
both Britain and the United States had ample representation in airpower, on the Navy side the primary
planner was initially Commodore John Hughes-Hallet. Hughes-Hallet’s experience included being a planner for the Dieppe raid, not exactly a comforting fact.
Despite limited naval assets, Morgan and his staff had
the task of planning for a major cross-channel attack.
At the same time, they were to have a contingency
plan available to rush troops to Europe if it seemed
likely that the German army was weakening or disintegrating, and thus the Allies might conduct a landing
with limited resistance.8
Morgan and his staff, though they were operating
with limited personnel, worked diligently on the enormous task that faced them. Morgan regarded the COSSAC role as that of a coordinating body which was in
fact ”. . . the embryo of the future Supreme Headquarters Staff.”9 One of the key tasks for COSSAC was to
determine where the invasion would take place. To
accomplish this task, he gave his American contingent
the task of researching the possibility of landing the
assault force on Normandy, while the British staffers
were to look at the advantages and disadvantages of
Pas de Calais. The choice was in many respects difficult. Both staffs assumed the Germans would have
heavy defenses at both landing sites. They thought
Calais would have more defenses than the Normandy
region. Calais, however, had a certain number of advantages. It was closer to Great Britain and led to excellent terrain for mobile warfare. Furthermore, Calais
was on a direct route to Northern Germany, the path
had a good east-west road network that led straight
to the strategic prize, Berlin. Calais, with its proxim-
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ity to Britain, was an obvious choice to the Allies, but
to the Germans as well. Normandy also had a good
road network leading inland. Both proposed landing
areas had beaches that were acceptable for amphibious landings. Normandy, though obviously further
from Germany, offered one significant advantage: If
the Allies made successful landings near the Cotentin
Peninsula, and American and British forces occupied
the Peninsula, then the Allies would have a suitable
port, Cherbourg.10
In the end, there were few significant advantages
of one site over the other. Thus, additional staff work
was necessary to develop a recommendation that
COSSAC could forward to the upper echelons of command. The staff thinking was crystallized in a conference held by Admiral of the Fleet Louis Mountbatten,
who invited Morgan to what has become known as the
“Rattle Conference.” This joint and Allied conference,
almost an old world gentlemen’s party, was characterized by both serious meetings and by innumerable
social occasions and outings. Attendees included 20
general officers, 11 air marshals and air commodores,
and 8 admirals. Attendees came from American, Canadian, and, of course, British services. Mountbatten
enthusiastically chaired the meetings which included
a myriad of social events. The group reached a final
consensus: the location for the cross-channel attack
would be Normandy.11
These ranking officers had worked through this
planning process; higher authorities would approve
the final decision, the actual landing site. It would be
a decision by the highest-level officials at the next Allied conference scheduled for Quebec in August 1943.
Even here, after 2 years of meetings between representatives of the American and British governments,
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there was still some friction on the issue of when a
cross-channel attack would occur. The British preference was still to delay until peripheral operations
could wear down the German strength through actions such as the CBO or operations in Italy and the
Mediterranean. By 1943, the Soviet Army’s resistance
to the Germans created increased numbers of casualties throughout the Wehrmacht, another factor that
weakened Berlin’s strength. Casablanca participants
had agreed to conduct detailed planning for the “second front” which, of course, resulted in the creation of
COSSAC.12
Some thorny problems remained for the Western
Allies, despite their excellent record of ironing out
national differences. At the Arcadia conference in December 1941, attendees had agreed that a single Allied
commander would be appointed for each theater of
operations. In keeping with prior agreements, once
COSSAC began to operate in 1943, its plan called for
the invasion force to consist of three divisions, two of
which were to be British (and supported by a single
airborne division).13 Since the majority of the force
proposed for the invasion was British, it followed that
the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force
would come from that nation. 14
Those familiar with amphibious operations would
quickly recognize that this was, at best, a conservative number of divisions for such an undertaking.
Conversely, Morgan and his staff faced significant
resource constraints such as the availability of landing craft, men, and supplies. British senior political
and military leaders were also cognizant of the reality facing the island nation. Planning an amphibious
operation, a direct assault against prepared German
defensive positions, brought back ghosts from the
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past. British leaders recalled the specters from World
War I; Gallipoli and the Somme. Adding to the problems posed by those unpleasant memories, there was
a physical limit to what Britain could contribute on
the ground. The British had been fighting German aggression since September 1939, and by the end of 1941,
with the addition of the Italian and Japanese foes,
Britain and its Commonwealth nations had reached
their limit of the supply of additional divisions. Simply, they were running out of men. As the buildup of
forces and supplies continued, it became increasingly
evident that the preponderance of the invasion force
would have to be Soldiers in the service of the United
States Army.
Churchill had originally promised the position of
Supreme Commander to Field Marshal Alanbrooke.
The invasion force’s national composition, however,
logically caused reconsideration. Given the increasing
number of American units in the landings, it seemed
obvious that an American would become the Supreme
Commander. Churchill and Roosevelt recognized
this in August 1943 at Quebec when they agreed that
the changing circumstances meant that an American
would have to be in command. Before the conference
was completed, Churchill informed Alanbrooke that
the command of the Expeditionary Force was going to
go to an American, General George C. Marshall. This
decision was a good one for the Alliance, but likely
fueled Alanbrooke’s dislike of many American senior
leaders. 15
The choice for the Supreme Commander, agreed
to by Churchill and Roosevelt, was Marshall, but
other decisions resulted. When Marshall assumed
this command, Roosevelt planned for Eisenhower to
take Marshall’s position as U.S. Army Chief of Staff.
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Eisenhower had impressed many American and British leaders with his work on American war plans and
at several Allied Conferences. Problems, however,
emerged with Marshall as the selected commander,
at least in Roosevelt’s mind. Marshall’s competence
was beyond question and he had earned this combat
command. The President initially seemed willing to
reward Marshall with this coveted command, but at
the same time, he seemed uncomfortable with a Washington without him. Thus, in the weeks that followed
the pivotal Quebec conference, the President did not
make any announcement concerning who would
command the growing American force in Great Britain. However, military staffs entertained the widely
rumored belief that it would be Marshall. In the late
fall and early winter meetings, at Tunis, Tunisia, and
Tehran, Iran, Roosevelt seemed to intentionally spend
time with Eisenhower, in a sense sizing him up before
he made the final decision.
There are many speculative reasons as to why
Eisenhower received the command, rather than Marshall. As Chief of Staff, Marshall had learned to navigate through the political minefields in the nation’s
capital, but he was brusque and cold with people,
even trusted subordinates, something that Eisenhower could easily attest. Thus, the President could talk to
“Ike,” but Marshall did not want anyone to call him
“George.” When later asked by his son, James, why he
appointed Eisenhower instead of Marshall, the President stated, “Eisenhower is the best politician among
the military men. He is a natural leader who can convince other men to follow him, and this is what we
need in his position more than any other quality.”16
Churchill, when asked for his opinion by Roosevelt
about nominating Eisenhower vice Marshall stated,
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“. . . that we had also the warmest regards for General
Eisenhower and would trust our fortunes to his direction with hearty good will.”17 On December 7, 1943,
Roosevelt met with Eisenhower at Tunis and simply
stated, “Well, Ike, you are going to command OVERLORD.” Eisenhower’s response was simply, “Mr.
President, I realize such an appointment involved difficult decisions. I hope you will not be disappointed.”18
Dwight D. Eisenhower, a man who had limited
command experience and who had no combat experience in World War I, was now set to command
the largest amphibious operation in World War II or,
for that matter, in all of history! This operation was
also against an army that the Allies regarded as their
most serious adversary. Choosing an officer with such
limited combat experience made Eisenhower’s appointment curious to some. Ike however, had shown
many excellent leadership qualities and had gained
the confidence of both Marshall and the President
through his performances as Chief of the War Plans
Division, commander of ETOUSA, and Commander
of Operation TORCH. The press announced he official
appointment on Christmas Eve, 1943. In the time that
elapsed between his appointment and the official announcement, Eisenhower worked to provide a smooth
disengagement from his duties in the Mediterranean.
He was aware of the basic concepts of Operation
OVERLORD and he had been briefed on the OVERLORD plan (as developed by COSSAC) to include the
strength of the force and the intended landing site—
Normandy. From the onset, he was dissatisfied with
the lack of combat power in the invasion force. Simply,
three divisions on a small frontage would be insufficient for a successful invasion. He immediately called
for a larger force. Although Roosevelt and Churchill
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appointed him in December, his official tasking for
this new assignment came on February 14, 1944. He
was to complete the following:
TO SUPREME COMMANDER
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
12 February 1944
1. You are hereby designated as Supreme Allied Commander of the forces placed under your orders for operations for liberation of Europe from Germans. Your
title will be Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force.
2. Task. You will enter the continent of Europe and, in
conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake
operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces. The date for entering the
Continent is the month of May 1944. After adequate
Channel ports have been secured, exploitation will be
directed towards securing an area that will facilitate
both ground and air operations against the enemy.
3. Notwithstanding the target date above you will be
prepared at any time to take immediate advantage of
favorable circumstances, such as withdrawal by the
enemy on your front, to effect a reentry into the Continent with such forces as you have available at the
time; a general plan for this operation when approved
will be furnished for your assistance. 19

Once appointed as Supreme Commander, Eisenhower exercised his prerogative and began to put
together a list of people he wanted for his key staff.
His understanding of political sensibilities was evident from the onset because, even though he wanted
General Sir Harold Alexander on his staff due to their
excellent working relationship in the Mediterranean,
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he recognized that this was clearly a British decision.
In spite of Eisenhower’s preference, Churchill gave
him the Commander of the British 8th Army, Field
Marshall Bernard Law Montgomery, hero of El Alamein. When assigned to Eisenhower’s staff, “Monty”
became Commander of the British 21st Army Group
and Commander of all Allied ground troops until a
lodgment was secured. Once Allied forces seized the
lodgment, Eisenhower planned to take personal command of all ground troops in France. That he desired
to work with Montgomery, who could be, to say the
least, difficult, was evident as early as December 27,
1943. At that time, Eisenhower called for a meeting
with Montgomery to discuss Operation OVERLORD.
They quickly concurred that they had to strengthen
the COSSAC plan since three divisions were insufficient. In addition, the planned front was too narrow,
a factor that would allow the Germans to concentrate
their efforts much more effectively. Ike’s first meeting
with his British subordinate was an unqualified success.
Eisenhower’s staff selection continued to show an
excellent grasp of joint and combined arms command.
Beginning in 1942, his experience in working with
the British allies, through his dual-hated command of
AFHQ and ETOUSA, made him familiar with the British political terrain and many of the principals. His
deputy Supreme Commander was Air Chief Marshall
Arthur W. Tedder, and Eisenhower used a British military aide, Lieutenant Colonel James Gault. His Chief
of Staff was an American officer whom he had come
to trust in the Mediterranean, Major General Walter
Bedell Smith. Eisenhower also absorbed the COSSAC
organization into his staff to include Morgan. Morgan’s experience in the initial planning of the opera-
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tion made him a logical choice for one of the Deputy
Chiefs of Staff. Eisenhower designated a British Officer, Admiral Sir Bertram H. Ramsey, for the position
of the Allied commander for naval forces. The Allied
Commander-in-Chief of Air Forces, Air Marshal Sir
Trafford Leigh-Mallory was also British. See Figure 1
for the SHAEF Chain of Command.
SUPREME COMMANDER

Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, U.S.

DEPUTY SUPREME COMMANDER

Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur W. Tedder, UK

ENGINEER DIVISION

Maj. Gen. H.B.W. Hughes, UK
Brig. Gen. Beverley G. Dunn, U.S.

SIGNAL DIVISION

CHIEF OF STAFF
Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, UK

Maj. Gen. C.H.H. Vulliamy, UK
Brig. Gen. F. H. Lanahan, U.S.

Lt. Gen. Frederick E. Morgan, UK
Lt. Gen. Sir Humfrey M. Gale, UK
Air Vice Marshal James M. Robb, UK

Col Emil C. Boehnke, U.S.

DEPUTY CHIEFS OF STAFF

ADJUTANT GENERAL

HEADQUARTERS
COMMANDANT

G-1

Maj. Gen. Ray W. Barker, U.S.
Brig J.N. Bosville, UK

Col Robert Q. Brown, U.S.
Maj. H.J. Rothwell, U.K.

G-2

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
DIVISION

Maj. Gen. K.W. D. Strong, UK
Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Betts, U.S.

Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, U.S.

G-3

MEDICAL DIVISION

Maj. Gen. Harold R. Bull, U.S.
Maj. Gen. J.F.M. Whiteley, UK

Maj. Gen. Albert W. Kenner, U.S.
Brig. E. A. Sutton, UK

G-4

Maj. Gen. Robert W. Crawford, U.S.
Maj. Gen. N.C.D. Brownjohn, UK

PUBLIC RELATIONS DIVISION
Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Davis, U.S.

G-5

Lt. Gen. A. E. Grasett, UK
Brig. Gen. J.C. Holmes, U.S.

AIR DEFENCE DIVISION

Maj. Gen. A. M. Cameron, UK

Figure 4-1. The SHAEF Chain of Command.
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Source: U.S. Army Military History Institute.

General Dwight Eisenhower, Supreme Allied
Commander and his British deputy,
Sir Arthur Tedder.
Working with Allies, even English-speaking ones
with a common purpose, could be and was often an
arduous task. In some respects, one of Eisenhower’s
consistent problems was British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. The two men shared a good deal of mutual respect, and Churchill seemed proud that he was
“half American.”20 The problem was that Churchill,
despite his long political career, was also a trained
and experienced military leader. He was a graduate of
Sandhurst, and a man who would have undoubtedly
relished his own command.21 Throughout the war,
Churchill frequently sought to interject his strategic
concepts into those proposed by his reluctant subor-
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dinate commanders or his American Allies. From the
Prime Minister’s active mind came a litany of peripheral strategies and ideas including potential invasions
of Italy, Greece, Rhodes, and Norway. Eisenhower
recognized this potential problem of interference by
the Prime Minister as early as 1942, but he also recognized the importance of a strong working relationship
with the British. Ike, as the Supreme Commander, had
one major advantage; Churchill liked him and the two
men genuinely respected each other and shared some
common interests. Thus, in innumerable meetings,
conferences, and private get-togethers, Eisenhower
was cordial despite some irritations. Though Churchill
frequently interjected his pet strategies, Eisenhower
never lost sight of the goal he and Marshall had agreed
to in 1942. Eisenhower worked on scheduling and
launching, as soon as feasible, a cross-channel attack.
He accepted few distractions to the task which he had
planned for and which the Combined Chiefs of Staff
had tasked to him on February 12, 1944.
With the task clearly specified, and the location of
the attack already agreed to, Eisenhower’s immediate
objective was to accelerate the buildup of men and
materiel to stage the invasion. First, it was imperative
to decide what the size of the invasion force would be
since COSSAC’s plan had been deemed insufficient.
American and British invaders were to assault a welldefended coast with no flanks to turn and no way to
maneuver for advantage. As an additional problem,
for an invasion of the magnitude envisioned by the
Allies, the invading force needed a port to provide a
logistical base for the lodgment and sustained operations. Typically, defending forces can protect a port
better than open beach areas like stretches of the Normandy coast.22 The Allies would need time to seize a
port.
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In an excellent example of inter-Allied cooperation, Montgomery took control of the planning for the
invasion and the subsequent seizure of the Normandy
peninsula. Montgomery’s plan called for five divisions
for the landings. Adding to the strength of the ground
forces was the plan to drop three airborne divisions,
making the total assault force eight divisions.23 In addition, the new Operation OVERLORD plan enlarged
the landing area, because the ill-fated Dieppe operation was a perfect example of how the enemy could
concentrate against a force that landed on too narrow
a front.
Another problem that concerned Eisenhower and
Montgomery was the additional resources needed
for Operation ANVIL. Allied leaders at the Tehran
conference in November 1943 finalized planning for
Operation OVERLORD and called for a secondary
attack against southern France, Operation ANVIL,
later known as Operation DRAGOON. Planners intended the latter operation to be a three, then later a
two-division assault. Properly executed, this would
place the Germans in a pincer movement from the
north and south of France, severely stressing their resources. As an added bonus, when Marseilles fell into
Allied hands, the addition of this port would improve
the supply situation for the advancing Allied armies.
Conversely, when the original COSSAC plan had been
strengthened by adding two additional ground divisions and two airborne divisions, this meant that the
resources necessary to conduct two separate but supporting invasions had increased considerably. Despite
the increased demands, Eisenhower believed that Operations OVERLORD and ANVIL were complementary and supporting operations. He was unwilling
to drop Operation ANVIL to strengthen Operation
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OVERLORD, although his British peers consistently
stressed that ANVIL was a questionable operation.
Military leaders had to support adequately the
Operations ANVIL or OVERLORD landings with
a strong commitment of air and naval assets. From
the onset, however, there was resistance from the
AAF to switch its priorities from its strategic based
CBO to supporting ground units. Beginning with the
Casablanca conference in January 1943, the senior
leadership had agreed that an important part of wearing down Hitler’s military might was the CBO. At
the same time, the method by which the commanders were to conduct the campaign to erode German
strength was contentious. For some British officers,
including the Prime Minister, this air campaign, the
efforts of the Soviet Army, and peripheral operations
by the Western Allies would all contribute to wearing down the German national leadership and military. This attrition would allow a successful landing
against a weakened German Army. In the opinion of
both AAF General Carl “Tooey” Spaatz and RAF Air
Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, an opinion shared by
many of their colleagues, an air campaign could bring
the Germans to their knees.24 Spaatz and Harris were
not in total agreement on how to wage the campaign,
since Harris believed in conducting area bombings
at night, and the American approach was daylight
precision strikes. Ultimately, however, the CBO by
the RAF and AAF was complementary. The two air
arms conducted a round-the-clock effort with the British hitting major German cities during the night and
their American peers conducting “precision” daylight
attacks against German industrial targets during the
day. AAF planners did undercut the effectiveness of
their tactic by too quickly switching targets, hitting
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the ball bearing industry, the aircraft industry and
then shifting to the petroleum facilities with a desire
to cripple the German synthetic fuel industry. Daylight precision bombing could have been much more
effective if it had consistently maintained focus on a
single vital German industry. Although British and
American air power advocates had differing opinions
on how to wage their air campaigns, both were loath
to shift away from the agreed upon strategic bombing campaign to targets in support of the proposed
ground campaign. Despite their desire to focus on
their designated targets, Eisenhower was determined.
In his opinion, a critical element to the success of Operation OVERLORD was dedicated air support from
both the strategic and tactical air forces.
Eisenhower’s concept was not simply using strategic air assets for tactical close support. It included
interdiction, focusing the heavy bombers on targets
that would have direct and indirect effects on the tactical battlefield. Key to the success of the Allied invasion was the ability to stop the Germans from moving
reinforcements and supplies to the Normandy area
once Allied landings began. Thus, he backed the socalled Transportation Plan, which fighter commander, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Leigh-Mallory had
developed to destroy rail and surface transportation
networks.25 RAF staff planners designed the actions
to bring the German transportation system to a halt.
Fighters and bombers were to freeze German transportation assets all over northern Europe and especially near Normandy. Eisenhower gave his preliminary approval of this plan, which called for targeting
101 rail centers in France and Belgium, on February 1,
and gave it final approval on March 26, 1944.26 With
strong support from the Combined Chiefs of Staff and
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despite strong objections from Allied air leaders, from
April until September 1944 the strategic bomber force
would be temporarily placed under Eisenhower’s direct command to support tactical air operations.
Prior to this handover of strategic air to Eisenhower’s control, the Allied air forces had already achieved
a significant accomplishment in preparation for the
Allied landings. In the 5 months prior to D-Day, the
Allies were successful in achieving an extremely important prerequisite for a successful landing, aerial
superiority over the Luftwaffe. This was by no means
an easy task, because Luftwaffe fighters had managed
to exact significant casualties on Allied air forces
throughout 1943. The pace of air raids over occupied
Europe increased in intensity before D-Day. Allied
fighters intentionally drew the Luftwaffe’s interceptors
skyward in the latter’s attempt to stop the destruction
wrought by massive day and night attacks. Despite
the extensive experience of German pilots, the AAF
and RAF outclassed the Luftwaffe in terms of aircraft.
By the fall of 1943, the P-47 Thunderbolt had been
fitted with drop tanks, increasing its range, and in
December of 1943, the P-51 Mustang entered service.
Both aircraft had significant advantages over the aging German airframes, both in terms of armament and
performance. From January to June 1944, 2,262 German pilots were killed. In March, 56 percent of the
available German fighters were lost. Germany could
not sustain these losses, and it was virtually impossible to replace destroyed and damaged airframes and
pilots, given the increasing pressure on the German
armed forces.27
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The P-51 Mustang was the ultimate piston-driven
fighter developed in World War II. Its speed, armament, and range allowed the AAF to deliver a death
blow to the Luftwaffe.
The issue of naval support for Operation OVERLORD was something new. Marshall had two Pacific
theater veterans experienced in the problems associated with amphibious landings assigned to Eisenhower’s
command. Major General J. Lawton “Lightning Joe”
Collins had commanded the 25th Infantry Division on
Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands, but sought from Marshall a corps command. Marshall had Collins assigned
to the European theater and given command of the
U.S. VIIth Corps. The War Department also assigned
Major General Charles H. “Pete” Corlett to the European theater in April 1944 to Command the U.S. XIXth
Corps. Corlett had extensive Pacific experience, having commanded the 7th Infantry Division in the land-
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ings on Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. Collin’s memoirs do not indicate any irritation regarding
his acceptance into the “European fraternity.” In fact,
he stated, “Though a newcomer to the theater, I was
greeted warmly and accepted as an equal by those who
had served in North Africa and the Mediterranean.”28
Conversely, Corlett, who had led successful landings
on opposed beaches at Attu Island off the coast of the
Aleutian Islands of Alaska and the Kwajalein Atoll,
claimed that Eisenhower and Omar Bradley did not
deem the lessons learned from his experiences in the
Pacific relevant. According to Corlett, “anything that
had happened in the Pacific was strictly bush league
stuff.”29 Whether General Corlett’s criticism is valid or
not, Bradley’s irritation with the competing priorities
of the Pacific theater is evident in his own postwar
memoir where he states:
. . . I found it difficult to understand why this single
most decisive attack of the entire war should have to
compete with the Pacific for its minimum means [He
refers to the supply of landing craft]. Naval bombardment support had been rationed to OVERLORD on an
equally tightfisted basis. And while I knew nothing of
the Navy’s commitment to the Pacific war, I was irritated by this disposition of the Navy to look on OVERLORD as a European stepchild.30

Williamson Murray and Allan Millet also noted a
failure of the OVERLORD planners to learn from the
Pacific experience:
The most significant lesson from the Pacific that Bradley and his senior planners passed up was the importance of naval gunfire support for the troops storming
the beach. As a result of Bradley’s obtuseness, U.S.
troops at Omaha and Utah beaches would receive di-
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rect support from only 2 battleships, 4 light cruisers,
and 18 destroyers. By comparison, at Kwajalein the
7th Infantry Division alone had attacked with the support of 7 battleships, 3 heavy cruisers, and 18 destroyers over a far longer bombardment period.31

The necessity for having strong fire support for the
landings was recognized by Operation OVERLORD
planners, but the plan counted on the effectiveness of
using strategic air assets to suppress German defenses
rather than an extensive bombardment by naval gunfire.32 Apparently, Allied leadership had convinced
themselves of bomber accuracy claimed by air power
advocates, that pinpoint daylight bombing could destroy German defenses. The experience of June 6, 1944,
failed to validate these claims.
One problem that the COSSAC staff seemed to
agree on was the shortage of landing craft. Marshall
in his report on the period 1943-1945 stated:
Here [planning for the cross channel attack] the Western Allies faced a shortage which was to plague us
to the final day of the War in Europe—the shortage
of assault craft, LST’s, LCI’s, and smaller vessels. . . .
[A]ll the resources in England and the U.S. were
searched for vessels and barges that could be employed in the Channel. Outboard motors and marine
engines in pleasure craft in the U.S. were appropriated
for this purpose.33

The problem of how to procure the necessary
number of landing craft for the invasion was no small
task. As Eisenhower and his staff were planning for
the cross-channel attack, the war in the Pacific and in
the Mediterranean had been consuming enormous
amounts of naval assets. For example, in 1943 alone,
American military forces were involved in the Solo158

mon Islands campaign, the retaking of the Aleutians,
and the landings on Sicily and Italy. Shortly after
Eisenhower took command, the stress on the landing
craft supply was further complicated by the amphibious assault at Anzio, Italy, on January 22, 1944. When
the United States entered the war, it had little experience with such things as landing craft. The British had
already developed the Landing Ship Tank (LST) and
the Landing Craft Tank (LCT). Both of these were effective for vehicles, but what the Allies needed was
the development of a suitable craft that could be massproduced and used for landing troops in amphibious
operations.
The answer came from a New Orleans, Louisiana,
entrepreneur named Andrew Higgins. Higgins had
developed shallow draft boats for the oil industry and
was familiar with small boat design and construction.
Higgins developed a plywood landing craft with a
readily deployable front ramp, which was ideal for
landing troops. He also developed a mass production
capability that permitted him to manufacture some
20,000 of these craft during the war. Eisenhower once
asked historian Stephen Ambrose if he knew Higgins,
and when the latter responded no, Ike said, “That’s too
bad, he is the man who won the war for us.”34 While
acknowledging the contribution of Andrew Higgins,
the conflicting demands for “Higgins Boats” was an
important factor that caused Eisenhower to delay the
invasion of the continent from his original date of early May to early June 1944.
The Higgins Boat, or landing craft vehicle, personnel (LCVP) was an excellent technical solution for
transport and landing soldiers on the beaches. Despite
the clever design of this craft and of the LSTs and
LCTs, however, the essential problem for Allied Plan-
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ners was the shortage of landing craft, particularly
LSTs. The Pacific demanded landing craft; Anzio consumed some of the supply; and the expansion of the
OVERLORD operation called for more. Obviously,
with each amphibious landing there were losses due
to accidents and enemy fire. Eisenhower faced a quandary. In his area of responsibility, he needed landing
craft for two separate invasions, Operations OVERLORD and ANVIL, and the demand outstripped available supply. In addition, America’s British allies were
not supportive on the secondary invasion, Operation
ANVIL. A front already existed in the Mediterranean,
the Italian Campaign, and the addition of yet a third
front was problematic. This operation would stress
German capabilities; but it would stress Allied forces
as well. To conduct Operation ANVIL, Allied commanders would need to pull out experienced troops
from Italy and would have to withdraw landing craft
used for Anzio.35 A debate between Washington and
London raged during the first 3 months of 1944 as to
whether the Allies should retain, reduce, or postpone
Operation ANVIL. The British were highly skeptical of ANVIL’s necessity and its probability of success. Eisenhower negotiated the issue with the British
Chiefs of Staff. On March 22, 1944, with mounting
evidence of limited resources to conduct two simultaneous invasions, Operation ANVIL was postponed. 36
Aside from the landing craft issue, another major
problem for the proposed amphibious operation was
the issue of supplying the landing forces. Operation
BOLERO, the original buildup of men and supplies
for the landings in northern France, was in many respects an accomplishment of great magnitude. The
British, Canadian, and American military landing
on Normandy Beach owes its success to Operation
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BOLERO. While acknowledging that the United States
had the industrial and agricultural capacity to supply
the Allied armies, two significant problems existed:
The landing site initially chosen by COSSAC, Normandy, did not have immediate port access to provide logistical capability. Granted, the plan called for
the seizure of the Cotentin port of Cherbourg, but how
would the initial invasion force and the follow-on forces be supplied until the peninsula could be secured
and the port opened.37 The enormity of the problem
was highlighted by Eisenhower who noted that “on
D-Day and D-Day+1 [we planned] to land 20,000 vehicles and 176,000 personnel. The vehicles included
1,500 tanks, 5,000 other tracked fighting vehicles, 3,000
guns of all types, and 10,500 other vehicles from jeeps
to bulldozers.”38
For the landings and the development of a secure
lodgment, the amphibious assault phase, which was
code-named Operation NEPTUNE, planners endorsed
an innovative solution. Drawing from concepts developed in World War I, the Allies explored the idea of
constructing giant portable harbors. Engineers could
build these harbors, and naval forces would then tow
them to the Normandy coast. These so-called “mulberries,” essentially artificial harbors and docks, would
provide a location where smaller vessels could bring
in supplies and unload them.39 As the plan evolved,
engineers and logisticians augmented the concept of
mulberries with another structure, “phoenixes.” These
devices were towering hollow concrete caissons that,
together with the mulberries and intentionally sunken
vessels, essentially created artificial harbors. The task
to create these artificial harbors was monumental. For
example, the phoenixes, designed for ship crews to
sink and create a breakwater, consisted of some 146

161

caissons. Building the phoenixes required 330,000 cubic yards of concrete and 31,000 tons of steel.40
Mulberries could alleviate the immediate supply
issue, but the Allied armies were mechanized units
and became the largest consumer of fuel in the European Campaign. Thus, as an important part of the
process, planners had to address the problem of how
to supply the enormous amounts of fuel necessary
for the Allied breakout and pursuit phase. Planners
were equally innovative in solving this problem. Attributed to Lord Louis Mountbatten as early as 1942,
a program called pipe line under the ocean (PLUTO),
was initiated. However, since the Germans controlled
the French coast, the construction of a pipeline could
not really get underway until the Allies secured a
lodgment. Engineers did not complete PLUTO until
August 12, over 2 months after D-Day. This was fortuitous, though, since the completion of the pipeline was
in time to fuel the pursuit of retreating German forces
in the area during August.
While one must give Allied planners credit for
their innovations that enhanced logistical support for
the landing sites, they were unable to provide for the
demands of future operations. These innovations alleviated the immediate problems, but the Allied plan for
the European Campaign failed to resolve the problem
of supplying the armies in motion. The plan to drive
westward, take the Cotentin Peninsula, and secure the
port of Cherbourg (according to the plan, D-Day +15),
was only a partial solution, since Cherbourg lacked
the necessary capacity to adequately supply the Allied
armies. Taking Cherbourg was also a curious move
considering that it required the Allies to attack in the
opposite direction of the goal, Germany, and the main
body of the German Army. Allied commanders faced
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further complications about the supply problem since
they had to clear the entire Brittany Peninsula in order
to gain the port of Brest before turning the full Allied
might eastward toward Germany.
While the port situation was a problem that was
never actually solved, the massing of supplies for
the invasion was an unqualified success. The British
Isles, in particular south eastern Britain, became a gigantic warehouse for the Allied armed forces. Allied
military leaders made great strides between 1943 and
mid-1944 to create this situation. Over 60,000 U.S. engineers and 75,000 British workers built six and a half
million square feet of covered storage and shops and
requisitioned an additional 13,500,000 square feet of
storage for Allied supplies. The Allies also used another 43,500,000 square feet of open storage for the
necessary buildup. In these facilities, as well as many
others, were 450,000 tons of ammunition, 175,000 tons
of fuel oils and lubricants, and parking locations for
50,000 vehicles.41
The U.S. Army’s Service of Supply task was to
funnel enormous amounts of supplies into British facilities. General Brehon Somervell was responsible for
ensuring that American forces had sufficient supplies
in the various theaters around the world. His commander in Britain was Lieutenant General John C. H.
Lee, an old friend from Somervell’s World War I days.
Eisenhower inherited Lee. Somervell had appointed
Lee to command the American supply effort for Europe in 1942, long before Eisenhower’s assumption
of command. The success of Operation BOLERO, the
buildup for the invasion, was likely in spite of its commander, rather than due to him. Lee was unpopular
in Eisenhower’s command because he was pompous
and self-righteous, whose religiosity caused him to
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be nicknamed “Jesus Christ himself Lee” by his many
detractors.42 Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff, Bedell Smith,
said of Lee, “He didn’t know much about supply organization,” and found him to be a “stuffed shirt,” one
of the “crosses that we had to bear.”43 From Eisenhower’s assumption of command until the end of the campaign, accountability for materials remained a serious
problem in Lee’s command, in part due to mismanagement and in part due to the thriving black market.
The problem within Lee’s command would finally
climax after the campaign was underway, with scandals in black marketeering in Paris, France. Despite
all of these problems, Eisenhower never attempted to
relieve Lee due to the latter’s strong political connections in Washington.44 In the end, the American supply system was robust enough to make up for Lee’s ineptitude and the inappropriate funneling of supplies
into the black market.
Though logistics would emerge as one of the shortcomings in planning for the European Campaign, the
deception campaign was completely the opposite; it
was a resounding success. A robust deception plan
was necessary because the Germans were preparing
for the invasion with increasing seriousness. As early
as the end of 1941, the Germans began constructing
defenses along the Atlantic coast of France, recognizing the likelihood that the Allies would try to invade
the continent. They had also created a high command
element in the west to coordinate the defense of Western Europe. Yet for all practical purposes, the German defense in the west did not truly begin to take
shape until 1943. Prior to late 1943, the Germans had
created a series of bunkers and strong points, but a
systematic defense of the most likely landing zones,
from Calais to the tip of the Brittany Peninsula, was

164

not well developed.45 The catalyst for renewed German preparation occurred when on October 25, 1943,
Hitler’s commander in chief in the West (or OB West),
Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt, submitted
an assessment of German defenses for Hitler’s consideration. Rundstedt stated with certainty that the Allies would invade the continent and predicted that the
first landing would come at Calais, followed by Normandy. Direct and brutally frank, Rundstedt noted
that to defend these most likely landing areas, Germany would need much more than just strong points;
rather it would need a defense in depth with adequate
mobile reserves for counterattacks.
Critics did not meet Rundstedt’s assessment with
the scorn and derision as so often happened when
officers gave Hitler unfavorable reports. Instead, the
Führer ordered that increasing assets be provided
for the defense in the west.46 In addition to providing more assets to the west, Hitler provided Rundstedt another asset, a new subordinate commander.
Hitler appointed Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel
as Commander, Army Group B, with responsibility
for the garrison in the Netherlands and the 15th and
17th Armies that were positioned in Normandy and
in the vicinity of Pas de Calais. Despite their different backgrounds and styles of command, Rundstedt
and Rommel surprisingly worked well together. Rommel surveyed the defenses in his command and was
disturbed by the overall German unpreparedness. He
tackled this problem with the same energy that had
given him his reputation as commander of the Afrika
Korps. Rommel estimated that, in addition to the fortifications or strong points built, engineers would need
to create extensive minefields to slow any invasion
force to allow time for a counterattack. As a credit to
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his energy and that of his engineers, between October
1943 and May 1944, German military and civilian labor scattered over four million mines along the French
coast.47 In addition to the mines, Rommel also had improvised obstacles installed both on the beaches that
were potential landing sites and in the open fields
where gliders could land troops. After observing the
existing gun emplacements, he ordered many of them
further strengthened and had additional positions
built.

Source: Author's Collection.

A USAF reconnaissance photo taken at first light on
May 19, 1944 (and at low tide) showing Rommel’s
obstacles designed to rip the bottoms out of Allied
landing craft.
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Rommel firmly believed that the only way to defeat the Allied invasion was to stop it on the beaches.
To do this, the Wehrmacht needed two capabilities: a
strong and mutually supportive system of fortifications, and a strong mobile reserve. Positioning armored units close to the coast as a mobile reserve was
imperative. Those reserve forces would rush forward
to push the Allied troops back into the sea. Rommel,
who had personally witnessed the growing Allied
airpower in North Africa, was totally convinced that
unless reinforcements, especially armored units, were
close to the coast Allied air supremacy would make
it impossible to get to the invading force in time. His
strategy was countered by the commander of armored
forces in the west, General der Panzertruppen Leo Geyr
von Schweppenburg, who believed that the armored
reserves had to be kept far to the rear and thus out
the reach of tactical air and naval gunfire.48 Because
of these two different philosophies on how armored
units should respond to the coming Allied invasion,
there was considerable friction between Rommel,
Rundstedt, and Schweppenburg. Instead of exercising
firm command over the three respected officers with
a clearcut decision directing where they would locate
mobile reserves, Hitler and Rundstedt allowed the
controversy to simmer and in the end essentially split
the control of armored units in France, rather than
assigning firm command authority over armored reserves. Events would show that Rommel was correct.
Rommel was convinced that the invasion was going to hit in the Calais vicinity and that it would come
at high tide.49 Thus, German defenders spent a considerable amount of energy focused on this region. After
all, it was close to Britain, and it led to the best terrain
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for mobility and the most direct route to Berlin. The
commander of Kriegsmarine in the West, Admiral Theodor Krancke, placed the likely invasion site further
west but could not decide with any degree of certainty where it might occur. Hitler vacillated on exactly
where the landings would occur, but he was certain
that the invasion would come soon.50
All of this demonstrates that from late 1943 to early
1944, the Germans knew the Allied invasion was coming. They were planning for the day an Allied armada
would appear somewhere off the coast of France. The
only remaining questions were when and where the
Allies would land. Since the coming invasion was no
surprise, it was crucial for the Allies to devise a plan
that would deceive the Germans about the time and
place of the invasion. American and British military officers created a deception plan called Operation FORTITUDE. Its overall objective was to convince Hitler
and his high command that Operation OVERLORD
was going to occur at locations where it was not, and
at the same time, convince them that landing activities
in the Normandy vicinity were actually a feint. Operation FORTITUDE used a number of methodologies to
accomplish a classic deception. False information was
fed through the former German agents to the Abwehr,
the German military intelligence service. Allied commands created ghost divisions, complete with shoulder patches, to convince the Germans that many new
divisions were poised for the invasion. Radio operators transmitted false radio traffic regarding equipment supplies and men to convince the Germans that
many more units existed than actually did. In Scotland, an Operation FORTITUDE plan focused its attention on convincing the Germans, through a stream
of messages, that Allied commanders were prepared
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to invade Norway. In the southern part of Britain, Operation FORTITUDE used phony message traffic, inflated rubber tanks, landing craft, and dummy aircraft
to show the supposed buildup in the area opposite
Pas de Calais. The most disturbing threat projected to
the Germans was the existence of a First Army Group
(FUSAG), commanded by General George S. Patton,
which seemed poised to strike the Pas de Calais area.
Of course, Allied leaders had scheduled a command
under Patton for activation, but Patton was not to be a
part of the invasion force. Rather, Eisenhower scheduled it as an element for exploitation, once the landings were successful and breakouts from the beachhead were executed.
As military leaders consider future operations
against the nation’s adversaries, they should carefully consider the significance of Operation FORTITUDE. The campaign was one of the finest examples
in modern warfare of the importance of designing and
executing a well-planned deception plan. The use of
multiple assets from all services, both the intelligence
services and the combat arms, convinced the key German commander on the ground that the invasion
would come near Pas de Calais.51 Thus, the deception
plan was a success in convincing the Germans of the
wrong location for the invasion. The bomber offensive, whose targeting pattern was deliberately diffuse,
made it difficult for the Germans to ascertain the exact
focus of the Allied air preparations. These activities
enhanced the deception.
When American and British forces launched the
invasion, Allied landing forces were under the command of Field Marshal Montgomery, the commander
of the 21st Army Group. The 21st was composed of the
U.S. First Army commanded by Lieutenant General
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Omar N. Bradley, and the British Second Army commanded by Lieutenant General Sir Miles Dempsey.
The three airborne divisions for the invasion had key
missions. The U.S. 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions
would land behind Utah Beach and shield the rear of
the landing zone from the expected German counterattack. The British 6th Airborne Division’s scheduled
drop was in the vicinity of Caen where it was to stop
expected reinforcements from the German Fifteenth
Army that would likely hit British landing forces.
Bradley and his U.S. VIIth Corps would land on Utah
Beach, and the U.S. Vth Corps would hit the beach on
a sector known as Omaha Beach.

Source: U.S. Army Military History Institute.

American Assault Troops Landing on Omaha
Beach, D-Day, June 6, 1944.
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The invasion of the northwest coast of France was a
monumental achievement for the Allied forces. From
the onset, they sought to conduct an amphibious invasion that was, in terms of its mass, unprecedented.
In 1 day’s time, June 6, 1944, Allied leaders intended
to land 150,000 men and massive amounts of equipment on the continent. To do this, it was necessary
to employ over 800 vessels to transport the soldiers
and supplies to the area of the assault. Additionally,
the number of transport aircraft necessary to drop
the airborne divisions was great. According to the
Supreme Commander’s report, the U.S. IXth Troop
Carrier Command alone dedicated 1,662 aircraft and
512 gliders to this effort.52 Since the Germans had liberally strewn the Channel with mines, the Allied navies needed 287 minesweepers to clear these deadly
obstacles. Maritime commanders also required a vast
armada of warships, landing craft of various types,
and small smaller coastal vessels of over 7,000 ships.
Despite superb planning, D-Day had a number of
significant shortfalls. Giving Eisenhower control of
the strategic bomber forces in the weeks immediately
prior to the invasion was a key decision. Strategic air
was literally able to strangle the German transportation system in occupied France and virtually prohibited the rapid transportation of reserves to the Normandy area. By June 1944, the French railway system
barely functioned; the interdiction campaign had
succeeded. At the same time, the use of strategic air
to support ground forces proved to be highly ineffective. Two problems contributed to this ineffectiveness:
First, the aircraft used by the American 8th Air Force
were designed for strategic campaigns like the CBO
and were built to operate effectively at high altitudes.
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The famed B-17 had a service ceiling of 35,800 feet,
and the B-24 could operate at 28,000 feet. Despite all
claims of that time and since the war, at that height
even the fabled Norden bomb-sight was incapable
in delivering precision bomb loads. Further complicating the problem on D-Day, scattered clouds were
present as low as 2,000 feet, and at 20,000 feet solid
cloud cover existed, totally obscuring the battlefield.
American bombers belonging to the 8th Air Force had
to target by instruments, and this was even more inaccurate than observed runs.
American military leaders sent 329 B-24 bombers
to drop 13,000 bombs to soften up the defenses near
Omaha Beach before the invasion. This ordnance,
however, failed to hit German defenses and, in fact,
fell as far inland as 3 miles.53 The bomber preparation
of Omaha Beach was a total failure, and German defenses on Omaha Beach were intact as American troops
came ashore. At Utah Beach, the bombers were a little
more effective because the IXth Bomber Command
was using B-26 medium bombers. Wisely, in preparation for supporting the invasion, maintenance crews
removed Norden bombsights from the bombers and
installed the more effective low-level altitude sights.54
Even though the preparatory bombing on Utah Beach
was more effective, even here about one-third of the
bombs fell seaward, and some of the pilots were unable to locate their targets due to the overcast.55 From
the beginning of the European Campaign, senior Allied leadership used a questionable tactic; employing
strategic aircraft for tactical purposes, a purpose for
which they were never intended. Allied military leaders would repeatedly return to this questionable use
of strategic bombers throughout the European Campaign, often producing debatable results.
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The air force was not the only service whose preparation of the battlefield was lacking. The American
and British navies did not have sufficient “battlewagons” that could lay down a heavy carpet of fire to
soften German defenses. Insufficient naval forces also
translated to inadequate fire support for the invading
troops.
At Omaha Beach, where bomber preparation had
accomplished little except to inflict damage on French
agriculture, all too many things went wrong. Planners had recognized that infantry directly assaulting
well-prepared defenses would need armor to support
them. Thus, ground force officers planned to employ
amphibious tanks to support the infantry. On D-Day,
however, of the 32 tanks modified for amphibious use,
29 sank, partly due to the weather but largely due to the
Navy’s decision to launch them over 6,000 yards from
shore.56 Six-wheeled amphibious trucks (DUKWs)
were a partial answer. Crews loaded the DUKWs with
105mm artillery pieces to allow troops to have artillery support, but heavy seas and German guns meant
that the two artillery battalions that were supposed to
support the 116th Infantry on Omaha Beach lost 16 of
their 24 artillery pieces in a matter of minutes.57 The
Navy also launched many of the Higgins boats some
16 to 20 kilometers off shore, too far from the beach.
The infantrymen then had to endure a lengthy and
perilous journey through heavy seas and under heavy
enemy fire. When sailors dropped the ramps, many
American Soldiers went into water up to their necks
or at least their armpits, and many drowned. Once
unloaded, this led to a dash over about 300 yards of
tidal sand because landings occurred at low tide, and
then another 100 yards of beach. In short, infantrymen
at Omaha Beach had a literal gauntlet of fire to run
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through before they could begin their arduous task of
tackling the German defenses.
Royal Army leadership offered to American planners additional equipment designed to tackle German
defenses. Montgomery had ordered Major General Sir
Percy Hobart to offer one-third of their special equipment to the Americans. Hobart commanded the British 79th Division, elements of which accompanied
the assault units going ashore on D-Day. Hobart’s
79th had special Sherman tanks called “Crabs” which
engineers equipped with flailing chain arms to explode mines. The British also had “Crocodiles,” tanks
equipped with flamethrowers, to overcome German
pillboxes and fortifications. Additionally, the 79th had
Armored Vehicle Royal Engineers, multi-purposed
vehicles based on the Churchill Mark IV chassis and
mounting a mortar designed to destroy fortifications,
as well as a bridging device to cross ravines. Despite
the offer to share these novel “gadgets” to help unravel German defenses, Bradley and his staff were not
interested.58
A major contributing factor to the near failure on
Omaha Beach was a significant intelligence oversight.
In the final stages of Allied preparations for the landings, American intelligence staffs had identified the
German 716th Division as the defenders of the Omaha
Beach sector. The 716th was not a highly rated division in terms of its combat power. However, the 716th
was not the primary adversary of American troops at
Omaha Beach. The 352nd Division that had moved
into this sector was a much more competent division.
Thus, on D-Day there were elements of two German
Divisions near the landing site. Although not all of
the 352nd Division was positioned for defense of the
beach, it gave American troops an extremely difficult
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time and, had the full division been manning the defenses, it could have been catastrophic.59 Small unit
and individual soldier courage and initiative on the
beaches ultimately compensated for these shortfalls.
Despite heavy casualties, Omaha Beach became a success.60
In the other landing zones, the experience was
quite different for both the British and the Americans.
For example, on Juno Beach, the 3rd Canadian Division was the assault force and suffered the misfortune
of coming in late and at higher tide, making the German obstacles more effective and exacting a heavy toll
of landing craft. Despite initial determined German
resistance, however, the Canadians were able to break
through the German defenses and move inland to a
depth of 10 kilometers on the first day. On Gold Beach,
the results were similar. There the Royal Navy gave
the Germans a heavy shelling, but the Germans still
succeeded in putting up a heavy resistance until the
determined British landing force punched through the
crust of coastal defense and actually advanced to the
outskirts of the city of Bayeux. The remaining beach,
code named Sword, also had the luxury of a heavier naval bombardment that successfully suppressed some
of the German fortifications. British assault forces did
have to contend with several major fortifications, as
well as accurate artillery fire originating from the rear
of the German mainline of defense. Still, they were
able to establish a firm foothold, link up with British
airborne elements, and prepare to move on Caen. By
day’s end, the British and Canadian troops had a firm
hold on their beaches.
Of the two American beaches, only Utah was an
unqualified success. On Utah Beach, the medium
bombers had been more accurate than their heavy
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cousins at Omaha Beach. Another assist from the air
came when elements of the 101st Airborne Division
were successful in destroying some of the German
artillery positions that could have exacted heavy casualties on the Utah Beach assault forces.61 A notable
mistake, landing 4th Infantry Division troops about
two kilometers south of their assigned landing area,
turned to an advantage since German defenses were
weaker in that area.
Another significant problem that emerged on DDay was the dispersion of the American paratroopers
and glider forces. The Allies had decided to drop three
airborne divisions at night, rather than at first light.
When the transports began taking off, the weather was
cloudy, and it was dark. German ground fire over the
landing sites was intense in many areas, and the darkness, poor weather, and inexperienced pilots caused
many of the airborne units to miss their assigned
drop zones completely. In fact, the paratroopers of the
American 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions were
widely scattered, robbing the airborne units of their
ability to concentrate and quickly accomplish their assigned missions. While poor drops could have been a
major problem, ironically, these errors in dropping the
paratroopers were, in the end, an advantage. Poorly
executed drops totally confused the Germans because
they were simply unable to determine the paratrooper’s areas of concentration and thus their mission.
Despite the errors and the usual fog of war, D-Day
was an unqualified success. An objective and detailed
analysis of what happened on the various beaches on
that day would provide numerous examples of heroism, initiative, and leadership, but while praising the
ground forces for what they had accomplished, readers should remember that this was a joint accomplish-
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ment. In the years preceding D-Day, the Allied navies
had effectively neutered the German Navy. By 1944,
for all practical purposes Germany no longer had a
surface fleet; their remaining ships were kept close
in port for fear of venturing to sea and meeting with
virtual destruction. The last foray of a German capital
ship, the Scharnhorst, had ended in disaster, and the
Allies bottled up what was left of the miniscule German fleet. Even the U-boat menace, which had caused
the Allies many anxious months in 1941-42, had diminished considerably. By 1944, improved air and
naval tactics and the cracking of the Kriegsmarine’s
Enigma code through ULTRA meant that U-boats
had become the hunted, not the hunters. German Eboats and patrol torpedo craft, which had caused so
much consternation and casualties at Slapton Sands,
Devon, England, were largely absent at Normandy in
part due to heavy seas and in part to the hesitancy
of Admiral Theodor Krancke to commit them. Thus,
naval supremacy meant that the Allies were able to
muster their invasion fleet and transport men and
supplies across the Channel with no opposition. The
German Navy’s only significant effort on D-Day was
when four E-boats made a run on the invasion fleet
and sank a Norwegian destroyer. Other than this brief
foray, the Kriegsmarine was conspicuously absent.62
The Allies had achieved naval supremacy.
Command of the air was another important factor
for D-Day and the days following the actual invasion.
Granted, the use of heavy bombers had been relatively
ineffective for direct support of the landings, but the
CBO that followed the “Transportation Plan” was an
unqualified success. The French/German transportation network was so badly damaged that the German
reserves, so necessary to defeat the invasion on the
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beaches, could not counterattack immediately against
the invasion force. Of the elite units that could have
helped German defenders contest the control of the
beaches, only the 12th SS “Hitler Jugend” Division was
able to move up rapidly, but it did not get into action
until June 7, at which time the Canadians had a firm
foothold on their assigned beach. The 17th Panzer
Grenadier Division had to move by road and, due to
Allied air dominance, it took them 5 days to cover 200
miles.
Importantly, German fighter aircraft were not
major factors in any defensive operations against the
invasion fleet and the beaches in part due to the attrition of pilots and aircraft in the first 6 months of 1944.
In addition, Luftwaffe commanders had recalled many
German fighters to protect the Reich from the Allied
bombing raids. Only a handful of fighter aircraft were
available when the landings occurred, making the
task for Germany’s Jagdkorps II extremely difficult, if
not impossible. The classic example of fighter shortages was the case of the famous German ace Lieutenant Colonel Josef Priller. Priller had watched, in dismay, as 124 aircraft from his 26th Jagdgeschwader were
moved from the vicinity of Lille, France, on June 5.
On the next day when the invasion forces appeared,
he had two fighter aircraft available. Nonetheless, his
higher command ordered him to take his “squadron”
and attack the beaches.63 In comparison, over a 24hour period, the Allied air forces flew 14,000 sorties
to support the landing forces. Allied tactical air forces
could rely on 2,434 fighters and fighter-bombers and
some 700 light and medium bombers for the Normandy landings.64 Allied control of the air over the coast of
France was complete.
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D-Day, the invasion of the continent of Europe,
was without question an unqualified success. In 1 day
alone, the Allies had landed eight divisions and three
armored brigades on German occupied France. Broken down by nationality, over 75,100 British and Canadian troops and 57,500 American Soldiers had landed
on the European continent from the sea. In addition,
23,000 airborne troops had also dropped into France.
Through the efforts of all three branches of service and
the combined efforts of two nations, Eisenhower, and
his joint and Allied staff had successfully completed
the first part of their assigned task. Allied forces had “.
. . entered the continent of Europe.” The Allied armies
were now poised to undertake the second and equally
important part of the task, to “undertake operations
aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of
her armed forces . . .”
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CHAPTER 5
TOWARD THE GERMAN BORDER:
OPERATION COBRA, THE FALAISE POCKET,
AND OPERATION ANVIL
We shall continue attacking, never give him a chance
to rest, never give him a chance to give in.1
General Omar Bradley

Allied planners had done an exceptional job in
the planning and execution of Operations BOLERO,
NEPTUNE (the naval aspects included in Operation
OVERLORD), and OVERLORD. In terms of senior
leadership, from inception to planning and then execution, Morgan, Eisenhower, and Montgomery had
performed their roles in an exemplary manner. Eisenhower, in particular, deserves special credit for his
difficult decision on June 5, 1944, when, despite the
weather, he uttered the simple, but decisive words,
“Let’s go.” The fact that the weather was questionable
even added to the Allied deception and thus to the Allied success. Enhancing the leadership shown by the
senior officers was the bravery and small unit leadership on all five beaches by Allied soldiers which,
in all cases, made up for the shortfalls already noted
in the planning or execution. Planning for the European Campaign, however, had focused on making
a series of successful landings, establishing a secure
lodgment, and then building up the forces within a
secure area. Once this was completed, the Allies could
execute a breakout from the beachhead area, closely
followed by a pursuit phase. Exploitation and pursuit
of the German defenders, lacked the careful planning
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that was evident in Operations BOLERO, NEPTUNE,
and OVERLORD. As historian Russell Weigley noted,
however, “Operation NEPTUNE [and OVERLORD]
planning” [and for that matter execution] “had been
tactical and technological, rather than operational.”2

Map 5-1. Depiction of the situation in the
Normandy area on June 12, 1944. In all cases, the
beach is secure and troops have moved inland.
Note, however, that Caen is still held by stuborn
German resistance.
The essential problem of the exploitation phase
was that it lacked the detail and the forethought that
had so characterized the previous operations. Planners had designated phase lines depicting the desired
progress of American units, but detailed planning was
at best sketchy. There were other troubling factors as
well. The British and Canadian landings put the Brit-
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ish 2nd Army3 on the edge of flat open terrain, good
terrain for mobile operations, which actually led to
the heart of Germany. Even so, some of the immediate terrain tended to favor the defender as events near
Caen would show. Landing the British/Canadian
Army here seemed logical because these landing areas were closest to the home islands. Since the British were still using a substantial number of Spitfires, a
Battle of Britain era aircraft with limited range, being
close to the home islands was important for tactical
air support. Conversely, the U.S. Army was the most
mobile army in the world, but the British 2nd Army,
which would become the 21st Army Group, was British and Canadian, not American. Instead, American
elements that would become the 12th Army Group
landed in an area that was not immediately favorable
to maneuver warfare. In the first 2 months of the European Campaign, the U.S. Army would show itself to
be increasingly capable in tactical operations, making
some mistakes, but learning and adapting rapidly to
the realities of combat on the continent. As noted by
one historian, however, “The United States Army was
the most mobile army in the world in 1944, but American commanders had yet to prove whether they could
translate the inherent ability of the American units to
move into effective maneuver on the battlefield.”4 In
short, the U.S. Army had yet to prove itself in operational warfare.
Institutionally, the U.S. Army had yet to discover
operational warfare. Individual officers, such as General George S. Patton intuitively understood it, but the
Army, by training or doctrine, had yet to emphasize
operational thinking. Consider, for example, Bradley’s 12th Army Group formed after the landings. The
12th would consist, for most of the European Cam-
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paign, as an entity composed of 29-31 divisions. In
the campaign, the 12th was one of three army groups
that had the prime responsibility of destroying Adolf
Hitler’s armies. Commanders did not receive proper
guidance about army groups from the doctrine of the
period because, according to this guidance, an army
group “is a tactical unit.” Its commander “may be designated by the theater commander or by the war department.”5 Initially there were two, later three, Army
groups that functioned under the theater commander
which again, according to doctrine, were tactical entities. The absence of the term operational in the larger
unit field service regulation is not as significant as the
use of “tactical,” in reference to larger combat formations. Most significant is the fact that most Allied
commanders, particularly at the start of the European
Campaign, tended to conduct their operations in the
field tactically, rather than operationally.
Neither the British-Canadian forces nor the American Army, both of which had been so unbelievably
successful on June 6, were able to quickly transition
to the pursuit phase. The Allied drive toward the
heartland of Germany almost immediately bogged
down. The reasons for the initial inability to breakout
from the lodgment were varied. Montgomery and his
21st Army Group faced an extremely capable enemy
force, the 15th German Army, which had a significant amount of elite panzer units. Indeed, because the
Germans believed the Allied deception, Wehrmacht
leadership positioned their strongest defenses and defenders to oppose landings in the Pas de Calais region,
closer to the British landing areas than the American
ones. Thus, the Canadians had to contend with the
crack 12th SS Hitler Jugend Panzer Division and the
British with the 21st Panzer and the Panzer Lehr di-
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visions. Montgomery had optimistically planned to
take Caen on D-Day, but despite all of his optimism,
the Germans stalled his drive and although Caen was
only 15 kilometers from the beaches, the city was not
cleared of Germans by British troops until their final
drive, July 18 to 21. From the beginning of the campaign, there seemed to be a hesitancy in executing decisive operations by Montgomery and some of his key
leadership. Operations that had merit were proposed,
but there was a distinct tendency to avoid risks, preferring conservative approaches on the field of battle.6
Part of this was likely due to the constant concern
about the shortages of manpower, which was a significant British problem. At this time during the war,
Britain’s manpower situation was bleak and London
could not offer many more soldiers for the campaign,
nor could it afford to take heavy losses. They could
not throw increasingly more divisions into the fight
because their army was not nearly as robust as the
American Army. Simply, the men were not there.
British reticence to undertake operations that were
risky or that might result in significant casualties had
previously more than once caused friction among the
Allied leadership. Adding to the manpower shortage
was the inadequacy of some basic weapon systems
available to the British and Canadian armies. British
Cromwell tanks were no competition for upgraded
German Mark IV, Panther, or Tiger tanks. The British were also short on anti-tank capabilities, having
no weapon system comparable to the German 88mm
gun. The British Piat anti-tank system—a hand-held,
spring launched rocket—was hardly a modern weapon system. Even the bolt-action rifle available to the
average “Tommy” was reminiscent of the weapon his
father carried in World War I. British ordnance never
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replaced it, despite 6 years of war. In short, for a variety of reasons, to include the capabilities of German
units and some poor British leadership on the ground,
the British army’s advance quickly halted.
As the attempt to break through German defenses
continued, there developed an interesting episode to
inter-Allied relations. From June 6 through the end of
the month, British and Canadian forces attempted to
take Caen and unravel the determined defense, but to
no avail. At the end of the month, Montgomery would
claim that the strategy agreed between he (as ground
component commander) and Eisenhower was for the
British forces, in position short of Caen, to fight a determined campaign and serve as a magnet, holding
around Caen the preponderance of the tough German
reserves. This would allow Bradley, once Cherbourg
was in Allied hands, to breakout on the right. Bradley as well contributes to this fiction of Montgomery’s
magnet strategy in his postwar memoirs, but the evidence indicates that neither was forthcoming about
what actually transpired. In his memoirs, Eisenhower
notes a June 30 directive from Montgomery that states
the latter’s intention to “attract the greatest portion
of enemy strength while the American forces, which
had captured Cherbourg 4 days before, would begin
attacking southward with a view to final breakout on
the right flank.”7 Curiously, on several occasions, records show Eisenhower expressing concern that British forces were stuck near Caen and seemed to be unable to breakout. Did Eisenhower want Montgomery’s
forces to breakout or serve as a “magnet?” Rather than
following a carefully crafted strategy, it appears that
Montgomery was stuck in the Caen environs and was
not able to advance in a timely fashion and exploit the
fine maneuver terrain.8
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Montgomery’s magnet strategy was a fiction as
evidenced by Eisenhower’s continued encouragement for Montgomery to take Caen, his D-Day objective, then break out and exploit the favorable terrain.
Thus, on July 7, Montgomery made a serious attempt
to unravel German defenses, attacking German positions with three divisions, which the RAF Bomber
Command supported by a massive preparation. Although the effect of the bombers was devastating, the
cratering of the ground made the movement by tanks
extremely difficult. Even though British forces made
some progress, after a month of fighting, Caen was
still not in Allied hands. The essential problem again
seems to have been caution on the British part, caution
to commit too many troops and risk heavy casualties.
The British were not alone in their inability to
break the hard crust of German defenses. In the area
of American operations, problems for the breakout
and pursuit phase also emerged. One of the first goals
for American forces, once they had consolidated their
hold on the enlarged beachhead, was to take the port
of Cherbourg. Securing this major port, though inadequate, would become even more important after
June 18 when a major storm hit the coast and wrecked
some of the temporary unloading facilities, including
the Omaha Beach mulberry and other structures that
had served as a lifeline for Allied troops. With an urgency to occupy the port, since logistics officials had
to ration ammunition, on June 15, U.S. General Joseph
Collins launched his drive to cut off the Cotentin Peninsula, depriving the German defenders of Cherbourg
of supplies and reinforcements. By June 17, Collins
had cut across the peninsula and isolated the German
defenders from any land-based reinforcement. After a
brief pause on June 22, he initiated a three-division at-
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tack to take Cherbourg. American troops faced heavy
fighting from determined German units, but on July
1, Cherbourg surrendered. Regrettably, the port was
in ruins and was not immediately usable.9 This was,
however, the first of several offensives that would
allow Collins to earn the nickname “Lightning Joe”
and establish his reputation as one of the handful of
American senior officers that could practice what we
now call operational warfare.
Although the logistical problem was far from resolution, Cherbourg was a step in the right direction. At
the same time, the Cherbourg operation, as successful
as it was, did not resolve the problem facing the U.S.
Army; how to breakout of the area that the Germans
fully intended to contain and, in Hitler’s mind, erase
from the face of the earth. Initially, American units
had shown more initiative and greater mobility than
British forces, but attempts to breakout and attack
eastward found the Americans to be in a very difficult
position. In addition to dedicated German defenders,
American forces had to contend with extremely poor
terrain. To attack eastward and drive into the heartland of Germany required American units to contend
first with the Norman bocage (hedgerows).
In the Norman countryside, farmers had divided
the small fields into blocks of land by earthen berms
that were roughly 2 to 3 meters high and between 1-2
meters thick. The bocage contained thickets of hawthorn; the G.I.s called them hedgerows. American
infantrymen had difficulties crossing these earthen
berms, and German soldiers could create highly effective defensive positions. Eisenhower described the
situation as “Our whole attack has to fight its way out
of very narrow bottlenecks flanked by marshes and
against an enemy who has a double hedgerow and

196

an intervening ditch almost every 50 yards as readymade strong points.”10 Often these hedgerows were
even more difficult to traverse by roads that wound
through the area, roads that bordered the berms and
were worn deep by centuries of traffic.

Source: Michael D. Doubler, Busting the Bocage: American Combined Arms Operations in France 6 June-31 July 1944, Ft Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1988.

Figure 5-1. While at Ft. Leavenworth, Captain
Michael D. Doubler devised a notional depiction of
the formidable defense developed by the Germans
in the Bocage area of Normandy.
The German Army was well known for its excellence in maneuver warfare but often forgotten is its
excellence in defensive tactics.11 German units made
these so-called hedgerows interlocking belts of defense
that stymied American advances. Figure 5.1 shows
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a typical German defense of one of these enclosed
fields. U.S. armor could not initially break through the
bocage at the base of the Cotentin peninsula. Here, the
bocage terrain transitioned to some low-lying fields
that could be and were flooded to make the terrain
difficult, if not impossible, for mechanized forces to
cross. Even nature, in the form of rainfall, could turn
the fields into soggy marshlands. Soldiers encountered fields that had causeways, but the low-lying
ground through the efforts of nature or man became
all too swampy.12
The terrain problems in this area should not have
been a mystery as the bocage was an obvious terrain
feature shown through aerial reconnaissance and, of
course, it was nothing new at all to the locals; it had
existed for centuries. Allied planners had focused
their attention on the landings and consolidation of
the beachhead and not on any stabilizing operations
afterward. Patton, who knew the French terrain well,
was not involved in the planning process because he
was in the proverbial “dog house” over the face slapping incidents in Sicily. Staff officers had not considered the low-lying marshy terrain and the hedgerows.
Allied forces also did not have any specially trained
assault troops or special equipment to break through
this inhospitable terrain. Instead, when American
units attacked the bocage, the terrain seemed to come
as a surprise to Allied leadership. For the problems
associated with the breakout through this region, they
were simply unprepared.
For Allied military leaders and their soldiers the
bocage became an expensive learning experience. To
break through this terrain, American military units
required modified equipment, additional firepower,
strong combined arms cooperation, new tactics, and
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sound leadership. At the outset, few of these were
available. Allied forces had increasing numbers of
tanks, but the standard U.S. Army medium tank, the
M-4 Sherman, could not easily break through the bocage. When the M-4s did penetrate one of these natural defensive lines, all too often they were targets for
well-placed German anti-tank positions. From the
onset of the campaign, the Sherman proved to be inadequately armored and undergunned. Equipped
with a gasoline engine, rather than a diesel, it earned
its appropriate nickname, “Ronson,” after a popular
brand of cigarette lighter. U.S. Army units, attempting
to smash German defenses, lacked the firepower that
their German adversaries possessed. In terms of small
arms, the M-1 Garand rifle was far superior to anything the Germans had, but there were no American
equivalents to the standard German machine guns,
MG-34 or MG-42. Those machine guns provided the
withering firepower that had inflicted many casualties on Omaha Beach. To their credit, American noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and company grade
officers led from the front and attempted to provide
the necessary leadership. The heavy vegetation also
muted the Allied advantage in air power.
Finally, field alteration of equipment, like the
makeshift bulldozer blade made from German steel
obstacles from the invasion beaches and mounted on
the front of Sherman and other tanks, did result in vehicles being able to slice through the thickets. Even so,
the limited number of these tanks and the number of
German defensive positions meant that, without any
way to bypass or overcome the bocage, any American advance was going to be a lengthy and expensive
process. For the best part of 7 weeks, American units
slogged through the bitter attritional warfare in the
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bocage region, as commanders watched the casualty
lists grow.

Source: U.S. Army Military History Institute.

While planners had failed to consider the obstacle
posed by the Bocage, American Soldiers devised a
plow, nicknamed the "Rhino," crafted from German
beach obstacles, to break through the hedgerows.
After weeks of fighting and slogging through the
worst terrain, the senior American commander in the
field, General Bradley, was discouraged. Bradley and
his superior commander on the ground, Montgomery,
conferred on July 10. Bradley expressed concern about
the lack of progress in his area of responsibility, but at
that time, he did have a notional concept for a breakout that would become Operation COBRA. While
Bradley was planning for Operation COBRA, British
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General Sir Miles Dempsey, commander of the Second British Army, proposed that the British stage their
own offensive. The British began organizing their own
operation, GOODWOOD, which jumped off with a
massive aerial bombardment on July 18. Eisenhower
showed great enthusiasm about the prospect of a British breakthrough, telling Montgomery that “This operation will be a brilliant stroke which will knock loose
our present shackles. Every plane will be available for
such a purpose.”13 Operation GOODWOOD, however, was disappointing and lasted only 3 days. Regrettably for the Allies, it ended without a breakthrough.
In the 3 days of fighting, the British lost 469 tanks and
3,600 men to determined German defenders. Though
Montgomery failed to achieve a breakthrough, his offensive had occupied the attention of six crack German divisions.14 Operation GOODWOOD contributed
to the ability of American units to breakout a few days
later with their own operation.15
After six weeks slugging it out against stubborn
resistance in the bocage, American forces took the key
crossroads town of St. Lo on 18 July. They were finally in a position to breakout from Normandy and
begin the sweep to the east. The plan Bradley's staff
devised for the breakout was termed Operation COBRA, which initially called for a two and later a threedivision assault. Army division commanders would
launch initial attacks after a saturation bombing parallel to the Periers-St. Lo Road, where American troops
were again up against tough German resistance.
Saturation bombing had not worked well for Montgomery’s July 7 attack, in part due to the hesitancy of
his commanders, but also due to the heavy cratering
from 500-pound bombs that made mobility extremely
difficult. In planning Operation COBRA, AAF Major
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General Elwood R. “Pete” Quesada, Commander of
the IXth Tactical Air Command, attempted to have
the ordnance size reduced to 250-pound bombs to
avoid this problem. However, Collins, commander of
the VIIth Corps, overruled Quesada since he wanted
the desired blast effect of the 500-pound bombs. Staff
officers completed planning for Operation COBRA in
draft form on July 13. On July 18, Army commanders
intended to initiate the operation, but fortunately, the
senior Allied commanders recognized that this was
too soon, and rescheduled the start for July 24.
Operation COBRA was the third instance in the
European Campaign where planners called for strategic airpower in a tactical role; these aircraft had to
conduct a mission that they were not designed or
equipped to accomplish.16 Given the intended operational ceiling for heavy bombers, the results were predictable. The bombers were supposed to fly parallel to
the Periers-St. Lo Road and drop their bomb loads, but
there ensued several tragic errors. The weather was
poor on July 24, and, as a result, Allied leaders had to
postpone the operation. Only about two-thirds of the
heavy bombers received notification of the mission’s
cancellation and over 300 bombers dropped their
bomb loads, approaching the target area perpendicular to the front lines rather than parallel.17 AAF P-47s
also made their scheduled preparatory runs. Many
of the bombs fell short. Casualties resulting from the
Allied air attacks on the American 30th Infantry Division included 25 men killed and 131 wounded. To
add insult to injury, because American troops had
pulled back from their original lines to avoid “shorts,”
the Germans moved forward and took some of the
originally American-held terrain. Before the offensive
could commence, American forces had to attack in the
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afternoon to regain their original ground. Again, commanders had to reschedule the attack for the following day, and this time the heavy bombers and tactical
aircraft came in on schedule. In the period of an hour,
1,495 heavy bombers dropped 4,406 tons of high explosives along the front.18 The bomb runs of July 25
used the same bombing pattern as the previous day.
While the German lines were hard hit, friendly fire
caused 111 American deaths and 490 casualties. These
casualties were in all three of Collin’s assault divisions
and included a high profile visitor, Lieutenant General Leslie McNair, former commander of U.S. Army
Ground forces who had, unbeknownst to Bradley,
slipped into the front lines to observe the effect of the
aerial pounding on German positions. McNair died as
a result of the bombing, and Soldiers witnessed a blast
throwing his body over 65 feet. He was only recognizable due to the three stars on his collar.
The effect of the bombing on German defenses
was staggering. AAF aircraft upended tanks and selfpropelled guns and destroyed the communication
network. American assault troops reported German
soldiers wandering around babbling incoherently,
bleeding from their ears due to the enormous concussion produced by the 500-pound bombs. The psychological damage to the German defenders seemed
more serious than the physical.19 Despite the criticism
of the air attacks, air power did deliver a devastating
blow. Regrettably, the German forces quickly recovered, and survivors from the 5th Parachute Division
and the Panzer Lehr, both elite units, put up tenacious
resistance despite their heavy losses of both men and
equipment. As the day ended, many American Soldiers were discouraged because, despite all of the ordinance delivered, the German defenses had failed to
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crack. Collins, however, had a keen sense of the battlefield and he understood that the bombing and subsequent attacks had pushed the Germans to the limit.
In his memoirs, he stated: “. . . but noting the lack
of coordination in the German reaction, particularly
their failure to launch prompt counterattacks, I sensed
that their communication and command structure had
been damaged more than our troops realized.”20
On the following morning, he committed the
three divisions to continue the attack and, although
this did not result in a total German rout, American
forces broke through the defenses and the German
line gave way. Through Collins’ keen sense of the
battlefield, and the excellent tactical performance
of the U. S. Army Soldiers, particularly of the 2nd
Armored Division, an opportunity emerged for
American forces. American Soldiers had cracked
the German defenses, and American units began
moving south, east, and west to exploit the attack.
They did not race, because the object of Operation
COBRA was to break through the German defenses,
and the operation’s tremendous success seemed to
come as a surprise to both Collins and Bradley. However, the end of the battle for Normandy was finally
in sight.
Once American forces had punctured the German
lines, logic seemed to dictate that American units
would proceed eastward into the heartland of France
and press the German military. Pre-invasion planning, however, called for a different axis of advance.
On August 1, Eisenhower officially activated Patton’s
3rd Army which advanced according to Operation
OVERLORD’s original plan. Elements of two corps
moved south, west, and east to begin the exploitation
east toward Germany and at the same time cut off and
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overrun Brittany. The newly activated 3rd Army did
not have the singular purpose of concentrating and
moving eastward toward the German heartland. Rather, it had multiple missions of securing the Cotentin
peninsula, taking Britanny, Brest, and beginning the
drive to the Seine River. Units from the heavy VIIIth
Corps moved west into Britanny. At the same time,
Eisenhower also made Bradley the commander of the
newly formed 12th Army Group, consisting of the 1st
and 3rd Armies, which became the main maneuver
element of the U.S. Army for most of the European
Campaign.21 At this stage in the campaign, the senior
Allied ground command remained with Montgomery
who was now dual-hatted as commander of the 21st
Army Group and head of all Allied ground forces in
the region.
Future planners and strategists will find the period
immediately following the breakout an interesting
study. The tasking given to Eisenhower on February
12, 1944, by the Combined Chiefs of Staff indicated
that Allied armies should proceed east toward the
heartland of Germany and destroy Germany’s armed
forces. At the same time, the major logistical problem
of feeding the Allied war machine had hardly been
resolved, and supplies still came from the Normandy
area. Allied logistics officials continued to use temporary port facilities established for the June 6 invasion.
American and British leaders hoped that control of
both the Cotentin Peninsula and Brittany would improve the supply situation. The possession of these
two regions only had the potential to improve the situation, not solve it. It would take weeks for the Allies
to take all of the area’s ports and months to get them
rebuilt and ready for use. Allied officers could not answer the logistical and port problem by using areas in
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western France alone. Supply problems would drag
on. Eisenhower would only see relief when Marseilles,
France, and Antwerp, Belgium, were in Allied hands
and were fully functional.
Neither Bradley nor Eisenhower seemed to recognize the tremendous opportunity provided by Collin’s breakout. Eisenhower, as late as July 21, was firm
in insisting on early control of Brittany stating, “We
must get the Brittany Peninsula. From an administrative point of view, this is essential.”22 Had operational
thinking been in vogue in the American Army, driving east and then swinging north for a junction with
Montgomery’s forces would have been a more logical
option, but controlling the two peninsulas with their
ports remained their priority. Interestingly enough,
Montgomery thought that changing circumstances
meant that the priority of capturing the Brittany area
was lower, and the Allied command should use a
much stronger force for the drive to the heartland of
Germany. He recognized that if Allied forces could
concentrate and focus on a drive to the Seine River,
then the potential for an operational movement resulting in the encirclement of a significant number of
German troops existed. Of course, experience in the
European Campaign would demonstrate that Montgomery was much better at recognizing opportunities
than executing them.
By August 3, Bradley would slightly alter the emphasis of his operations hoping to use a minimum
force to clear the Brittany Peninsula, but ultimately
the emphasis of the 12th Army Group remained there.
Bradley was firm in his adherence to the original plan
that called for Brittany’s seizure. The American forces
moved rapidly to do so. By August 7, American forces
had moved the entire length of the peninsula, but they
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were unsuccessful in securing Brest. German forces
defended Brest much better than they had Cherbourg.
Brest did not fall until September 19 and by the time
it fell into Allied hands, the port was destroyed by
German sabotage, Allied air raids, and the fighting
around the port. Nearby, Allied forces bypassed German garrisons at Lorient and St. Nazaire which held
out until the end of the war.
As American forces rapidly exploited Collin’s
breakout, American units moving west, south, and
east presented an open flank. Hitler recognized this
was an opportunity and intervened. Although his senior commanders counseled caution considering Allied mastery of the air, at the end of July, Hitler was
in no mood to take much advice from his senior military commanders. On July 20, several German officers
attempted to assassinate the Führer, causing him to
distrust even more the traditional military establishment. Hitler regarded the offense to be the epitome of
military operations and saw no future in remaining on
the defensive, fending off Allied initiatives. He therefore ordered Generalfeldmarschall Günther von Kluge,
Commander of Army Group B, to mount a counterattack aimed at Avranches, which, if successful, would
take German units back to the Atlantic, establish a
new defensive position, and cut off supplies and reinforcements to American units pushing south, east,
and west from the beachhead. To accomplish this task,
Kluge had to throw together four Panzer divisions to
lead the German counteroffensive. The German Mortain offensive jumped off on August 7 with the intent
of driving through the Avranches area to the sea and,
in the process, cutting the road over which U.S. 3rd
Army’s supplies moved.23
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Map 5-2. This map depicts the breakout after
Operation COBRA and the potential “bag”
at Argentan/Falaise.
When the Germans attacked, the offensive created
a minor crisis for the U.S. Army. It caught the U.S.
30th Infantry Division by surprise, even though the
12th Army Group headquarters was aware of German
activities in the area. Although the attack inflicted serious casualties on the 30th Division, this American
division did a superb job of using good defensive
terrain and was successful in blunting the German
attack. Elements of the American 120th Infantry Regiment controlled the salient geographical feature in the
area, Hill 31. The Germans found movement difficult
without a rain of observed artillery fire. To complicate
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the Germans’ task, by late morning of the offensive’s
opening, the sky over their advancing armored units
was full of Allied aircraft. The dreaded AAF Jabos, the
fighter bombers that dominated the skies throughout
the European Campaign, pounded the Germans daily.
After 5 days of hard fighting on both sides, a
unique opportunity existed for the Allies. Hitler’s offensive, and it was exclusively his, had developed a
long salient into American lines, inviting a response
by Allied leaders, a response that subordinates should
have exploited, given Eisenhower’s task of destroying the German army. This is particularly true, because the German counterattack did not come as a
surprise to Bradley.24 From the beginning of the European Campaign, senior American officers had one
of the unique capabilities ever offered to a group of
general officers—the ability, through ULTRA, to read
the enemy high command’s message traffic daily. The
deciphered information did not reveal all German operational intentions, but it regularly revealed order of
battle information. Thus, when Kluge began throwing
together his assault formations for the offensive, German intentions were revealed. Mortain, for the Allies,
was no surprise; the Germans were going to attack.25
Montgomery had also hit the Germans with two
offensives in the early part of August. Dempsey and
his British 2nd Army were on the offensive, trying to
crack the German defenses. The Canadian First Army
had jumped off on August 8 with another offensive
called Operation TOTALIZE. With this offensive,
Montgomery sought to attack through the CaenFalaise Road that would, if successful, put Canadian,
Polish, and British troops in the town of Falaise. At
the onset, Montgomery was not thinking of countering the German attack. He wanted to punch though
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the German lines and swing east; taking advantage of
the road network that had Caen as its hub. Once on
this road, he intended to move eastward to the Seine
River. Hitler, who had created a salient stretching toward the sea, was unwittingly providing the Allies
with a unique opportunity: the potential for bagging
and destroying an entire German army, see Map 5-2.
With the German 7th Army’s salient pointing toward Avranches, it invited the potential for an Allied
classic double wing envelopment, with elements of
the 12th and 21st Army Groups pinching off the entire
German 7th Army. Since the breakout had already occurred, the Allies had hoped that Patton’s 3rd Army
and elements of Montgomery’s 21st Army Group
could drive eastward and trap the retreating German
forces along the banks of the Seine River. The Germans recognized that this area contained an excellent
defensive position, and the German military leadership had hoped to build a defensive position along the
Seine to contain the Allies when they advanced from
Normandy. Fortunately, for Eisenhower and other
Allied officers, the rapid Allied advance prevented
the Germans from devising a good defensive position
tied to the Seine. At the same time, if the 12th and 21st
Army Groups could drive east to the Seine River and
then link up on the west bank of the river, they would
again have the opportunity for a long double wing
envelopment, offering the possibility of destroying
Army Group B as well as the 5th Panzer Army. The
German army could ill afford to lose these forces. The
long envelopment was problematic, given the supply
situation, but at the same time, the Allied forces had
a chance.
The possibilities for the Allies, however, grew on
August 8 because, with the Germans developing a
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salient that stretched toward the Atlantic, there was
also the potential to execute a short envelopment to
pinch off the German salient at its base. If Allied military units could execute either event, then this success
could propel Eisenhower well on the road to completing his specified task of destroying the German army.
On August 8, with the German offensive only a day
old, there was an important meeting held at Bradley’s
headquarters. Present at the meeting were Eisenhower, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau,
Bradley, and his key staff officers. As participants
discussed the plans, a three-way phone conversation
with Montgomery began.26 With Operation TOTALIZE in progress, military officers observed that a great
opportunity had emerged. If the XVth Corps of Patton’s 3rd Army, commanded by Major General Wade
Haislip, turned left at Le Mans and attacked toward
Argentan, the German 7th Army could be bagged, see
Map 5-2.
At the meeting, Bradley took an aggressive and optimistic stance. He recognized the opportunity stating,
“This is an opportunity that comes to a commander
not more than once in a century. . . . We’re about to
destroy an entire hostile army.”27 The German army
that he wanted to destroy consisted of approximately
100,000 soldiers. Montgomery conferred with Bradley
on July 10 and expressed concern about the lack of
progress in his area of responsibility. After the conference, Dempsey had proposed that the British stage
their own offensive designed to take British units from
Caen to the town of Falaise. In short, advances by both
armies provided a unique opportunity that the Allies
could take advantage of if they had the necessary resources to do so. Bradley may have undercut his desire to accomplish this by sending the U.S. Vth Corps
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racing for the Seine River, rather than adding muscle
to his branch of the short envelopment he was hoping
to accomplish. Patton clearly saw the opportunity, but
would have preferred a longer envelopment, with elements of the XVth Army swinging north near Chartes,
rather than Lemans for a deeper envelopment.28
Before the German attack, the Allies had been advancing east with the goal of reaching the west bank of
the Seine River. With American forces holding firm at
Mortain, on August 10, the XVth Corps executed a left
turn and began to advance north toward Argentan.
This was the town where Montgomery had planned
for the two armies to meet. Montgomery’s Canadians
were facing stiff opposition from the Germans in their
drive south toward the same town, and they had made
little progress since August 8. Heavy resistance from
the Germans was logical because it became obvious to
Hitler and his high command that the Panzer forces
would not be able to clip the 3rd Army’s lifeline. Thus,
the shoulders were, in fact, getting stronger since the
Germans were no longer trying to execute a breakout
to the Atlantic but rather to extricate their forces from
the salient of their own making.
Kluge knew what was happening with his units in
the pocket or, as the Germans called it a kessel, that
was rapidly forming to put up stiff resistance to the
Canadian and American advances. At the same time,
he was attempting to hold the shoulders and extricate
units, like the 116th Panzer, 2nd Panzer, 1st SS Panzer, and 12th SS Panzer Divisions, which the 7th Army
could not afford to lose. He was having difficulty with
Hitler, who demanded a renewed German offensive
to the Atlantic. By August 12, Haislip’s XVth Corps
was close to securing the town of Argentan but was
encountering heavy resistance. Still, he had essentially achieved his objective, and consequently, Haislip
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sought new orders. By August 13, Bradley provided
the new orders; he halted Haislip’s advance.
As early as August 12, it was obvious that the Canadians would not be able to close the 25-mile gap
and put a cork in the narrow bottleneck that the Allies
had created. Only a couple of days into the operation,
Bradley identified the slow advance of the Canadian
First Army and expressed his concern to Montgomery. In his traditional style, Patton attempted to override Bradley’s orders by telling Haislip to take Argentan and then slowly proceed toward Falaise. When
Bradley learned of this situation, he quickly halted the
XVth Corps.29 Even by this time in the campaign, friction existed between the commander of the 21st Army
Group and his American colleagues. Eisenhower was
also displeased that the combined British and Canadian force remained in the Caen area, particularly
because they had the best maneuver terrain. Bradley joined the legion of officers who simply did not
like Montgomery; he only tolerated him. As early as
the Sicilian campaign, Patton had a definite and often expressed dislike for his British colleague. These
personality and national rivalries came into focus at
Argentan and Falaise.
Patton tried in vain to get Bradley to relent and let
the XVth Corps renew its attack, but the 12th Army
Group commander would not move. On the evening
of August 12, Patton called Bradley and declared,
“We’ve got elements in Argentan. Let me go on to
Falaise, and we’ll drive the British back into the sea
for another Dunkirk.” Bradley responded, “Nothing
doing, you’re not to go beyond Argentan. Just stop
where you are and buildup on that shoulder.”30 Bradley seemed to think that Patton could make the link
up, but that the narrow ribbon of U.S. troops would
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not be able to hold against determined counterattacks
by German units trying to break out of the pocket. He
also expressed concern about the potential dire consequences of the two armies colliding and the potential
for fratricide. Thus, in his memoirs he stated, “I much
preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan than a broken
neck at Falaise.”31 Eisenhower, who knew of German
attack intentions through ULTRA, was present when
the Germans initiated their Mortain attack because he
had established a forward headquarters in France on
August 7, a short distance from the Norman city of
Bayeux. From his headquarters, Eisenhower observed,
but did not intervene in the American response to the
German attack. He totally supported Bradley’s decision to halt the XVth Corps at Argentan.
Hitler reluctantly authorized the German withdrawal on August 14, and German units began streaming eastward through the bottleneck. Canadian units
completed the capture of Argentan on August 16, but
a gap remained in Allied lines through which the Germans could and did retreat. Allied forces finally closed
the gap on August 19 with German resistance continuing until August 22. Within the pocket, American and
Allied forces took roughly 50,000 Germans prisoner.
Allied intelligence sources estimated 10,000 Germans
died and approximately 50,000 escaped. Those that
escaped took very little with them; their tanks, trucks,
and self-propelled guns were a tangle of wreckage.
About 50 German divisions had been involved in the
fighting, but after August 19, German commanders
had only 10 organized divisions remaining in existence, and those forces were scattered elements. Even
as this episode of the European Campaign was ending, Allied units were already moving eastward to
their next objective, the Seine River. At the same time,
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they were harrying the remaining elements of the 7th
Army and the 5th Panzer Army, trying to block the
German retreat over the Seine River. One can gauge
the severity of the breach in German defenses in western France through the speed of Patton’s progress. By
August 26, Patton gleefully reported he was on the
Seine. Regrettably, however, the battered remnants of
the Wehrmacht also achieved one of their finer accomplishments in this European campaign by successfully extricating the remnants of their forces across the
Seine. From there, beaten German units began their
short retreat into the frontiers of the Reich.
Through the operations beginning June 6, resentment had begun to grow between the British and the
American leadership. It may have begun early in the
campaign when Montgomery was unable to achieve
his first day’s objective, the capture of Caen. Then once
Caen fell, a review of Map 5-2 shows the reader that
after Operation COBRA, American forces advanced
rapidly, but the British-Canadian Army seemed to
move agonizingly slow against the Germans. This
caused even Eisenhower to complain about the slow
progress of British forces. The British and Canadian
force was up against an extremely capable armor
heavy adversary, but at Caen and later in the environs
of Antwerp, Eisenhower became very irritated with
the slow progress by the British.32 At the same time,
Montgomery responded bitterly on July 26 because of
Eisenhower's complaints. The Americans had reached
their objective, i.e., Argentan, and they had to wait for
the slower moving British and Canadian force, which
caused any number of recriminations about who was
responsible for letting far too many Germans to escape
to fight another day.
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The Falaise Gap episode was the first of several
significant disagreements between the Western Allies.
While this disagreement was occurring at the theater
and operational level, yet another was emerging at
the Supreme Commander’s level. Eisenhower fully
believed in launching a second invasion front after
the Normandy landing was secure, and on June 24, he
rescheduled the invasion of southern France for August 15. The discord over a second front in southern
France started at the May 1943 Trident conference in
Washington, DC.33 The British were at best reticent,
and at that time they wanted to convince their American counterparts that an invasion in southern France
was premature. Later in the spring of 1944, Eisenhower grudgingly postponed Operation ANVIL due
to resource constraints, but he was unwilling to cancel
the operation entirely. Months later at the Tehran conference, Churchill made impassioned pleas to forego
any efforts to invade southern France. His attempts
to undermine the proposed operation continued until
only 5 days before the actual landings.34 Ultimately,
the British reluctantly agreed to the operation. Later
Allied discussions showed that political and military
leaders considered the issue far from being resolved.
Churchill feared American military leaders would
drain their divisions and other Allied assets away
from his primary focus of Italy. Therefore, the Prime
Minister continued to push the benefits of continued
operations in the eastern Mediterranean to include
other favored peripheral schemes.
American planners, to include both the Supreme
Commander and the Joint Chiefs, took a decidedly
different view. Allied difficulties in the Normandy
hedgerows and available amphibious forces after the
June 6 invasion allowed Eisenhower to reschedule the
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invasion of southern France, the long awaited Operation ANVIL. Allied planners selected an August 15
landing date with troops and supplies loading for the
operation on August 10. In this charged atmosphere,
a German attack in progress and an Allied landing
impending, Churchill arrived on the continent intending to dissuade Eisenhower from executing Operation
ANVIL.35
Churchill knew that to execute ANVIL, Allied
military commanders would reduce forces from the
Mediterranean Theater of Operations, specifically
from Italy. It would also mean that the Mediterranean
strategy that Churchill had consistently promoted
would again be the victim of the American Northern Europe focus. Churchill was totally opposed to
Operation ANVIL, but from the onset, Eisenhower
viewed Operations OVERLORD and ANVIL as closely connected and complementary. On the afternoon
of August 7, Churchill discussed, actually argued,
for some 6 hours over the problems that would occur if Washington conducted this operation. He even
resorted to an emotional plea stating that the beaches
were going to run red with Allied blood, “and if that
series of events should come about, my dear general,
I would have no choice but to go to his majesty the
King and lay down the mantel of my office.”36 This
was the most acrimonious debate on strategy between
the Supreme Commander and the Prime Minister that
occurred during the entire war. Eisenhower firmly believed that it was important to fight on as many fronts
as possible to stress and stretch the limited German
resources. Whether he was right or wrong regarding a
multiple front strategy, the Allies badly needed a high
capacity port like Marseilles. As the meeting wore on,
Eisenhower expanded his vocabulary, learning many
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different ways to say no to the agitated and insistent
Prime Minister.
Churchill was angry about the whole affair. In a letter to the Chief of Staff of the Army on August 11, 1944,
Eisenhower told General Marshall, “He [Churchill]
seems to feel that the United States is taking the attitude of a big, strong, and domineering partner rather
than attempting to understand the viewpoint that he
represents. I have never seen him so obviously stirred
upset and even despondent.”37 In an earlier July 6
memorandum to Major-General Sir Hastings Ismay,
Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defense, Churchill revealed his feelings about American leadership. He believed that “we have been ill-treated and are furious”
due to American behavior.38 Given his bitterness about
Eisenhower ignoring British priorities, the Prime Minister asked that Eisenhower rename ANVIL as Operation DRAGOON since Churchill believed that he had
been “dragooned” into the action.39 Certainly national
or personal pride was an element in this extended, but
generally polite argument. American dominance in
key decisions for the European Campaign had been
an established fact since early 1944. This was due to
the preponderance of U.S. land, air, and naval forces
for the campaign. The British had taken a back seat to
the United States in strategic decisions and, of course,
Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander, was American. Churchill tried unsuccessfully to retain some focus on his favored peripheral operations, notably the
Mediterranean. American leadership was not interested in the British peripheral schemes, which included
London’s postwar political considerations.40 Churchill
threatened to resign over the matter on August 9.41
Roosevelt, as well, refused to support Churchill’s position.42
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Casting aside national interests and priorities, an
invasion of southern France offered several advantages for the Allies. The invasion would divert German
forces from opposing the main American and British
thrust in Normandy. This action would further stretch
the beleaguered Wehrmacht, forcing it to fight on still
another front, and would increase the opportunity for
a clear breakthrough in the German defenses. Much
more important, if American forces could capture the
port of Marseilles in southern France, that port had
greater capacity than any other port along the Normandy coastline. Securing Marseilles and the area’s
railways, roads, and waterways (like the Rhône River)
would add a needed logistical center to support Allied
armies as they advanced into Germany. This debate
over a second invasion, if nothing else, underscored
one thing: the United States was the dominate power in the war’s strategy. The debate over Operation
ANVIL strained Allied relations; however, there was
never a threat of a permanent rift. As a complement
to both men, Eisenhower and Churchill retained their
pre-Operation ANVIL respect, and the operation proceeded as the Supreme Commander planned.
The initial planning for Operation ANVIL had begun under the auspices of the U.S. 7th Army in late
December 1943. By March 2, 1944, the planning was
under the direction of Major General Alexander M.
Patch who, like U.S. Generals Collins and Charles
Corlett, was a Pacific veteran and familiar with amphibious operations in that theater. The planning was
coordinated with the Free French and the actual assault, consisting of three American infantry divisions
(the U.S. VIth Corps) was under the command of
Major General Lucian Truscott. The assault divisions
would be reinforced later with six French colonial
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divisions. The invasion was supported by an ad hoc
Anglo-American 1st Airborne Task Force, the Canadian-American 1st Special Services Force, French special
assault groups, and French resistance members.43
Perhaps learning from the Normandy experience,
the Allied armada launched its airborne attack in daylight hours. Close to 400 transport aircraft lifted off
from Italian airfields in the early morning hours. The
aircraft dropped their troops without the loss of a single aircraft. On the beaches, casualties were remarkably light. In the first 2 weeks of the operation, there
were only 2,700 American and 4,000 French casualties.
The problems with expanding the lodgment like had
occurred at Normandy, or the threat of the Germans
pushing Allied forces into the sea, simply did not exist. One can see the success of this operation not only
through the light casualties and the rapid exploitation
of the beachhead, but by the Allied capture of two
desperately needed key ports, Toulon and Marseilles.
Both ports surrendered on August 28, a mere 2 weeks
after the landings. Despite German sabotage efforts,
Allied military forces opened Marseilles on September 15. Toulon followed 5 days later.
One reason behind the rapid advance in southern
France was an uncharacteristic decision by Hitler, a
retreat. With the Allied operation only 2 days old,
messages decoded through ULTRA on August 17 and
18 revealed that Hitler had ordered Army Group G
to evacuate the invasion area and join up with Army
Group B on defensive positions on the Sens-Dijon
Line.44 The German XIX Army retreated up the Rhone
Valley with its 11th Panzer Division as a rear guard.
Constant monitoring through ULTRA also assured
the Allies that no counterattack, like the Mortain offensive, was forthcoming. Generaloberst Johannes Blas-
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kowitz’s Army Group G successfully withdrew from
southern France, eluding Truscott’s attempts at encircling his Army Group. However, as he retreated out of
the area, he lost over half of his force of 250,000 men.45
As a result, with operations in southern France being
less than a month old, on September 11, the American
and French forces from southern France met elements
of Patton’s 3rdArmy. Operation DRAGOON, originally known as Operation ANVIL, allowed the Allies to
push the Germans out of France faster, buildup their
logistics capacity, and establish airfields to attack into
southern Germany. Eisenhower characterized the
move into southern France as decisive. In his opinion,
there was no other single development as influential in the defeat of the Germany forces as Operation
DRAGOON.46
After the war, some British leaders continued to
level criticism about the American decision to proceed
with ANVIL. These officers speculated that if the divisions pulled out of Italy for Operation ANVIL had
remained, then the Allies would have been more successful in the Italian campaign. American and British
forces could have driven through the Po River Valley
and into the Alps, maybe even into Austria. Apparently, such critics had never studied the Austro-Italian
Campaigns of World War I or the old axiom that one
should not attack in an area where the terrain clearly
favors the enemy force. Events of 1943-44 should have
shown that neither Italy nor the Balkans were suitable
for highly mechanized armies to fight and maneuver.
American contentions that Operation ANVIL/
DRAGOON was a highly successful operation is obvious, then and now. Russell Weigley best summarized
the contributions of Operation ANVIL/DRAGOON
as:

221

As the American Seventh Army approached a junction with the Third Army in Mid September, the pace
of the Allied advance since the Cobra breakthrough
was about to create a crisis in supply. Without the
southern French ports, this crisis would have been insurmountable. Without the southern French ports, a
tactical crisis yet to come would have been far more
desperate than it proved to be.47

The August 7 discussion concerning Operation
ANVIL/DRAGOON was significant because it resolved which nation would dominate in developing
the strategies for the remainder of the war. The “end,”
the objective of defeating Germany, had always been
clear, but the “ways” to attain this objective had at
times been contentious. At SHELLBURST on August
7th, Churchill’s attempts to convince the Americans of
using a peripheral strategy reached a conclusion.48 After those discussions, British leadership could propose
changes in the war’s direction, but American might,
both in terms of manpower and industrial production,
along with Eisenhower’s position, meant that America’s leadership could trump any major changes. The
United States was clearly not a junior partner in the
Alliance.
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CHAPTER 6
OPERATION MARKET GARDEN
But Sir, I think we might be going a bridge too far.1
		
		

Lieutenant General Frederick Browning
to Field Marshal Montgomery

Following the breakout from the Normandy lodgment and the successful landings in southern France,
it seemed as if the once vaunted Wehrmacht had lost
its ability to organize a coherent defense. Initially,
the speed and size of the Allied breakout throughout
northwestern France denied German military units
the ability to regroup and establish a strong defense
against Allied advances. Adolf Hitler’s Mortain offensive only exacerbated the problem. Neither Eisenhower or the SHAEF staff anticipated the speed of the
Allied advance as they prepared their projections for
success. Montgomery and Bradley pushed the German forces out of the Normandy area, and with Patton’s 3rd Army, American ground forces advanced
over a broad front to liberate France and inflict substantial casualties on the retreating German military.
Victory seemed in sight.
The Germans had hoped to create a defensive position along the Seine River, but the lack of resources
and the quick Allied advance made it impossible to
create a new defensive line to hold the Allies in place.
With no prepared defensive positions on the Seine, the
German retreat continued through the end of August
and into the first week of September. The relentless
pressure from the Allies pushing eastward, and their
dominance in the air, kept the Germans off balance
throughout the month of August. The axis of the Brit229

ish 21st Army Group extended across northern France
into Belgium. The American 12th Army Group moved
eastward toward southern Belgium, Luxembourg,
and central and southern Germany. After the Operation ANVIL/DRAGOON landings on August 15, another line of advance proceeded from the south, and
a third army group, the 6th, was organized opposite
Alsace-Lorraine. Eisenhower’s broad front strategy,
though in many ways unimaginative, had severely
stressed the Wehrmacht’s capabilities. The crises facing
German commanders went beyond events in France,
because even though the Wehrmacht could achieve
some tactical victories on the Eastern Front, the Russian steamroller moved relentlessly forward, crushing
everything in its sight.
Eisenhower’s decision to press the pursuit was
correct and demonstrated a good sense of the battlefield, but the rapid advance put stress on the limited
Allied logistical system. Consider the OVERLORD
planner’s original timetable. Some American staff
members thought that Bradley’s 12th Army Group
would reach the German border by D+96, but other
SHAEF analysts estimated that reaching the German
border would take until D+300.2 The Operation COBRA breakout and pursuit phase lasted only 47 days.
The Allies had a tremendous material and manpower
advantage over the Germans, but as the pursuit phase
proceeded, the logistical tail from Cherbourg and Le
Harve became dangerously long. There were other
ports in France. Unfortunately, the Germans still held
a number of these ports, and Allied forces encircled
these port cities rather than dedicating the resources
to capture them. In early September, the only major
French ports in Allied hands were Cherbourg and
Marseilles. These were simply inadequate for Allied
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needs. All other significant French ports were still in
German hands, and since they were on the Atlantic
coast, they offered little to resolve the supply crisis. At
the same time, capturing ports, wherever they were located, did not always result in having an immediately
usable facility. American and British forces also faced
the consequence of taking a defended French port
that had suffered destruction of its facilities through
either intentional sabotage or an unintended consequence from the battle. Landing supplies, organizing
distribution, and establishing proper transportation
required a tremendous effort to get thousands of tons
of supplies to combat and support forces every day.
Eisenhower recognized this, and one of his important goals was to take possession of a major useable
port, specifically Antwerp, Belgium.3 If Allied forces
could accomplish this task, then the logistical system
for the Allied armies might increase and expand combat operations throughout the area. The success of
Operation ANVIL/DRAGOON and the subsequent
capture of Marseilles and Toulon was a tremendous
boon, but still the supply problem seemed to elude
resolution.
Ports, however, were only a part of the problem.
Even if the Allies could capture ports quickly and
make them operational, the linking transportation network was often awry. The success of the AAF and RAF
Transportation Plan meant that Allied units could not
immediately use large sections of the French railway
system.4 Like the effort against German-held ports, the
AAF and RAF attacks had savaged the French rail system. Air interdiction and strategic bombing missions
had severely damaged or destroyed rolling stock,
rail-lines, bridges, and other critical infrastructure.
The U.S. Army in particular, demonstrated its usual
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innovative tendency by creating the Red Ball Express,
a truck-bound transportation system which rushed
supplies forward 24 hours a day from the beaches to
the troops in contact. Obviously, Allied logistical officials used great amounts of gasoline and vehicles for
this temporary expedient, but it helped to ameliorate
at least some of the crisis. Motor transportation and
the laying of pipelines for gasoline were consistently a
prime concern. Although PLUTO functioned well by
transporting gasoline from England to the continent,
they only brought fuel to the French coast. Distribution into the continent’s heartland was a weak link in
the Allied logistical system.
Gasoline became a limiting factor for American
and British forces that were trying to maximize the
advantage of mobility, a force multiplier provided
through having highly mechanized forces. One can
see the logistical impact on Allied efforts by looking
at Patton’s 3rd Army. In August 1944, the 3rd Army
alone was using about 400,000 gallons of gasoline
a day. By the end of the same month, the allocation
had dropped to 32,000 gallons.5 These shortages effectively immobilized Patton’s drive toward southern
and central Germany. To provide at least some assistance to the creaking logistical system, Allied leaders
stripped select new British and American units of
their trucks and other transportation assets in order to
supply units in combat. The demand for gasoline from
truck transportation alone consumed 300,000 gallons
daily.6 Without gasoline, the advance into Germany
halted. The supply system provided the U.S. 1st Army
with 3,300 tons a day, while Patton’s 3rd Army could
rely on a mere 2,500 tons.7 These resources amounted
to only about half of their allotted requirements. An
inadequate supply system began to dictate strategy.
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The failure to develop an appropriate logistics infrastructure slowed the ability of Allied forces to develop
depots that could directly support combat operations.
One major factor in the logistical problem was not
only the lack of suitable ports; it was also the success
of Allied forces in the period from July 25-September 9, 1944. As American and British forces rapidly
liberated France, it became obvious that the French
economy and the civilian supply network was also a
casualty of war. Time was required to reestablish the
civilian sector infrastructure. At least for a period, Allied forces would have to dedicate some of their logistical capabilities to supplying the French and later
the Belgian populations. The result of the military and
civilian demands on the inadequate transportation
network were such that by the end of August 1944,
the Allied offensive in the west was slowly but surely,
coming to a halt.
In the midst of these Allied victories and the growing list of shortfalls, there was a significant change in
the Allied command structure. On September 1, Eisenhower assumed the role of ground component commander from Montgomery while retaining his role as
Supreme Commander. From June 6 until September 1,
the commander of ground forces had been Montgomery. Montgomery wanted and felt he deserved this
command. Eisenhower’s assumption of command,
serving in a dual-hatted capacity, resulted in a dispute,
at times bitter, between Eisenhower and Montgomery. This dispute was enduring, even outlasting the
war. Eisenhower’s broad front strategy, or called by
some the strategy of general advance, was also a point
of contention between Montgomery and Eisenhower.
Both Montgomery and Eisenhower’s long time friend,
Patton, were highly critical of the broad front strategy.
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Both of these officers favored focused and powerful
thrusts toward the heartland of Germany because both
believed that through focused thrusts the Allies could
destroy the German military and end the war quickly.
Patton, though he grudgingly followed Eisenhower’s
direction, repeatedly pushed for a more imaginative
approach to the European Campaign, but to no avail.

Source: U.S. Army Military History Institute.

Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery, center, hero
of El Alamein, increasingly became a thorn in
General Eisenhower’s side as the European Campaign progressed.
It was from senior commanders of the British
Army, particularly Alanbrooke and Montgomery,
that Eisenhower suffered some of the worst barbs.
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Alanbrooke considered Eisenhower to be a failure as
Supreme Commander. Like Montgomery, he was opposed to Ike’s dual-hatted command. In addition, he
did not at all believe in the broad front strategy.8 There
were sharp divisions among the Allied military commands.
It was Montgomery however, that continued,
sometimes subtly and on other occasions openly, to
voice criticism of Eisenhower’s strategy and leadership. Montgomery was determined to prove that a
different strategy would be more effective in defeating the German military. In early September, he and
his staff began developing a new option. British units
were on some of the best terrain for mobile warfare.
Good terrain, however, had not resulted in a British
rush to the Rhine area. In late July, British and Canadian forces had pushed across northern France and were
ready to liberate Belgium and the Netherlands. On
August 17, Montgomery suggested to Bradley that his
combined British and Canadian force could advance
through Belgium above the Ardennes. Using 40 divisions, including Bradley’s American units, they could
drive across the Ruhr River.9 Montgomery believed
this mass of force would be unstoppable, especially
against a weakened and disorganized foe. This operation would allow Allied forces to reduce war munitions production and create a path toward Berlin, via
the North German Plain. This drive to Berlin could
end the war by December 1944. A successful British
drive to Berlin might allow the Western Allies to occupy most of Germany and parts of Poland, thereby
decreasing the Soviet Union’s role in this region.
Montgomery’s plan could not have come at a more
propitious time. Eisenhower’s broad front strategy
had stretched German capabilities and had resulted
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in exacting heavy casualties on innumerable German
formations. At the same time, the broad front strategy, and the second landings in southern France, had
also stretched American capabilities. As the prewar
German border was reached and attritional warfare
seemed on the horizon, Eisenhower explored options
to avoid a stalemate. In many respects, at least a part
of the problem confronting him was the gamble taken
earlier by Marshall. The Chief of Staff had taken a significant risk by assuming that a 100-division American
Army would be sufficient to win the war to include the
Pacific Theater and other obligations. While Marshall
had planned for the 100-division Army, in reality the
War Department capped the Army’s strength in 1943
at 88 divisions (the number actually reached was 89).
More serious than the actual number of divisions was
the ratio of support troops to combat troops. In March
1945, the U.S. Army’s strength reached 8,157,386 officers and enlisted men. Subtracting the 2,308,849 in
the AAF and the Women’s Army Corps, 5,848,537
Soldiers were in the Army’s ground forces. Of this
number, only 46 percent, or 2,711,969, were serving
in combat, combat support, or combat service support
units. Thus, the number of enlisted Soldiers assigned
to the 89 combat divisions was not significantly different from the number serving in the 73 combat divisions in service in December 1942, 1 year after the war
had begun.10
The manpower problem was recognized by McNair before his untimely demise in the Normandy
area. He was unable to resolve the problem. Bradley,
in one of the more candid and insightful sections of
his post war memoirs, recalled:
Prior to the invasion, we had estimated that the infantry would incur 70% of the losses of our combat forces.
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By August (1944) we had boosted that figure to 83% on
the basis of our experience in the Normandy hedgerows. The appalling hazard of an infantryman’s life in
combat was illustrated at St. Lo where in 15 days the
30th Division sustained 3,934 battle casualties. At first
glance those casualties would seem to imply 25% losses for the division. That figure is deceptive. Because
three out of every four of those casualties occurred in
a rifle platoon, the rate of loss in those platoons exceeded 90 percent. 11

Granted, as the campaign in Europe proceeded, the
combat power of American units, in many respects,
increased because the American Soldier had become
a seasoned and competent element on the battlefield
and one the Germans and British started to respect. At
the same time, as the fall proceeded, a serious manpower shortage developed. During the beginning of
the European Campaign, manpower shortages had
been a British problem. However, in autumn 1944,
the same problem plagued the American Army as
well, particularly in the availability of combat infantrymen. If the Allies were to conclude the war more
quickly and effectively, then other approaches other
than a strategy of general advance might need to be
explored. The question remained, could the American
Army’s leadership take a different approach to defeat
the Germans other than this broad front strategy. As
noted by one author, “American generals had demonstrated their tactical competence, although their
ability to craft tactical engagements into larger operational strategy to close with and destroy the enemy
remained questionable.”12
Montgomery was uncertain that the Americans
could make these adjustments, and he sought to show
American generals, particularly Eisenhower, how to
fight more efficiently. Montgomery’s desire to take
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center stage in the campaign, in many respects, had
a certain degree of irony. His record on Sicily and at
Caen made it questionable as to whether he could deliver Rommel or Patton style advances that could end
the war more quickly, but nonetheless he was determined to try.
Critics could see the most recent example of his
slow and meticulous nature at Antwerp. This port city
was an important decisive point on the map for Eisenhower and the Allied war effort. Taking this port, together with Marseilles, could have resolved the Allied
supply problem that got worse since the beginning of
the campaign. Montgomery’s 30th Corps did an excellent job of reaching the port on September 5 and found
it in unbelievably good condition. Antwerp, however,
lies inland from the coast, up the Scheldt Estuary.
Without possession of the river, to include both banks
and the Walcheren and South Beveland Islands, Antwerp was useless to the Allies. By taking Antwerp, the
30th Corps action not only secured it for the Allies, it
also essentially trapped the German XV Army. Only a
narrow escape route existed, and cutting that should
have been the 30th Corps immediate task. Instead, the
British drive into Antwerp, which originally showed
such promise, lost momentum at this critical time.13
At least part of the reason for this missed opportunity
was the fact that Montgomery’s thoughts and plans
were on another operation. This hesitation gave the
Germans a necessary respite. Much like the situation
on the Seine River, the Germans proved themselves
masters of organization and improvisation. Between
September 4 and 22, the XV Army’s commander, General der Infantrie Gustav von Zangen, succeeded in
evacuating over 80,000 men and a substantial amount
of their equipment to join up with the main body of
German forces on the Dutch mainland. The British
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Army did not secure the Schledt or seal off the XVth
Army’s retreat.
As this opportunity slipped through Allied hands,
Eisenhower’s quandary was becoming even more
serious. His adversary was now fighting on interior
lines, its front had constricted considerably, and the
German soldier was defending home territory. If
Eisenhower wanted to keep the enemy off balance, he
had two main options: He could attempt to maintain
his broad front advance, even though he was faced
with declining resources, and push into Germany,
albeit more slowly. His other option was to concentrate his attack on a narrow path to drive across the
Rhine and into Germany. If Allied leaders chose the
latter option, either the 12th or the 21st Army Groups
could be given this mission, but resources were not
available for both to take the initiative. Only one army
group would have sufficient logistics to conduct the
single attack. Further complicating the problem, the
only reserve manpower immediately available on
the continent were airborne units. Marshall and the
AAF’s Arnold, had expressed concern about the two
elite American airborne divisions, the 101st and 82nd,
sitting idle and pressed Eisenhower to use these divisions to conduct an airborne assault.14 Eisenhower
had planned to conduct airborne operations after the
Normandy campaign, but the pace of advance from
August to early September made it difficult to plan
such operations since objectives were taken before airborne assaults could be executed.15
Montgomery, miffed about Eisenhower’s assumption of ground component command, proposed to
take the initiative. On September 4, he sent a message
to Eisenhower proposing a full-scale effort on the
North German Plain aimed at Berlin. Montgomery’s
concept was to shift the weight of Allied efforts to his
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command; troops and supplies included. Eisenhower,
in response the following day, was not convinced
that the full weight of Allied power should focus on
Montgomery’s operations.16 At the same time, from
the campaign’s onset, staff officers recognized that
the northern France-Low Countries’ terrain was conducive to armored operations. It also led directly to
the North German Plain, excellent maneuver ground,
which was the most direct route to Berlin. If American forces maintained their pressure on the German
fortified line known as the Siegfried Line, then British
forces had the best shot at pushing straight to Berlin
and ending the war by Christmas.
Some might ask, why not send the undisputed
American master of maneuver warfare, Patton, on a
mission to unravel the Reich’s defenses? The answer
was simply that Patton was occupied in a bitter campaign of reducing the defenses of Metz and was incurring significant casualties in the process. Terrain was
not on his side. Bradley, who did not like Montgomery, later countered with a proposal to attack Germany
with his 12th Army Group. Using Patton’s 3rd Army,
Bradley planned to push through Lorraine and then
punch a hole through the Siegfried Line.17 The 1st and
3rd Armies could then attack through the Frankfurt
Gap and as the two armies moved into Germany, the
1st Army would press its attack in a more northerly
direction.
Given the terrain, Montgomery’s plan seemed to
offer better prospects than the attack planned by Bradley. Montgomery’s staff had actually created several
plans to cross the Rhine River, a major obstacle to entering Germany. One plan, Operation COMET, proposed that an airborne force drop into Germany and
take the town of Wesel, on the Rhine. If successful,
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Operation COMET would allow Allied forces to pour
into Germany. Montgomery later strengthened the
original forces under Operation COMET and moved
the objective west. 18 His revised plan included three
and a half airborne divisions. Instead of taking Wesel,
British and American airborne forces would land in
Holland. The main goal was to take a series of bridges
that would cross several rivers to include the Rhine
near Arnhem. Once Allied forces took the bridges, a
British ground column would race towards the bridges to consolidate these gains and secure access across
the Rhine.
On September 10, Montgomery met with Eisenhower in Brussels, Belgium, to discuss future operations. The meeting had all of the earmarks of discord
like the meeting between Eisenhower and British
Prime Minister Winston Churchill in August. In this
case, it was not between the American commander
and the Prime Minister; the argument was between
a British Field Marshal and his superior. Montgomery was extremely vocal in expressing his displeasure
about the broad front strategy and essentially sought
full logistical support for the 21st Army Group, to the
supply starvation of the others, in order to conduct
a rapier-like thrust toward Berlin. He essentially lectured Eisenhower as if he were a subordinate, finally
causing Eisenhower to reach over, place his hand on
Montgomery’s knee, and say, “Steady Monty! You
can’t talk to me like that. I’m your boss.”19 This was
Eisenhower, as Supreme Commander, at his best.
Twice in essentially a month’s period, he had endured
confrontations with the British leadership and despite
severe irritation, he kept his temper and successfully
worked with two highly opinionated British leaders.20
Despite Montgomery’s arguments, Ike’s decision
was firm; the broad front strategy remained in place.
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All the same, desiring to placate the British and to
seize, if possible, the Rhine crossings, Eisenhower authorized Operation MARKET GARDEN. Montgomery
was given priority for logistics, but American forces
would continue their operations, albeit more slowly.
For the British in particular, this operation was
critical, since its success would give the Allies control
of Holland and potentially the north German coast.
Only 2 days before this meeting a new weapon, a V-2
ballistic missile, hit a London suburb carrying its oneton warhead. German missile crews launched V-2s
from sites in Holland and could strike a number of
key political, military, and industrial sites in England.
Unlike the earlier V-1 jet propelled cruise missile, the
V-2 was not detectable by radar and hit the target at
supersonic speed.21 There was no warning. This new
terror bombing campaign put pressure on SHAEF to
act quickly and, if at all possible, seize the launching
sites, putting an end to this threat. Operation MARKET GARDEN gave Eisenhower and Montgomery
what they wanted. For Eisenhower, the operation
used airborne troops and offered the possibility of
early crossings over the Rhine River. At the same time,
it gave Marshall a deep airborne envelopment, something that he wanted. For Montgomery, it offered him
the center stage in the campaign. The Allied command
assigned logistics priority to the 21st Army Group,
much to Bradley’s dismay. Speed was essential. MARKET was the airborne portion of the operation, which
required the first British and American paratroopers
to land on September 17. GARDEN was the ground
link-up. Operation MARKET GARDEN concepts
required planners to turn their ideas into workable
plans and actions. The 21st Army Group commanders
had only 7 days to organize, equip, plan, and execute
this campaign. While the Normandy campaign had
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been preceded by months of training and preparation,
Montgomery was directed by Eisenhower to move out
quickly in this daring attack. Montgomery’s plan did
have an element of brilliance. Russell Weigley noted,
“If MARKET GARDEN was to succeed, however, it
would most emphatically demand tactical execution
as bold as the strategic concept.” Regrettably, it did
not.

Source: U.S. Army Military History Institute.

The V-2 rocket, a significant German “miracle
weapon,” which Hitler hoped would change the
course of the war.
Operation MARKET GARDEN had three main objectives: First, by outflanking the Siegfried Line, the
Allies would avoid the German entrenched positions;
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second, it would allow the Allies to have access to the
North German Plain and better maneuver country;
and, third, if properly executed, it would allow Allied
troops to cutoff those German units still in Holland.
The commanding officer of the ground portion of Operation MARKET GARDEN was British Lieutenant
General Frederick “Boy” Browning. He was an officer
who had never jumped in combat, though he did have
some airborne experience. Browning was also the primary planner for this airborne operation. Even though
the American airborne forces committed to MARKET
GARDEN outnumbered the British, the operation
was Montgomery’s brain child and thus Browning
was chosen. National considerations seemed to outweigh the fact that the American commander of the
XVIII U.S. Airborne Corps, Major General Matthew B.
Ridgeway, had much more experience. The 1st Allied
Airborne Army was under the command of an American, Lieutenant General Lewis H. Brereton, an AAF
officer with a dubious record.
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Note: The plan for Montgomery’s master stroke, Operation
MARKET GARDEN, shows the air drop sites, the advance of
Horrock’s XXX Corps, and the subsequent planned drive into
the Ruhr Valley.

Map 6-1. Operation MARKET GARDEN.
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Brereton and his staff completed the plan’s air
portion. His plans created the first problem for the
operation. A critical element of the plan was to ensure a sufficient number of troops would land on the
first day. Despite using both AAF and RAF transport
units, the planned airborne assault still did not have
sufficient lift capability to land all of their forces with
one drop. Instead, Brereton would have to land the
airborne forces in increments, rather than in a single
massive drop. Given the Allied mastery of the air, he
had the capability to conduct two sorties per plane on
the first day, thereby strengthening the light airborne
forces, as well as lessening casualties to the aircrews
due to the element of suprise. Nonetheless, Brereton
ruled that option out.22 Brereton did accept some risk
by dropping the airborne forces in broad daylight,
despite fears of up to 40 percent attrition, but landing paratroopers without sufficient forces or supplies
would jeopardize the ability of the airborne troops to
achieve their mission. When Allied military leaders
executed MARKET GARDEN, Brereton’s transport
forces would take the first 3 days to land necessary
airborne units on their targets. Allied transport pilots
would then use the fourth day to resupply the airborne forces.
Complicating the MARKET portion of the operation, Brereton ordered the RAF’s 2nd Tactical Air
Command to remain away from areas where the transport and resupply missions were conducted.23 Fears of
disrupting the transport aircraft with tactical combat
aircraft forced the 1st Allied Airborne Army to lose
critical close air support capabilities during the initial
and later stages of the campaign. Major General R. E.
“Roy” Urquhart, British 1st Airborne Division commander, would have found close air support in the
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initial days of the Arnhem operation “invaluable.”24
Inadequate artillery, limited anti-tank capabilities,
and the use of airborne troops—inherently light infantry—translated to a lack of firepower to contest enemy
armor and other activities. Brereton’s failure put Allied airborne forces at a severe disadvantage without
tactical airpower. Allied successes against German
forces in France had depended heavily on AAF and
RAF close air support and interdiction missions. Close
air support could have given those forces an added
capability. Restricting tactical air support for Allied
forces was paramount to surrendering the air space to
the Luftwaffe.
A major error that eroded the chance of success for
the operation was selecting the British 1st Airborne
Division for the task of taking the Arnhem Bridge and
appointing Urquhart as the division’s commander.
The division’s forces had not participated in the Normandy campaign. The division was also relatively
inexperienced, compared to the combat tested American 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions. Seizing and
holding the bridge was a critical and very difficult
task. The RAF made it even more difficult. Initially,
the operation’s plan called for the bulk of the 1st Airborne’s troops to land in the vicinity of the bridge. The
RAF’s Air Vice Marshall L. N. Hollinghurst objected
due to the location of German anti-aircraft and forced
a change of the drop zone to an area outside Arnhem.
The drop zone selected was over six miles from its
objective. This modification required British troops to
move quickly across six miles of enemy territory without the necessary ground transportation and seize a
major roadway bridge. They also had to leave some of
their limited force to secure the landing site for further
drops, supply missions, and glider landings. Deploy-
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ment of this smaller force made the success of taking
or holding the Arnhem bridges problematic. Browning selected troops from the 1st Polish Independent
Parachute Brigade to support the British forces in Arnhem, but not on the first day’s drop.
To coordinate the movement and progress of the
various moving parts in this operation required reliable communications between the divisions and their
component elements. Radio sets provided to the British 1st Airborne Division, however, had only a three
to five mile range.25 These radios would likely be out
of range to units approaching Arnhem. Any requests
for artillery or, if possible, close air support, would
probably go unanswered. Coordinating all of the necessary actions would be difficult, if not impossible.
A more critical problem was the distance between
the British 1st Airborne Division and their commander, Browning of the I British Airborne Corps. Browning
was to land at Nijmegen, the Netherlands, a distance
that would put him out of radio range with Urquhart.
Without communications, Browning did not know the
division’s status and was unable to coordinate support or relief action for the Arnhem forces. His decision to land his entire staff was also a major error since
it required 34 gliders for the staff and their equipment.
Urquhart’s 1st Airborne Division could have put some
of these craft to better use to land additional support
for its exposed troops. Browning had also dismissed
much of the strategic intelligence concerning German
military units in the region and did not pass this information forward to his subordinate division commanders.26 If the divisional commanders, especially
those earmarked for Arnhem, had known about the
presence of the II SS Panzer Corps, they could have
taken or arranged for effective anti-tank capabilities.
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Urquhart’s division had three major initial objectives. Its primary goal was to seize the bridges at
Arnhem. South of the city, there was a major bridge
for motor vehicles and foot traffic. West of Arnhem
is a railroad bridge over the Rhine River. Capturing
one or both of the bridges would provide the necessary passage into Germany.27 The next objective was
to take the territory south of Arnhem with the 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade. This would allow
the British XXX Corps to pass forward in a northerly
direction through Arnhem. If transportation delays
occurred in landing, then the British 1st Airborne Division and the Polish brigade could ensure the control
of this area. The last objective included clearing the
immediate area of any anti-aircraft defenses. These
measures would allow AAF and RAF aircraft to reduce the threat to aircrews, while they resupplied the
ground forces and provided air support to the deployed forces on the ground.
An experienced airborne officer would have vehemently objected to the drop zone that was located over
six miles from Arnhem. On September 14, Urquhart
briefed his plan to Browning and the other division
commanders. Major General James Gavin, commander of the 82nd Airborne, turned to his G-3, Colonel
John Norton, and said, “My God, he can’t mean it,”
and Norton replied, “He does, and he is going to try
to do it.”28 After the operation was over, the experienced German 1st Parachute Army commander, Generaloberst Kurt Student, concluded that the decision to
drop the British 1st Airborne west of Arnhem, so far
from their objective, was “the most important” reason
for the failure of Operation MARKET GARDEN.29
According to the British plans, when the Arnhem
bridges had been taken by the Allies the RAF and AAF
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were scheduled to take the British 52nd (Lowland) Division (air transportable) north of Arnhem, projected
for the 5th and 6th days, to consolidate Allied control
over areas north of Arnhem and allow Montgomery to control a major Luftwaffe airfield near Deelen,
Holland. 30 Capturing Deelen could give the British a
forward operating base for air transportable supplies
and forces. It would also provide a valuable airstrip to
conduct tactical air operations across the Rhine River.
The drops scheduled for the two American divisions were much more logical in that the drop zones
were close to the objectives and were in good open
country. Allied planners assigned the American 101st
Airborne Division to deploy near Eindhoven and the
division was to secure several bridges. Its companion
82nd Airborne Division would drop further north
near Nijmegen and capture bridges over the Maas
(Meuse) River, Maas-Waal Canal, and the Waal River. Seasoned airborne commanders led both of these
combat experienced divisions.
Once the British airborne forces seized control
of the Arnhem bridges, the 2nd British Army under
General Sir Miles Dempsey was supposed to advance
to the area where airborne troops had secured the
bridges and relieve them. The 2nd Army would then
advance past Arnhem and exploit this breakthrough,
driving into Germany. This portion of the operation
was code-named GARDEN. The British XXX Corps,
under Lieutenant General Brian Horrocks, would
have to dash through Belgium and Holland to take
control over the critical bridges for the airborne forces.
Successful capture of the bridges depended on a series
of coordinated actions that commanders would have
to complete within a few days. If the airborne forces
failed to capture the bridges or if the structures sus-

250

tained any damage, then a serious delay might create
conditions where a German force could counterattack.
If GARDEN was successful, then XXX Corps and
the 21st Army Group were free to exploit several options. British forces could drive southeast and try to
surround the Ruhr and cutoff the western industrial
center of Germany, capturing an essential piece of
the German war economy. Armored forces could also
drive northeast and make a dash for Berlin, an action
that could end the war. Either of these courses of action could draw German forces from the West Wall
and other defensive positions, potentially creating an
ideal situation for Allied forces. If the German defenders tried to use their limited forces to stop a British
advance, then the American 12th Army Group would
have a better opportunity to pierce a crumbling defensive line and advance along a broad front.
Allied intelligence sources, using ULTRA, had
identified some of the German forces in the area where
Operation MARKET GARDEN was to take place. For
example, the old adversary of British forces in the earlier stages of the campaign, the German XV Army was
in the vicinity. This German army had been pushed
out of the Brussels area, escaped from the Schledt
area, and had settled into northern Holland. Many of
its subordinate units had survived an escape from the
Falaise Pocket. Commanders of some of these units,
remnants of decimated German divisions, had organized these shattered pieces into improvised battle
groups or Kampfgruppe. The Kampfgruppe did not have
a standardized size, but instead they were an ad-hoc
collection of men and equipment, loosely organized,
some no larger than battalion strength. Their main
purpose for being in Holland was to refit, although as
the Allies would find out, they had the ability to put
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up a stiff resistance. Allied intelligence was concerned
about the presence of the II SS Panzer Corps. In addition, the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions had moved
into the Arnhem area to reorganize and replace losses.
Relentless Allied attacks had weakened the 9th SS
Panzer Division. Its strength had dropped from an
authorized 18,000 soldiers to less than 3,500 effective
combatants. SS tank crews only had 20 Mark V Panther
vehicles available, as opposed to their normal complement of 170.31 The 10th SS Panzer Division had even
fewer assets and less than 3,000 soldiers. Although the
two Waffen-SS units had sustained horrendous casualties, they represented a dedicated and experienced
defensive force that could descend on Arnhem and
contest British 1st Airborne Division plans to capture
and hold the bridge over the Rhine River.
Generalfeldmarschall Walther Model’s Army Group
B had units positioned in the general area where Operation MARKET GARDEN was scheduled to take
place. Within this Army Group were the 15th Army
and 1st Parachute Army. Other German support organizations located throughout Holland also offered additional units to defend the area. Granted, the leaders
of these depleted German divisions could not withstand a sustained attack by similar Allied armored
divisions, but they were in place and they too were
composed of many seasoned veterans. Unfortunately
for the Allies, the SS forces near the vital Arnhem area
would offer the most serious challenge to the success
of Operation MARKET GARDEN, especially against
light airborne units.
Montgomery did know about the presence of the
II SS Corps via several sources. He dismissed all of
these reports. Eisenhower had also learned about
this potential threat through his chief of staff, Bedell
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Smith. Smith suggested landing a second airborne division near Arnhem, but concerns about changing the
operation and angering Montgomery caused Eisenhower to defer the decision to the 21st Army Group
commander. Smith also conveyed the information to
Montgomery, but the British commander ignored the
warning.32 The prevailing attitude among senior commanders, based on German performance over the previous month, was that the German units were greatly
weakened by their combat operations and would not
pose a serious problem. Determined Allied attacks
through their lines by XXX Corps would easily shatter
their thin defenses.
A key element to GARDEN was a rapid advance of
the XXX Corps to reach the paratroopers holding the
bridges. Since the airborne units were lacking heavy
weapons, their reinforcement by conventional forces
was crucial. To accomplish this rapid advance, armor
and infantry units had to move across terrain that essentially canalized the attackers. The proposed advance was over a solitary main road that led through
Eindhoven to Nijmegen and finally to Arnhem. The
road was the only way to pass through land that could
not support major cross-country armor movements.
The land surrounding Nijmegen contained canals,
waterways, and other water obstacles that could delay
any major efforts to bypass the road system through
overland operations. The limited road system and the
unsuitable surrounding terrain restricted the range
of maneuver for British ground forces. A determined
German defense, if given time, could focus on this
narrow corridor of advance and slow if not stop any
British progress north.
Initial elements of Operation MARKET GARDEN
started on the evening of September 16. Brereton was
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still concerned with the Luftwaffe’s ability to use its
remaining fighters and anti-aircraft defenses to bring
down his transport aircraft. Given this concern, the
RAF Bomber Command launched several raids using
Lancaster heavy bombers and smaller nimble Mosquito light bombers to strike airfields that operated
German interceptors. The RAF hit one Luftwaffe facility where Germany officials based their newest fighter, the Me-262 jet. RAF aircraft severely damaged the
runway, making it difficult for the Me-262 pilots, with
its tricycle gear, to operate.33 The RAF also attacked
potential anti-aircraft artillery positions throughout
the region.
Allied air forces also conducted operations to destroy enemy air defenses on the day of the invasion.
On the morning of September 17, AAF and RAF fighters and bombers struck Luftwaffe and coastal defense
batteries throughout Holland. The RAF sent bombers
and escort Spitfire fighters to disrupt the operations
of flak ships. The AAF sent a 1,000 B-17 and fighter
escort force to bomb and strafe 112 anti-aircraft artillery locations.34 Through these air attacks, commanders believed that they had significantly reduced the
enemy air resistance. RAF 2nd Tactical Air Force pilots also hit troop barracks at Arnhem, Nijmegen, and
other locations to reduce any threat by enemy ground
forces to the airborne landings. These critical assaults
were necessary to reduce a number of threats, but
they also alerted the German military command of
a potential airdrop in the near future. The AAF and
RAF used 1,418 bombers and escorts to prepare the
area for paratroop and glider landings. Only seven Allied aircraft were lost throughout the night and early
morning raids. In less than a day, American and British bombardiers dropped over 4,000 tons of bombs in
support of the landings.
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Brereton arranged for the bulk of the transport fleet
to begin their take-offs at 10:25 am. Pathfinder groups
preceded the main body of transport aircraft and gliders. Two transport aircraft groups arrived over Holland. The initial plan for the airborne force included
1,545 transport planes and 478 gliders originating
from 24 airfields across England. Aircrews actually
flew 1,174 aircraft on Operation MARKET GARDEN’s
D-Day, and of those aircraft launched, 338 either
aborted their drops, were lost, or were damaged.35 The
initial drop was a superb achievement on the part of
Allied air forces, with approximately 20,000 troops accurately inserted into Holland within a window of 80
minutes.36 Despite this huge air armada, the airborne
divisions could only land part of their forces due to
the space limitations of the aircraft. The fact that only
part of the troops could be transported with available aircraft coupled with the refusal of air transport
leaders to conduct a second drop the same day would
have a profound effect on the operation. The limited
transport caused the British 1st Airborne Division to
limit its landing of light artillery to a mere 24 of their
75mm pack howitzers. This restricted fire support
would have to last until XXXth Corps could arrive
with heavier artillery. Brereton, again, compounded
the fire support problem by effectively grounding
close air support, an essential tool to counter enemy
armor and troop concentrations.
Transport aircraft flew either a northern or a southern route. Aircraft with the northern route dropped
the British airborne forces on the Arnhem area and
the American 82nd Airborne Division on Nijmegen.
The route avoided the concentrated flak units based
throughout the Walcheren Islands along the channel
coast, the Rotterdam area, Nijmegen, and Arnhem.
Pilots flying on the southern route were above terrain
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controlled by the 21st Army Group for most of their
flight. Units from the U.S. 101st Airborne Division still
had to cross over heavy flak areas when their planes
flew across Eindhoven. Despite the Allied bombing
preparations and strafing missions, the Luftwaffe was
able to send interceptors against the transports. Allied air losses included 68 transport aircraft, 71 gliders, and 20 fighters on the first day. These casualties,
for a daylight drop, were far less than the 40 percent
anticipated losses. Paratroops and glider units began
landing around 12:30 pm and continued into the early
afternoon.
The RAF dropped British airborne forces in their
designated areas northeast of Arnhem. By 1:50 pm,
approximately 5,000 British airborne troops had landed in Holland.37 Urquhart’s forces then faced over a
six-mile march as they moved toward their objective;
Arnhem. They encountered some delays as they tried
to organize themselves and move out toward their assigned objectives. Jeeps sent in by gliders were their
only motorized transport equipment. These light vehicles did provide a limited reconnaissance capability and could tow the few anti-tank weapons onto the
battlefield.
Although the German military had indications that
a major airborne operation was about to occur, they
knew few specifics about when and what objectives
the Allies would take. As a result, the airborne landings took the defending Germans by complete surprise. Model’s Army Group B, with headquarters near
Oosterbeek, the Netherlands, was very close, a mere
three miles away, to Urquhart’s landing zone. As the
paratroopers began landing, Model retreated to the II
SS Panzer Corps headquarters since he believed that
his capture was the airborne operation’s objective.
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Despite the German presence throughout the region, coordinating a dedicated defense against this
surprise attack was at first difficult. Obergruppenführer
und General der Waffen-SS Wilhelm Bittrich, commanding the II SS Panzer Corps, did manage to identify the
airborne force’s mission of seizing the bridges over
Arnhem and Nijmegen. Bittrich ordered the 9th SS
Panzer Division to protect the two Arnhem bridges,
survey Arnhem and Nijmegen for enemy activity, and
attack any enemy forces in the Oosterbeek area. He
also ordered the 10th SS Panzer Division to occupy
the bridge near Nijmegen. Bittrich requested Model’s
permission to destroy any bridges once they were
under German control to deny their use to the Allies.
Model did not concur. He thought the Allies would
move against German defenses east of Arnhem. If the
Germans destroyed the bridges, then German military
forces from Holland could not support any counterattacks or defensive activities. Thus, destroying the
bridges would only support the Allies’ mission.38 This
decision on the part of the German senior commander
was fortuitous for the Allies.
After some opposition and delay from the landing
sites, the British units managed to move toward their
objectives. Elements from the British 1st Airborne Division reached Arnhem’s outskirts and approached the
railroad and roadway bridges. Before they could take
the railroad bridge, German forces used explosives to
demolish it. The only other bridge was the main roadway bridge south of Arnhem. British paratroops did
find a ferry that could cross the Rhine River, but they
failed to use it. The paratroopers took the northern end
of the roadway bridge that same evening after clashing with German forces rushing south to Nijmegen.
Unfortunately for Urquhart, an armored car unit from
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the 10th SS Panzer Division controlled the southern
end of the roadway bridge. The British had managed
to move a battalion into Arnhem, but German units
moved quickly and efficiently to cutoff any reinforcements. British defenders had no choice but to take up
a defensive posture and wait until the XXXth Corps or
other elements of the airborne division scheduled for
the second drop on the following day relieved them.
If the 1st Airborne had been dropped closer to their
objectives, Urquhart’s forces might have taken all of
the bridges. Due to the distance from the objective and
the time it took Urquhart’s men to get organized, British paratroopers were faced with a major task of dislodging elements of the 10th SS Panzer Division that
controlled the southern end of the Arnhem roadway
bridge.
American paratroopers of Major General Maxwell
D. Taylor’s 101st Airborne Division had to capture
the city of Eindhoven and then take a highway bridge
over the Wilhemina Canal. Taylor also had to occupy
a 15-mile stretch of road to allow the XXXth Corps
to advance northwards. This roadway north from
Eindhoven linked the 101st and elements of the 82nd
Airborne Division. Paratroopers needed to capture
several other crossings and bridges independently
and push north ahead of the XXXth Corps. The lightly
armed paratroop and glider forces had to disperse to
control this road and hold out against any enemy opposition. The stretch of road was nicknamed “Hell’s
Highway” by the U.S. Soldiers. Taylor dispensed with
his assigned artillery and ordered his infantry units
to land first on September 17. Since the division contained only light artillery, Taylor thought his artillery could not support the dispersed airborne forces
along the road.39 This scheme might have worked if
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the XXXth Corps elements had made rapid progress
through the initial German defenses, and German engineers had not blown-up any of the bridges, but this
was not the case.
The 101st landed without opposition and quickly
took most of their objectives. The exception was the
crossing over the Wilhemina Canal. American forces
attempted to take a crossing over the canal at Son, the
Netherlands, but Taylor also assigned a force to take a
rail and road crossing west of Son. Unfortunately, German forces had destroyed both bridges. No advance
over the canal could occur until the XXXth Corps
could provide appropriate bridging and engineering
support to span the waterway. The Allied advance
northwards towards Arnhem faced a delay.
The 82nd Airborne had several objectives upon
landing. Paratroopers were to advance south of Nijmegen and take a bridge over the Maas River. Other
objectives included taking bridges across the MaasWaal Canal and another key bridge north of Nijmegen
over the Waal River. Altogether Gavin’s 82nd had to
take six bridges, control the roadway north, and advance through hilly, wooded terrain southeast of Nijmegen. Gavin believed control over the region and
bridges depended on his Soldiers’ ability to control
the Groesbeek Heights, a wooden ridgeline that ran
north to south of this hilly area.40 The 82nd needed to
dominate this ridge, because from it German defenders could stage a counterattack against any of the six
bridges or cut the access to the roadway.
Without the division’s full resources, limited by the
initial landing transportation allocations, Gavin had
to make a choice. His forces could take all of the six
bridges, but without control of the wooded ridgeline,
a German counterattack could sweep the Americans
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away from their initial gains. Gavin decided to take
the bridges over the Maas River and the Maas-Waal
Canal and accept the risk of attack from the wooded
ridgeline. American airborne forces had to wait for the
British XXXth Corps to make a combined attack on the
bridge near Nijmegen. Through no fault of its own,
the lack of mass for the 82nd Airborne Division affected the operation’s success. The XXXth Corps was
running into difficulty.
Operation GARDEN’s fate rested on XXXth Corps
moving the 64 miles from Neerpelt to Arnhem. Horrocks’s Corps first had to breech German defensive
positions and then rapidly drive towards Eindhoven.
Launching the GARDEN portion of the operation from
Belgium, Horrock’s force crossed the Meuse-Escault
Canal near Neerpelt, Belgium. The initial attack by
British ground forces, with RAF and artillery support,
broke through the German Kampfgruppe, and XXXth
Corps was able to push ahead. The exploitation, however, was not as easy as had been believed. When the
lead Irish Guards Division pushed into enemy territory, within 1,000 yards of its start, German defenders
used their anti-tank weapons to destroy nine tanks.
Thus, despite a massive artillery barrage and RAF
close air support, the German defenders managed to
delay the push north. After the first day, the XXXth
Corps had advanced only six miles. Initial plans had
called for the XXXth Corps to make the drive to Arnhem within 2 days. After the first day’s delays, this
goal was out of reach. The 1st Allied Airborne Army
units would have to defend their positions and wait.
Resupply of these units might allow them to hold on
to their captured bridges and areas, but heavy firstday casualties and the potential for a reinforced German counterattack could create a catastrophe for the
British and American forces.
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The slow start on September 17 disappointed
American and British commanders. Since the Germans had initially stalled the XXXth Corps advance,
on the second day of the operation, an alerted foe had
the potential of attacking at any point from the Belgium border to south of Arnhem to stop the invading
Allied force. German soldiers had already delayed the
Allied advance by demolishing some of the bridges.
The Allied ground advance also had to contend with
moving through crowded urban areas filled with ecstatic Dutch civilians recently liberated after years of
occupation.
Insufficient forces on the ground, poorly chosen landing zones, too many objectives, insufficient
firepower, limited routes to advance, and incorrect
assumptions about the capabilities of the German
defenders all played a part in preventing airborne
and ground forces from taking all of their objectives.
Montgomery had ordered the British XIIth and VIIIth
Corps to make advances to the left and right of the
XXXth Corps, but these forces also moved slowly partly due to a lack of fuel and logistics. The only possibility of salvaging something from Operation MARKET
GARDEN was a determined advance up the main but
vulnerable highway by the XXX Corps.
The drive north to relieve the 1st Allied Airborne
Army units became mired in delays due to enemy attacks all along the path to Arnhem. Despite their depleted and weakened status, several German Kampfgruppe began converging on the British and American
units. Many experienced senior leaders led German
units, and they were on familiar terrain, a distinct advantage. The only option available to the Allied airborne units was to dig in and wait for the relief force.
This option was a difficult task, especially for British
airborne troops that held the most contested area, the
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city of Arnhem. The roadway bridge south of the city
became the most critical battle in the operation. British 1st Airborne Division soldiers were able to maintain a tenuous presence at the northern end of the
bridge, but German forces were able to surround them
which meant that units from the XXX Corps would
have to cross the Rhine River against opposition. SS
units used the Arnhem ferry, disregarded by the British, to move units south of the Rhine River. Bittrich
organized several German units and counterattacked
the British. Through these attacks, the Germans were
able to isolate many of the British units. The Germans
relentlessly attacked the British defenders from September 17 to 21. British defenders successfully resisted
an attack on the bridge on September 18 by elements
of the 9th SS Panzer Division’s reconnaissance battalion. The 9th’s commander attempted to rush the
bridge, but concentrated fire from British anti-tank
weapons, grenades, and small arms fire stopped the
advance. Still, the situation for the British 2nd Parachute Battalion holding on to one end of the bridge
became increasingly desperate. At the same time, the
Germans were able to infiltrate the drop zone for the
1st Airborne and, because the British did not have effective radio communications, efforts to adjust resupply drop zones were hampered. Dropping supplies to
reach British airborne forces became problematic, if
not impossible. Casualties, reduced ammunition, and
few anti-tank weapons meant that by September 21st
British airborne units were in dire straits.
Allied forces hoped for far more success from D+1.
On September 18 aerial resupply missions and additional paratroop landings started after a delay due to
weather conditions in England. Poor weather in England delayed the Polish paratroop brigade’s deploy-
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ment into the Arnhem area. Eventually, the Polish
units landed, but the entire brigade did not get airlifted until September 21. Although the weather worked
against supply and reinforcement drops, XXX Corps
and the 101st Airborne Division were able to capture
Eindhoven with its important bridge, and pushed toward Son. By evening on the 18th, British engineers
had built a temporary bridge over the Wilhemina
Canal and could move forward toward Nijmegen.
On September 19, the XXX Corps reached elements
of the 82nd Airborne Division near the Waal River.
The operation to link-up with British paratroopers at
Arnhem, however, faced repeated delays. The paratroopers continued to hold Arnhem and denied the
II SS Panzer Corps from reinforcing German forces
in Nijmegen. Still, if the Germans could forestall XXX
Corps from breaking through to Arnhem, then the 9th
SS Panzer Division and other units could destroy the
British paratroopers whose perimeter was increasingly shrinking. A possibility still existed that Operation
MARKET GARDEN might succeed, but the chance
was slowly slipping away.
The German military’s quick reaction and interpretation of the operation’s goals created conditions
that would deny an Allied victory. The Luftwaffe was
a shadow of its former self, but in opposing Operation
MARKET GARDEN it exhibited considerable resilience. German aircrews had 425 Bf-109 and FW-190 interceptors available to attack the AAF and RAF cargo
and troop carriers.41 Luftwaffe fighters strafed British
positions and both air and flak crews disrupted glider
and paratroop drops with accurate fire. Further, enemy opposition and poor communication with troops
on the ground resulted in much of the ammunition
and supplies dropped for Arnhem being lost, because
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aircrews mistakenly dropped them over enemy controlled territory.
Airborne division commanders had to make difficult choices. Urquhart’s positions near Oosterbeek
and surrounding areas allowed German forces to attack them piecemeal. British forces had to withdraw.
Urquhart reformed his units, but the British forces in
Arnhem controlling the bridge were separated by German defenders. Meanwhile, south of Arnhem, lack of
resources to reinforce the American 82nd Airborne
forces had delayed them from taking the Nijmegen
roadway bridge. They would need the British forces
to support an attempt to seize the bridge. Although
the combined American-British effort was successful,
taking the bridge on September 23, this was far too
late to save the operation. After a heroic defense, the
British 1st Airborne Division forces in Arnhem had
surrendered on September 21. Urquhart still had a
sizeable force near Arnhem, but casualties and limited supplies made the chance of capturing the bridge
virtually impossible. The only realistic option was to
withdraw these remaining British troops. The Allied
forces withdrew during the night of September 25.
In the meantime, XXX Corps had broken through the
Belgian border and had reached the Rhine River, but
despite this belated success, German resistance had
stiffened, and there was no clear corridor for an attack
toward the North German plain.
The concept of using airborne forces to seize vital
objectives and using ground forces to relieve them
was valid and bold. Early German examples in Holland during 1940 and the successful Allied Normandy
drop validated these concepts. Dashing ahead and
seizing bridges over the Rhine River to place Allied
soldiers across the Rhine, if it had been successful,
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had the potential of significantly shortening the war.
Conversely, it would be difficult to find an operation
that could serve as a better example of what not to do
when planning an operation, than Operation MARKET GARDEN.
From the very beginning, planning and tactical execution of the operation was badly flawed. First, there
was the issue of leadership. Since it was Montgomery’s
operation, he chose to use British officers with little
or no airborne experience to plan and lead the operation. As a British conceived operation, he would not
use the more experienced American airborne leaders
like Ridgeway or Gavin. Second, ignoring the available intelligence from various sources that indicated
the presence of elite German units in the drop areas
was extremely foolish. In his memoirs, Montgomery
later admitted his error in underestimating the capabilities of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. In his defense, he
would only be the first of several Allied generals in
the fall of 1944 to underestimate the fighting power
of the Wehrmacht.42 Third, the operation was hurriedly
planned, with authorization being given on September 10 and execution performed on September 17. This
was a rather short planning period, to say the least,
considering that this was the largest airborne drop in
World War II. Fourth, the planners based the operation on the success of interconnected events. Any one
failure would doom the operation.
Failure came in many forms. The failure to schedule a second drop on the first day of the operation
resulted in the paratroopers having insufficient combat power to achieve their objectives. Operational security was compromised when Kurt Student’s forces
captured a copy of Operation MARKET GARDEN’s
plans. This error was entirely American because,
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against orders, an American officer had a full copy of
the MARKET GARDEN orders with him on the glider
ride that claimed his life. This compromised the entire
operation. Perhaps the most serious error was dropping the British 1st Airborne too far from its objectives, compounded by the narrow corridor of advance
for the British XXX Corps.
Any one of these issues could have affected the
success of this operation. Taken together, they proved
to be a recipe for disaster. In his memoirs, Montgomery acknowledges several of these errors, but it is interesting that the first problem he noted was that full
priority for logistics was not given to Operation MARKET GARDEN as Eisenhower wished. Using Chester
Wilmot as an authority, he indicates that Patton had
really not been stopped on the Meuse, and that full
priority for operations had not been given to Dempsey
and Courtney Hodges, commander of the U.S. 1st
Army, both important commanders on the Allied
left.43 This provides some credence to Montgomery’s
claims, but it is small credence indeed. Montgomery
concludes that if he had the logistical support from
the operation’s inception, he would have succeeded,
despite his admitted errors.44 His most intriguing
comment is included in his immediate post war book
where he stated that the operation “was 90 percent
successful.”45 Given that the stated objectives for this
operation, which were not achieved, and the fact that
the British 1st Airborne Division had been wrecked,
it is difficult to understand how anyone could make
such a statement.
Though failing in its operational objective, Operation MARKET GARDEN did focus Allied attention
to opening Antwerp; Montgomery’s “90 percent success” had, in reality, created a salient that had to be
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defended and may have diverted forces to the effort.
But it was indeed fortunate for the Allies that the Germans did not have the available strength to make this
salient a target for counterattack.
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CHAPTER 7
THE HÜRTGEN CAMPAIGN
Unlike other battles in Europe so far, we sacrificed
our ground mobility, our tactical air support, and we
chose to fight the Germans under conditions entirely
to their advantage.1
		

Major General James M. Gavin

BACKGROUND
As the third week of September 1944 ended, Allied armies had not advanced past the prewar German borders, and parts of Holland had yet to be liberated.2 The Allied problem with supply had slightly
improved because of Operation ANVIL/DRAGOON
and the seizure of Marseilles and Toulon, France, but
the final resolution of the supply problem still eluded
Allied commanders. At least a part of this problem
was because of the priority that Eisenhower had originally attached to Antwerp, Belgium, which had fallen
by the wayside due to Operation MARKET GARDEN.
Throughout September, Eisenhower regularly prodded Montgomery to finish the Antwerp operation, but
his authorization of Operation MARKET GARDEN
clearly undermined large-scale operations against the
Germans holding the Scheldt Estuary. Thus, Allied
leaders consigned Antwerp to the status of an unusable port, even though its docks and facilities were
in good condition. When Operation MARKET GARDEN failed, the priority for British forces returned to
the task of clearing the Scheldt Estuary and opening
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the port. Still, Antwerp was not functional until late
November because the German control of the Scheldt
Estuary totally negated Allied possession of Antwerp.
After Operation MARKET GARDEN, American
and British forces had to clear German forces out of
the Scheldt area. This effort did not commence until
October 2, 1944.3 Montgomery was only willing to
dedicate the 1st Canadian Army to the task, an army
that consisted of only two corps. Compounding the
problem, the Canadians did not receive the necessary
priority for supply to allow them to accomplish this
task.4 In early October, Eisenhower became more insistent with Montgomery to take Antwerp. In a letter
to Marshall on October 15, Eisenhower was able to
report:
We are having a sticky time in the North, but Montgomery at last has seen the light and is concentrating
toward his west, left flank in order to clear up the Antwerp situation.5

The Allies were also confronting an additional
problem. German resistance was increasing. A number
of factors contributed to the ability of German units to
resist. The Wehrmacht had suffered tremendous losses
in both manpower and equipment throughout 1944,
but by September, the area that German units had
to defend had been substantially constricted. From
late 1943 into the first half of 1944, Albert Speer’s
reorganization of Germany’s war industry had produced significant results. German production of airframes, tanks, and even small arms reached its peak.
Manpower was also increased, since September, by
a decree from Adolf Hitler, the Volksturm organization, the People’s Army, was established mobiliz-
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ing males from 16-60 to defend the Reich’s borders.6
Volksturm soldiers were not given the level of training
that regular army soldiers received, and they lacked
heavy weapons systems to support their units. Still,
these new soldiers were additional resources, which
provided the German Army with additional combat
power. Finally, the German soldier was defending his
home terrain, a factor that tended to stiffen resistance.
Despite the Allied CBO and the German losses on all
fronts, the German soldier remained a formidable
opponent. Operation MARKET GARDEN provided
a hint of this capability; it would become even more
evident in a place called the Hürtgen Forest.
Even as Montgomery was attempting to regain the
priority that he had for Operation MARKET GARDEN,
Bradley, commander of the 12th Army Group on his
southern shoulder, pondered the potential strategies
that he thought were available to Eisenhower:
(1) He could dig in with his 54 divisions across the 500
mile Allied front that now extended from the North
Sea to the Swiss border. By postponing a November
offensive he could wait until the following spring
when a host of fresh U.S. divisions and a vast reserve
of tonnage at Antwerp would insure him sufficient resources to strike a knockout blow by winter 1945;
(2) Or, he could start a November offensive with the
troops he already possessed and bank on adequate logistical support through existing supply lines.7

According to Bradley’s analysis, a cessation of Allied operations would afford the Germans with the
opportunity to strengthen their defenses, to better
train their new recruits, and to buildup the necessary
war supplies, which would result in even tougher
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resistance to Allied advances. The key western German defense position, the Siegfried Line, was largely
intact, and German jet fighter production was underway. Without Allied pressure, time would only allow
the Germans to reconstitute their forces. Throughout
the remainder of the year, Eisenhower continued to
promote the broad front approach, a strategy of general advance, which would keep consistent pressure
all along the line and prevent the Germans from reorganizing their defense. Eisenhower, however, had to
face continued criticism from some of his subordinates
about his strategy. Beginning with Operation COBRA,
two of Eisenhower’s senior officers, Patton and Montgomery, pushed for a change in strategy. They advocated for sharp focused thrusts against the Germans
rather than a linear approach. The grumbling over
Eisenhower’s strategy continued into the fall of 1944
and winter 1944-45.
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Map 7-1. The Western Front, Fall 1944, about the
Time of Operation MARKET GARDEN.
Both subordinate commanders could not dissuade
Eisenhower from his broad front strategy because it
exerted heavy pressure on the limited German resources. Additionally, an appraisal of the battle maps
from that period demonstrates that Eisenhower was
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unable to attack the Germans across their entire front.
A review of ongoing operations in the fall of 1944
shows that Montgomery was holding the Operation
MARKET GARDEN salient. He also had the specified
task of attempting to clear several pockets of German
resistance in Holland. Bradley’s 12th Army Group
had two major operations in progress in 1st Army’s
area: attacks against Aachen, Germany, and the division level assaults in the Hürtgen Forest. In short, the
1st Army was oriented toward the northern end of
the Ruhr and the North German Plain. Further south,
Patton’s 3rd Army was engaged in an arduous campaign to take the fortress of Metz. The campaign to
take Metz would cost Patton considerable casualties
and did not afford him with the ability to engage in
maneuver warfare, which was his specialty. There existed in the terrain between the 1st and 3rd Armies, a
lightly held area where the 12th Army Group did not
have sufficient strength to stage any type of offensive
action. Despite both the 1st and 3rd Armies being under Bradley’s command, the two armies attacked in
a fashion that was in no way mutually supporting;
rather they pursued operations that were more like
two uncoordinated attacks.
In the south, a new Army Group, the 6th commanded by U.S. Army Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers,
was adding significantly to German woes and Allied
fortunes. Allied units with aggressive American commanders and more than adequate supplies pushed
the Germans through southern France and into the
age-old disputed area known as Alsace. One notable
element in Devers’ command was the American 7th
Army commanded by Lieutenant General Alexander
Patch. During this time, French troops belonging to
the 2nd French Armored Division and assigned to
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Patch’s Army, elated the population of France in late
November by taking back the revered Alsatian City
of Strasbourg from the Germans. Despite its strength,
the 7th Army, was unable to clear the entire area of
Germans, since the latter were able to hold on to the
“Colmar Pocket” throughout the remainder of the
year. Nonetheless, the 6th Army Group’s operations
added pressure on the beleaguered German defenders, but not without a cost to the Allies. The 6th Army
Group’s operations further added to the broad front
and stretched the limited logistical resources even further.
Despite Devers’ success, he, and for that matter his
6th Army Group, would never receive the accolades
or command emphasis like that of the 12th or 21st
Army Groups. At least some of this was likely due to
personal animosity. In the summer of 1943, Devers,
who was a West Point classmate of Patton, was serving as commander of American Forces in Britain. In
this role, he blocked Eisenhower’s request to transfer
four medium bomber groups from Britain to North
Africa. Devers was never in Eisenhower’s close circle
of friends, and crossing Eisenhower on this request
did not in any way improve relations. For the remainder of the war, Eisenhower tended to be overly critical
and certainly cool to Devers. He did not seem to value
Devers’ advice, as compared to that given by Bradley.
In the European Campaign, Devers and the 6th Army
Group tended to be a backwater of the overall effort.
As German resistance increased and a solid German
defense line formed, Eisenhower faced a quandary.
Where and how could he stage the necessary attacks
to maintain Allied momentum and drive the Germans
back into their heartland? There were no flanks to
turn; a vertical envelopment would have been desir-
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able, but where could Allied forces accomplish this
task, and who could punch a hole through German
lines to link up with those light forces? Besides, both
British and American airborne forces were not available since Allied commanders had not recalled them
from the Operation MARKET GARDEN area, and the
two American divisions would be in combat there
until early November. Patton was heavily involved in
the Metz area and Montgomery’s 21st had as their priority the finishing the Antwerp task. Seemingly, the
most logical location for a new offensive was directly
north of the Ruhr in the U.S. 1st Army’s area of responsibility. The area that dominated Bradley’s thoughts
and those of Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges appeared to be the Stolberg corridor in Germany, which
could lead U.S. forces to the Rhine. This corridor led
to a great portion of the country suitable for maneuver
warfare and could lead to a single wing envelopment
of the Ruhr industrial sector; or if the American commanders so desired, a shot at Berlin. For the American
Army, the hope for a rush to the Rhine River in the fall
of 1944 seemed to center on Hodges and his 1st Army.
The Battle for Aachen.
The initial task that Allied troops had to confront
was the penetration of the Siegfried line, a belt of defensive fortifications that started at the Swiss border
and stretched up to the vicinity of the Dutch border.
The defensive line consisted of anti-tank Dragon's
teeth, barbed wire, mines, and pillboxes, a formidable
fixed defense. An equally arduous task facing the 1st
Army was the taking of the city of Aachen. This was
the first major German city American troops would
attack. Aachen held an allure for American command-
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ers. Regrettably, it also had great value for the Germans as well; Aachen was Aix-la-Chapelle, the city of
Charlemagne, an historic capital that its defenders
had to hold at all costs. Due to its significance, Hitler
ordered that the German military defend the town of
160,000 to the last man.8
The 1st Army plan was logical given the task at
hand, encircling the city through a double wing envelopment. Aachen was not heavily fortified. Still,
Aachen was a medieval city that made it ideal for
defense; few sensible commanders would want to
stage a direct attack that would result in bitter houseto-house fighting. Thus, the plan called for Corlett’s
XIX Corps to break through the Siegfried line and
when it reached the vicinity of the German town of
Würselen, it was to turn south in preparation for
meeting the U.S. VII Corps. The VII Corps was also to
have punched its own hole through the Siegfried line
south of Aachen. When it was east of Aachen’s environs, its units were to swing north and link up with
the XIX Corps near Würselen. On October 2, 1944, the
Americans launched their offensive. In the first 5 days,
American units were successful in making substantial
progress. The following week, the Germans were able
to prevent the Americans from linking up as planned
near Würselen. Still, on October 16, the encirclement
was complete and for the next 5 days, American units
hammered the defenders from both the ground and
the air. The city surrendered on October 21 and the Allies were rewarded with the capture of the first major
German city of the war. Aachen was a shattered hulk.
At the same time, the two U.S. lead divisions, the 1st
and the 30th, had also taken substantial losses in their
rifle companies. The Allies breeched the Siegfried line,
but the rising losses meant that Allied strength was
declining.
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While the battle for Aachen was being fought, the
1st Army was further dissipating its strength in another offensive. A series of attacks in a wooded area south
of Aachen and north of the Ardennes, the Hürtgen
Forest, would return the U.S. Army to warfare reminiscent of World War I. The attacks on the Hürtgen
Forest remain one of the most puzzling episodes in
the European Campaign. In the official history of the
1st Army, “the original source of the idea of clearing
the forest cannot be determined.”9 The 1st Army Commander, Lieutentant General Hodges, Major General
William B. Kean (Hodges’ Chief of Staff), and VIIth
Corps commander Major General Joseph Collins were
all concerned about the threat that a German force
could pose to the flank of the VIIth Corps as it advanced up the Stolberg corridor. To protect the flank,
Hodges and his VIIth Corps commander proposed to
clear the forested area of German units in an operation
strangely reminiscent of the Argonne Forest in 1918.10
In spite of all of the information available today, it is
still difficult to understand why the Americans waged
a battle there. Part of the problem was that the objectives changed during the course of the battle; and after
the war senior officers who were involved created a
fiction about the campaign and its objectives.
As the campaign continued from September into
October, a realization seemed to emerge that the Roer
Dams might be important military objectives. The
Americans had to take the Hürtgen Forest, because it
was the gateway to the Roer Dam complex. It was not
until the first week of November that the dams had
been clearly identified as a threat, and thus that they
had to be captured.11 If these dams were not taken,
then the Germans could blow them and flood the area
where 1st Army elements intended to advance.12 Now
in the second month of the campaign, the Roer Dams
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had become the primary objective, rather than that of
preventing a German incursion into the VIIth Corps’
flank.13
Conventional military wisdom, then and now, emphasizes that it is unwise to attack at a time and place
where the enemy force holds a clear advantage. The
American campaign in the Hürtgen Forest ignored
this traditional military wisdom because in this dank
forest, the defender held every advantage. A study
published by the U.S. Army’s Combat Studies Institute noted, “The configuration of the terrain which
had sharply defined roller coaster like ridges and valleys, and gorges compounded the stupefying effects
of fighting in the woods.”14 This naturally defensible
terrain contained numerous well-prepared bunkers
and pillboxes. Forests dominated the terrain and the
road network was often poor in some areas and nonexistent in others. The German defenders were defending a foreboding forest, a manmade forest, dark
and dense, planted before the war. One veteran of the
campaign, Ralph Johnson from the 28th Division Service Company, described it this way:
The Huertgen Forest was a dank dark and impossible
place; a pine forest with trees so thick that the sun did
not penetrate until about 10:00 a.m. and disappeared
again at 3:00 p.m. The ground underfoot was 10 inches
deep in wet pine needles and moss.15

Such terrain was hardly the place one would expect the most mobile, the most mechanized army in
the European Theater to attack since it negated the key
advantages of mobility and tactical airpower, which
the U.S. Army had available.
The failure to understand the problems attributable to the terrain may have been just one part of a larger failure by the 1st, 5th, and 7th Army headquarters.
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The Allies believed that the German Army was on the
verge of collapse, and that the end of the war was very
near. Granted, the German Army had taken massive
losses, however, its soldiers were no longer fighting
in France; they were now defending their home. What
had happened to Allied armies in Operation MARKET
GARDEN and in the stiff defense of Aachen failed to
teach the Allies very little about German capabilities.
As American Army planners prepared for attacking
into the Hürtgen, intelligence officers thought that the
forest was held by weak units composed of fatigued
soldiers and young boys. Granted, in September when
the 9th Infantry Division’s attack was launched, the
German 353rd Infantry Division had a hodgepodge of
units in the Hürtgen which were second tier troops.
By October, when operations in the Hürtgen began in
earnest, the 275th Infantry Division was responsible
for its defense. Staff officers did not regard this division as a crack German unit. One author noted, “What
the German division lacked in combat power, it recouped in the advantages the forest gave to the defender.”16 1st Army planners failed to recognize that
even second tier units can perform extremely well in
terrain that is highly defendable. Regrettably, for far
too many American Soldiers, it would take two bitter
lessons, the Hürtgen and the Ardennes, to reinforce
the fact that the Germans were not yet defeated.
The Experience of the 9th Infantry Division.
The first division to attack into the Hürtgen was
the 9th Infantry Division, commanded by Major General Louis A. Craig. Collins had hoped to punch a hole
in the Siegfried line before the onset of winter. He ordered Craig to clear the northern section of the Hürtgen and take the villages of Hürtgen and Kleinhau. By
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so doing, the 9th would prevent a German attack into
the flank of the 3rd Armored Division which was attacking south of Aachen into the Stolberg area.
Craig’s attack jumped off on September 14. Even
though the American division made progress by taking
the villages of Zweifall and Schevenhütte, the 9th was
tasked by their higher headquarters with competing
priorities. Two of Craig’s regiments were reassigned
to assist the attack on the Aachen suburb of Stolberg.
Thus, the 9th’s attack became the responsibility of only
one regiment, the 60th Infantry. As Craig’s attack into
the Hürtgen was in progress, on the Allied left flank
two other operations were ongoing, the attack into
Aachen and Operation MARKET GARDEN, all focusing on the terrain north of the Ruhr River. Fighting by
9th Division elements continued into the third week
of September, seemingly with the original objective of
the 9th’s action being obscured by a series of tactical
milestones that became the norm in the dank forest.
In early October, the attention of the 9th was again
focused on the Hürtgen as Collins ordered the resumption of the attack, this time with two regiments.
Collins retained the 47th Regiment for support to the
3rd Armored Division. At this stage of the operation,
the 9th Infantry Division’s G-2 analyzed the region
and suggested that the Roer Dams were important.
However, the 1st Army staff dismissed his report.17
Instead, the VIIth Corps ordered two regiments from
the 9th Infantry Division to attack through the forest
and seize Vossenack and Kommerscheidt, with the
ultimate objective of the town of Schmidt. The attack
began shortly before noon on October 6. Mud, the
dark forest, bunkers, and both mortar and artillery fire
caused the attack to falter. The American forces did
slog through the miserable terrain, with infantry units
finally reaching the outskirts of the town of Germeter
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Source: U.S. Army Center of Military History.

Map 7-2. The 9th Infantry’s Attack.
on October 9. The two regiments had little chance of
reaching either Vossenack or Schmidt. Bitter fighting
ensued for the next 4 days with attacks, counterattacks, and reinforcements arriving on both sides.
By October 13, a classic stalemate had emerged on
the battlefield. The goal of the division remained the
major road junction in the town of Schmidt, but this
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objective was far beyond their reach. Altogether, elements of the 9th Division were in the Hürtgen Forest
for almost 30 days. When the division left the front, it
had suffered some 4,500 battle and nonbattle casualties. Despite the sacrifices of its Soldiers, it had only
gained a little over 3,500 yards of forest.18 Even more
disturbing, it had not cleared the Hürtgen of German
troops, neither had it taken the key town of Schmidt.
Given the unusual and puzzling American interest
in this area, the Germans continued to add reinforcements for the defense of the Hürtgen.
The failure of the American drive into the Hürtgen Forest was only one of the problems that faced the
12th Army Group, and the U.S. 1st Army in particular.
In October, the 1st Army was dangerously low in supplies. Ammunition was in short supply and, in particular, the limited number of artillery rounds caused
considerable concern as it resulted in a restriction of
support to troops in contact with the enemy.19 Shortages, however, went beyond ammunition. 1st Army had
limited supplies of rations, trucks, and tanks. Part of
the problem was the transportation of supplies, since
Antwerp was not yet open, and it was a long distance
from Normandy to the Hürtgen. Eisenhower’s desire
to keep up the pressure along the front, and Bradley’s
direction to have both the 1st and 3rd Armies in an attack mode contributed to significant shortages for 1st
Army.20
The 28th Infantry Division Attack: Background.
Following the failure of the VIIth Corps to seize
the stated objectives in the Hürtgen, the second, and
in many respects the most puzzling, phase of the
Hürtgen fighting was initiated. This phase was a part
of a plan devised by the Headquarters, 12th Army
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Group, which called for an attack through the Stolberg corridor designed to put American troops on the
west bank of the Rhine River and, if American troops
were fortunate enough to seize a bridgehead over the
Rhine River. Hodges’ 1st Army was responsible for
conducting this attack, and two Army corps were designated to provide the necessary firepower, the Vth
and VIIth Corps. Collin’s corps would take the main
effort. The VIIth Corps was to attack the northern part
of the Hürtgen through the Stolberg corridor. Corps
boundaries shifted in late October and Gerow had the
responsibility for the next attack. The Vth Corps leadership directed the 28th Infantry Division to initiate a
supporting attack for the VIIth Corps main effort. The
28th began moving into an area east of Rott, Germany,
on October 25, replacing the exhausted 9th Infantry
Division. The Vth Corps headquarters gave the 28th
the following direction:
1. R
 elieve the 9th Infantry division on October 2627.
2. P
 repare to attack the Germans, with the significant objectives being Kommerscheidt and
Schmidt.21
Unlike the 9th Infantry Division, the 28th was able
to employ all three of its regiments, actually regimental combat teams (RCT), to achieve its objectives. Each
RCT from the 28th would have specific objectives.22
The 109th RCT would attack toward and capture the
town of Hürtgen. The division staff sent the 110th
RCT to advance toward the town of Simonskall. The
third RCT, the 112th, was to secure the ridge that led
to Vossenack. The overall objective for the 28th, however, was to secure the town of Schmidt and draw
German attention and reserves away from the VIIth
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Corps main effort. Again, as designed, the 28th’s action was supposed to be a supporting attack rather
than the main effort.23
The Vth Corps commander and his staff developed the overall plan for the 28th Division’s attack.
All available evidence seems to indicate that the 28th
Infantry Division commander, Major General Norman “Dutch” Cota and his staff, had little input on the
plan, and Cota objected to the plan. The Corps staff
ignored his objections.24 Despite the issues, problems
surfaced. The VIIth Corps was unable to get prepared
to conduct the main effort on November 5, as initially
planned. The Corps staff rescheduled the attack for
November 10 and then postponed it for an additional
6 days. Despite the VII Corps delays, the Corps did
not cancel or reschedule the 28th Infantry Division’s
drive. Instead, it began as ordered on November 2,
even though it was supposed to support a main effort
that, by that time, was nonexistent. This meant that
on November 2, the 28th’s attack was the only push
along a 27-mile section of the front and for only a few
days. For a few days, the division’s attack was the only
one on the 170-mile Western Front.25 This allowed the
Germans to focus their attention on a solitary division
action, rather than on the collective elements of two
corps.
As was typical of many major U.S. offensives in the
European Campaign, the 28th Infantry Division staff
believed that they would receive significant air and
artillery support, but such plans merely demonstrated
army and corps planner’s ignorance of the Hürtgen’s
terrain. The heavy forest prohibited accurate close air
support and, for that matter, the forest and the terrain
complicated observed artillery fire. In addition, at the
time the division commander wanted to attack, the
weather was poor. Planners did recognize the tough
287

task assigned to the 28th, and the Vth Corps did provide additional assets to the 28th. The 707th Tank Battalion, equipped with Sherman M4A1 tanks, and the
893rd Tank Destroyer Battalion, equipped with M10
tank destroyers, provided additional firepower on the
ground. Given the strength of the German position
and the terrain, the 117th Engineer Group, three artillery battalions, and a 4.2-inch mortar battalion were
attached to the division as well.
The 28th’s Full Division Attack.
Even though the combat power of the 28th Infantry Division was significantly enhanced as a result of
these attachments, the attack plan developed by the
VIIth Corps diminished the strength of this ill-fated
division because it dissipated, rather than concentrated the division’s combat strength. The plan called for
the main effort to be conducted by the 112th RCT, but
the corps’ scheme of maneuver required the other two
RCTs to attack in different directions than the 112th.
The 109th RCT attacked north toward Hürtgen, an
entirely different axis. The 110th was to attack in the
opposite direction from the 109th, with its geographical objective the town of Simonskall. The corps plan
was at least in part affected by the experiences of the
9th Infantry Division whose units had suffered from
a withering counterattack on their northern flank by
Kampfgruppe Wegelein on October 11. To prevent the
potential of a similar flank attack, division staff put
the RCTs in motion on both flanks of the 112th. This
plan meant that the 28th’s three regimental attacks
were not mutually supporting. The principle of concentrating combat power and mass, on a clearly defined, decisive, and obtainable objective seemed to be
a foreign concept to the corps planners.
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Source: U.S. Army War College.

Map 7-3. This map shows the Hürtgen area in
general and the key locations for the Hürtgen
campaign.
Unknown to Cota and his higher headquarters, the
three RCTs, all in motion from the November 2 to 4,
became realistic players in a German war game. When
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the 28th attacked, German Army Group B, commanded by Model, and his senior commanders were at
army headquarters in Cologne, Germany. The senior
officers were playing a war game based on a scenario
where American troops attacked toward Schmidt in
the Hürtgen Forest. When an actual attack occurred,
Model detached a couple of his key commanders
to take charge of operations on the ground, and the
remainder stayed in Cologne, playing the exercise
based on realistic events in progress. Given American
interest in continuing operations into this forested
area, Model ordered the 116th Panzer Division, the
“Greyhounds,” to advance toward the 28th from the
north and the German 89th Infantry Division to move
up from the south. As German reinforcements advanced, the situation rapidly deteriorated for the 1st
Army, and especially for the 28th Infantry Division.
German strength was building and, to complicate the
situation, the 28th’s attack had the attention of Model,
well known as an officer skilled in defensive strategy.
From the start of the operation, the 28th Division was
in serious trouble as the result of a flawed corps plan
and an increasingly powerful enemy force.
Nonetheless, at 9:00 am on November 2, the 28th
Infantry Division began its attack. The main avenue of
advance for the 109th RCT was in a heavily forested
area parallel to the road that led to Hürtgen. Initially,
this RCT’s 1st Battalion made good progress, but its
3rd Battalion stalled and made very little progress. As
was standard practice, the Germans responded with
two well-organized counterattacks that the Americans
repulsed. By November 6, the 109th was essentially
in a static position, and the Germans, who had excellent pre-sighted artillery fire, continued hitting them
with tree bursts that rained shards and tree fragments

290

on the Soldiers. The 109th attempted to renew its attack, but the Germans, laid down a heavy carpet of
fire on the 109th flank making any further attacks far
too costly.
The 28th’s second RCT, the 110th, fared little better
when it began its attack in coordination with the 109th.
The 110th struck through a heavily wooded area that
German engineers had seeded with mines, boobytraps, barbed wire entanglements, and well-emplaced
bunkers. Despite early Army estimates about the limited capabilities of the German defenders, the 110th
faced determined and well-prepared German troops.
The American effort became a repeat of the 1918 battle
in the Argonne Forest, complete with the accompanying casualties. For 3 long days, the 110th fought hard
to accomplish its assigned mission. By November 5,
German defenses were still firmly holding their positions. By this time, the 110th RCT had taken heavy
casualties and was no longer an effective fighting unit.
The 28th’s main effort, however, was the attack by
the 112th RCT. The task assigned to the 112th, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Carl Peterson, was not
easy. He assigned his three battalions a separate task
that dissipated the 112th’s strength, a problem that
was inherent in the overall division attack. Despite
these factors, by November 3, it seemed likely that the
112th would accomplish its mission. Unlike the other
two RCTs, this unit appeared to have made a clear
breakthrough in the German defenses. By the end
of the day, Peterson reported that his battalions had
taken Kommerscheidt and Schmidt. Corps and Army
headquarters had every reason to be pleased with the
28th’s success and congratulated the division’s headquarters for its achievement. Finally, it seemed that the
1st Army’s plan to clean out the Hürtgen Forest was on
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track. The euphoria of a seemed victory, shared by the
Division, Corps, and Army headquarters, obscured
two very significant problems. First, the 112th’s successful advance had essentially been an infantry operation with armor to follow. Thus, the infantry did
not have the necessary heavy weapons to support its
position. Second, the line of communication through
this area of advance moved through an area known as
the Kall Trail. Choosing this as a suitable line of communication demonstrated Vth Corps’ ignorance of the
terrain. The Kall Trail was at best a path, suitable only
for the advance of a couple of infantrymen abreast and
not for the movement of armor or heavy trucks.
Division officers attempted to get heavy weapons
into Schmidt by sending a platoon of five tanks to reinforce the weary 112th’s infantry. Only three tanks
reached the 112th due to the poor road conditions. At
about 9:00 am on November 4, as the limited armor
assets approached the town, the Germans had already
seized the initiative and had counterattacked from
three directions. The German pressure mounted and
was relentless. On the following day, German artillery and mortar fire rained down on the G.I.s. In order
to pressure the defenders, the Germans attacked the
112th’s positions about every 4 hours, fatiguing the
infantry beyond their endurance. To complicate the
situation, German troops were regularly operating in
the Kall Gorge, threatening to cut the American line
of communications. At this point, the 112th’s defenses
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Source: U.S. Army War College.

Map 7-4. Showing the Area where 28th Division
attacked.
simply began to fall apart. The limited armor permitted American forces to hold on to the nearby town of
Kommerscheidt, but the 28th could not hold Schmidt.
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The Corps staff had designated Schmidt as a decisive point, and “Dutch” Cota had received accolades
from both Corps and Army headquarters for taking it.
As a result, Cota was unwilling to allow it to remain
in German hands without a fight. In succession, Cota
created two task forces. The first, Task Force Ripple
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Richard W. Ripple, attempted to retake Schmidt. The weather was
poor on November 6 and prevented observed artillery fire or close air support. This support could have
helped the task force immeasurably, unfortunately,
Task Force Ripple’s attempt failed. At the same time,
German panzers and artillery exerted pressure on
Kommerscheidt that forced some American Soldiers
to leave their positions and run to the rear. The defense managed to hold until November 7. On that day,
the Germans unleashed a firestorm on the American
defenders. German commanders followed this attack
with a combined arms strike by panzer and infantry
assets from the 89th Infantry Division. Under heavy
pressure, more 112th infantry broke and left their positions. The Germans pushed the remaining G.I.s out
of Kommerscheidt, and the remaining infantry took
refuge outside the town in the surrounding woods.
Sometime in the November 5-7 time period, American officers became aware of another problem. Division, Corps, and Army headquarters did not have a
clear understanding of the seriousness of the situation
or the circumstances facing the American Soldiers
in the dank woods. This was evident when Hodges
first visited Cota’s headquarters on November 5 and
expressed considerable displeasure to the 28th’s commander about his division’s lack of progress.26 No
one thought it appropriate to note that the higher
headquarters plan was at least in part responsible for
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the lack of progress. The shortcomings of the plan
included the Corp’s failure to concentrate forces, its
ignorance of the terrain, and the failure to recognize
the tough German resistance. Cota’s determination to
regain Schmidt and hold the terrain that the 28th Division had taken resulted in the creation on November 7
of Task Force Davis. Commanded by Cota’s assistant
division commander, Brigadier General George Davis
was charged with retaking Schmidt. Task Force Davis
never really had a chance. The units available for Davis’ assigned task were badly battered and were insufficient to tackle the growing German strength in the
Hürtgen. Cota’s inability to hold Schmidt and achieve
1st Army’s goals resulted in additional criticism. On
November 8, Hodges severely dressed down Cota for
his inability to keep track of his units in the Hürtgen
and for the 28th’s inability to achieve its goals.27
Davis’ inability to get the task force attack off the
ground and a frank situation report personally delivered by the 112th Commander, Lieutenant Colonel
Peterson, about the status of American units in the
field caused Cota to reevaluate the 28th’s position.
After considering the condition of his troops, he sent
a request to Vth Corps Headquarters to allow his division to withdraw across the Kall River. As remnants of
the 112th, 707th, and 893rd Tank Destroyer Battalions
were withdrawing, the Germans continued to exact
casualties from the survivors. The units completed the
withdrawal between November 8 and 9.
The cost for the 28th Division had been staggering.
From November 2-14, a division of 13,447 Soldiers had
suffered 5,028 in cumulative losses.28 The vast majority of these were in the division’s rifle battalions where
it lost the preponderance of its forces. For example,
the 112th Infantry had 2,093 Soldiers killed, wounded,
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and missing. The attached 707th Tank Battalion lost 31
of its 52 M4 tanks. In all, the division and its attached
units were exhausted and had to be relieved for reconstitution. 29
Regrettably, the 28th Infantry Division would not
be the last American division to be gutted in the still
puzzling attack into the “green hell” of the Hürtgen;
perhaps only the most famous, due to the numerous
accounts concerning the Kall Trail and the battle for
Schmidt.30 Despite what had happened to the 9th Infantry Division and the 28th, Hodges persisted with attempts to take the Hürtgen. On November 19, Hodges
ordered another division, this time the fresh 8th Infantry Division to relieve the exhausted 28th and attack
on November 21. Corps staff provided the divisional
goals based on specified geographical objectives, none
of which related to the Roer Dams. Hodges pressured
the division commander Major General Donald Stroh,
much as he had Cota, until finally on November 27
the exhausted Stroh was relieved at his own request.
In that brief period, the last week of November, the
8th Infantry Division suffered 1,092 battle casualties,
including 154 officers and men killed in action and
another 1,317 nonbattle casualties. They were able to
take the town of Hürtgen, but neither the forest nor
the dams were in U.S. hands.31
The fate of the 9th, 28th, and the 8th was also be
shared by the 1st and 4th Infantry Divisions, units that
were also thrown into single division attacks against
a well-entrenched enemy force in highly defensible
terrain. Corps and Army commanders fed them into
the fray, one at a time, and each element suffered considerable casualties, with no advantage for the Allied
cause. The fighting in the Hürtgen Forest did produce
German casualties, but it did not destroy the German
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forces or their will to fight, as can be seen through the
events of December 16 and the days following. The
Hürtgen Forest remained in German hands until February 1945.
As November closed, given the determined German resistance facing two divisions in succession,
the 1st Army intended to initiate another Operation
COBRA style operation. This attack included a massive air assault by heavy bombers, and the planners
designed the bombings to blast a path for U.S. troops
so they could advance to the Rhine River. Thus, on
November 7, Hodges attended a meeting with representatives from SHAEF, 12th Army Group, 9th Air
Force, 1st Army, and the IX and XXIX Tactical Air
Commands to finalize the air attacks. The plan called
for 1,200 heavy bombers from the AAF's 8th Air Force
to drop their loads on the German line facing the VIIth
Corps. An equal number of aircraft from the RAF
would hit selected Roer Valley cities, while medium
bombers belonging to the IX Tactical Air Command
would concentrate on German Army rear areas. As
Collins’ units moved forward, the IX aircraft would
provide direct support for the advancing corps elements. Planners recalled the fratricide problems in
Operation COBRA and planned the bombing runs to
avoid American positions. On November 16, with the
lavish air assets, VIIth Corps launched its offensive.
Poor visibility once again robbed AAF planes of the
desired accuracy, although, unlike Operation COBRA, the air strikes did not inflict serious casualties.
Much like Operation OVERLORD, the damage to German defenses was minimal. In short, the leadership
had failed to comprehend that strategic aircraft were
designed for strategic bombing campaigns and should
be used for the purpose intended, not to support tactical events.32
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The Hürtgen in Retrospect.
As one considers the Hürtgen campaign and the
horrendous casualties suffered there, one must ask the
question: How did the Hürtgen attacks contribute to
achieving the Army’s objectives in the European Theater? The answer is simply—very little; a type of inertia on the part of the Corps, Army, and Army Group
commanders seemed to drag unit after unit into this
vortex with no one seriously asking why were they
doing this. As months dragged on, Hodges, with
Bradley’s agreement, threw division after division
into the wooded area, forgetting the casualties the Argonne Forest had cost Army divisions in 1918. A blind
combativeness seemed to seize Bradley and Hodges
causing them to ignore other options that would have
helped to reach the Rhine River. Far better terrain existed in the 12th Army Group’s area of responsibility,
the Losheim Gap and the Monschau corridor, but no
one seemed to recognize the potential for maneuver
warfare using this favorable terrain. Had Bradley or
Hodges initially recognized the potential threat of the
Roer Dams, they could have conducted an offensive
southeast of the Hürtgen Forest where the terrain was
much more favorable for the attacking Allied divisions
and certainly would have produced less casualties.
Some have noted incidental benefits from the Hürtgen campaign. In a recent study on the Hürtgen, Army
historian Robert Rush postulates that this battle in the
foreboding woods may have damaged the chance of
success for the Ardennes offensive that began on December 16.33 The Germans did suffer because of the
drain of ammunition and fuel caused by operations
in the Hürtgen, however, some German units, like
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the 116th Panzer Division, also suffered losses in the
battle that depleted some of the Wehrmacht’s offensive
capabilities. One can hardly attribute the failure of the
Ardennes offensive to the Hürtgen. Had the American
Army conducted mobile operations in the Monschau
Corridor or the Losheim Gap, the damage to a German counteroffensive would have been much more
detrimental to the German war effort and with far less
U.S. losses than those suffered in the vicious fighting
in the Hürtgen.
Eisenhower’s official report on European operations, released in 1946, provides a hint that senior
leadership might have recognized the campaign was
a mistake. The report discusses the campaign efforts
to take Aachen and the Stolberg corridor, but mention
of the Hürtgen is scant. The reader is left with the impression that the battle may not have occurred.34 Despite the efforts of dedicated Soldiers in the Hürtgen,
the U.S. Army entered a quagmire that its senior leaders refused to extricate themselves from. Eisenhower
could have stopped it. Instead, he chose to let it continue, perhaps because it kept pressure on the German
Army. This episode is strangely reminiscent of World
War I where both French and British commanders
conducted their battles from rear area headquarters,
oblivious to the actual conditions at the front. A study
of the literature available on the Hürtgen indicates
that senior officers from Bradley to various division
commanders in the 1st Army did not fully understand
the conditions in the forest or the terrain where they
ordered their troops to fight. Perhaps James M. Gavin
best summarized the situation when he did a reconnaissance of the battlefield in early February 1945 and
later stated:
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The thought crossed my mind that the disaster that
had befallen the 28th Division in the Kall River Valley
might have had some relationship to the lack of understanding in the higher headquarters of what the actual
situation on the ground was.35

Equally serious, the Hürtgen effort was not directly linked to the campaign’s overall objectives. The
changing rationale for attacking in this foreboding
forest, with all of the senseless loss of life, means that
even today, after over 60 years, the Hürtgen campaign
remains puzzling. The Battle of the Hürtgen Forrest
weakened a U.S. Army already short on infantrymen
and made it less capable of immediately achieving the
objectives of the campaign. It would also be the first
of two episodes where Allied intelligence and Allied
commanders tragically underestimated German capabilities.
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CHAPTER 8
THE ARDENNES OFFENSIVE
Taken by surprise, Eisenhower and his commanders
acted swiftly, but they will agree that the major credit
lies elsewhere. In Montgomery’s words, The Battle of
the Ardennes was won primarily by the staunch fighting qualities of the American soldier.1
		

Winston S. Churchill

THE MANPOWER CRISIS
After the bitter fighting in Aachen, Germany, the
Hürtgen Forest, and the battle to take Metz, France,
the American Army was suffering from significant
problems. There were still limitations on some categories of supplies in the field, although taking Marseilles
and opening Antwerp had significantly improved the
logistical situation. More than the materials of war, the
American Army was short on Soldiers. The casualty
figures enumerating the losses suffered in the campaign across France, Operation MARKET GARDEN,
Aachen, and Metz, as well as numerous other engagements in Europe and in other theaters, do not accurately reflect what was happening to the U.S. Army.
Casualties were not equally suffered by all branches
or all types of units. The preponderance of the casualties in the summer and fall fighting of 1944 were in the
infantry rifle companies. As noted by Bradley:
To replenish those losses and halt any further decline
in Infantry strength, we combed the ETO [European
Theater of Operations] for emergency replacements.
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But though truckloads of hastily trained riflemen were
bundled off to the front, they could not offset the litter cases that passed them headed rearward. The drain
continued until December 15 when G-1 reported the
12th Army Group was short 17,000 riflemen among its
31 divisions on the line.2

Bradley lamented the added problems of 12,000
casualties from trench foot and the “bankrupt replacement system.” In reality, the problem facing the U.S.
Army was twofold. The fall casualties, particularly the
attacks in the Hürtgen by one division after another,
wrecked the combat power of a number of divisions.
The casualties experienced by the 9th Division, for example, are particularly revealing regarding the impact
that the fighting had on the division since their entry
into combat operations. See Table 8-1.
Month
July
August
September
October
Total

Killed
712
376
218
384
1,690

Wounded Exhaustion Nonbattle
2,989
520
1,315
1,809
280
1,540
1,551
161
1,457
2,224
280
2,158
8,573
1,241
6,470

Total
5,536
4,005
3,387
5,046
17,974

Source: HQ, 9th Infantry Division, Report of Operations, JulyOctober 1944, 309-0.3, Box 7326, Record Group 407, National
Archives II.3

Table 8-1. 9th Infantry Division Casualties,
July 1-October 31, 1944.
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A comparable chart included in an Army Combat
Studies Institute study on unit reconstitution shows
a day-by-day breakdown of casualties from November 2 through November 18, 1944, suffered by the
28th Infantry Division. The study’s authors indicate
that of the 4,878 replacements received by the division
following the Hürtgen offensive, 4,458 were infantry
specialties. The study emphasizes that, “The division
was able to replace its heavy personnel losses, but the
influx of replacements was so great that the individual
regiments of the division were no longer combat effective.”4
The indications of the heavy attrition of infantrymen can also be seen in Patton’s attempts to destroy
the defensive positions at Metz. As soon as SHAEF
had given the 3rd Army the authorization to begin its
Lorraine, France, offensive on September 3, Patton’s
two corps, U.S. Army Lieutenant General Manton
Eddy’s XIIth and U.S. Army General Walton Walker’s
XXth, pressed hard to clear Lorraine. Walker’s XXth
Corps, however, came up against Metz, which Adolf
Hitler had declared a fortified city. This was a “tough
nut to crack,” because the XIIIth SS Corps was responsible for its defense. Walker, much like Joseph Collins
and Courtney Hodges in the Hürtgen Forest, had no
real understanding of the terrain his Soldiers faced.5
Nonetheless, on September 6 he first sent the 7th Armored Division, followed by the 5th Infantry Division
and the 90th Infantry Division into the Metz vicinity.
Although Patton prided himself on his knowledge of
historic battles and relished being on these battlefields,
he too ignored the fact that Metz was heavily fortified.
Romans had fortified the town, and it had been significantly and repeatedly strengthened for centuries,
even up through the period after World War I. The
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5th Infantry Division fought hard through October 16
to take this fortified city. After its failure to take Metz,
division personnel began training on how to take fortified areas. By that time, almost half of the division’s
assault forces had become casualties. It was not until
November 3 that division staff officers developed a
scheme of maneuver instead of using a direct assault.
Even then, the last fortification of Metz did not surrender until December 8.6
Problems suffered throughout the fall, however,
were only part of a larger situation that had begun to
emerge even before the Normandy landings. In his
preliminary war plans, Albert Wedemeyer had called
for a much larger Army than was actually created.
The War Department did not seriously consider his
recommended force structure of 215 combat divisions,
and staff officers subsequently reduced it. Wedemeyer
did recommend that the Army ground and air components should consist of 8,795,658 Soldiers. Ultimately,
the size of the Army did come close to this proposed
force size when its total strength reached 8,291,336
uniformed personnel. The problem was not insufficient Soldiers, but an insufficient number of Soldiers
in the appropriate units necessary to fight and win the
war. The Army needed combat arms Soldiers, particularly infantrymen. Simply put, too many men were
going into the wrong specialties. For example, the
AAF trained more pilots and aircrew members than
were needed for the demands of the war. The War
Department staff began to recognize that they had
underestimated the number of combat arms Soldiers
necessary to win the war. In 1944, the AAF transferred
about 24,000 air cadets to Army ground forces to be
retrained as infantrymen.7
Another example of the recognition of the impending manpower crisis was the cutbacks in the Army
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Specialized Training Program. With insight and an
eye on the future, Marshall had originally agreed
to create a program, proposed by Secretary of War
Henry Stimson, called the Army Specialized Training Program. This program took Soldiers with high
academic potential, based on their high Army General
Classification Test scores, and enrolled them in college
to complete degrees. Program designers envisioned
that the Army would place these candidates in both
wartime and post war positions of responsibility. By
February 1944, however, War Department planners
determined that this program was consuming too
much manpower, and Marshall reduced it to 30,000
Soldiers. This action released 120,000 Soldiers for service in units.8 Even with the reductions in the number
of high aptitude Soldiers and Airmen admitted into
this special program, the Army faced a looming crisis.
As early as July, Army offices throughout Washington and Europe became aware of the impending
manpower crisis, but bureaucratic wrangling between
headquarters and commands caused the problem to
drag on without any real resolution.9 The growth of
headquarters staffs and support troops caused part
of the problem. A military headquarters is inherently
a bureaucracy, and the standard practice for virtually every bureaucracy is that it perpetuates itself and
continues to grow. Not only did this bureaucracy continue to grow throughout 1944, the greater coordination between joint and combined forces added to the
expansion. Eisenhower recognized this problem and
tried to resolve it, where possible, he combed supply
and service units to find Soldiers that were available
for retraining as infantrymen. In some cases, the Army
used female Soldiers from the Women’s Army Corps
to fill administrative positions in headquarters or in
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service units so that male Soldiers could be relieved
to perform front line duty.10 Patton levied 5,000 men
from his Corps and Army headquarters, and from
various noncombatant positions and sent them to be
a retrained as riflemen replacements at a center in
Metz.11 Even this was not enough; the Army still suffered from a manpower shortage in its infantry units.
It was a shortage unlike that suffered by the British
Army, since London simply did not have more men
to use as soldiers. The American Army had men in
uniform, but these men were simply in the wrong specialties. Another reason for the shortage of personnel
was the growth of complex technologies of the day.
Advanced communications, maintenance, medical
support, and other capabilities required a cadre of
extensively trained personnel. If the War Department
wanted to maintain a large AAF or armored vehicle
fleet, then many well-trained personnel were needed.
AN ABSENCE OF OPERATIONAL THINKING
This leads to yet a third and very important issue,
the strategy used by Allied commanders who were
waging the European war. The Normandy landings
had been unbelievably successful and had opened up
the heartland of France to Allied armies. After Allied
forces blunted the Mortain offensive and the combined American-British forces closed the Falaise Gap,
the Allies implemented the broad front strategy. In the
period following Operation COBRA, the most innovative operation attempted by the Western Allies was
Operation MARKET GARDEN. Other than Operation
MARKET GARDEN, operations on the ground took a
largely tactical approach. Critics frequently raised the
question, were the broad front strategy operations fo-
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cused on the destruction of German forces in the field
or on seizing terrain? Martin Blumensen, among others, has criticized the Army leadership of the period
for their tactical approach in its European operations.
In his words,
The basic Allied motive was . . . geographical and territorial. The intention was to overrun land and liberate
towns. In which direction were the Allies going? Toward the enemy homelands, specifically the capitals.
Seizing the cities, the Allies believed, was sure to win
the war.12

Certainly, war waged on the ground is about taking terrain and tactical operations, but as one considers strategy and achieving strategic goals for the
campaign, tactical approaches alone are not efficient
methods of achieving those goals. One can see an example of a terrain and tactical approach to the battlefield by reviewing the operations of Eisenhower’s
premier maneuver element, the 12th Army Group.
Its commander, Bradley, was an infantry officer who
seemed to have a largely tactical view of war. He often
recognized larger opportunities on the field of battle.
Martin Blumenson stated that Bradley “. . . initiated
potentially brilliant maneuvers, then aborted them
because he lacked confidence in his ability to see them
through to completion.”13 By nature, Bradley was a
conservative commander, but one who had caught
the eye of the press and public. The press made him
famous as the “Soldier’s general.” Still, in spite of this
popular acclaim, he was never successful in making
his mark as a great operational commander in World
War II.14 From the time that the breakout began, with
Operation COBRA, through the end of the Ardennes
campaign in January 1945, Bradley was unable or unwilling to bag and destroy a German force. Planners
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offered Bradley several opportunities to do this and
thereby more rapidly achieve the stated purpose of
the campaign.15
Depending on your perspective, it is possible to be
critical of Bradley or his 1st Army commander, Hodges. In fairness, what military strategists now call operational thought had not entered into the American
Army’s lexicon of war.16 The promotion of operational
art did not enter the American Army’s literature until
the late 1970s and early 1980s. Some American officers, however, were ahead of their time. For example,
Patton intuitively understood the concept and Collins
seemed to accept and practice it, though not consistently. The adversary, the Wehrmacht, practiced what
we now call the operational art. It was not doctrine,
it reflected their way of war, as emphasized from the
mid-19th century through World War II. Though not
referred to as operational art it was, nonetheless, classic operational thinking.17
THE GHOST FRONT
The casualties from the summer and fall fighting,
the bitter and at times attritional battles that seemed
to focus more on terrain rather that enemy forces, and
the growth of headquarters and service troops meant
that the U.S. Army was physically unable to adequately cover Eisenhower’s broad front strategy. 18 One historian declared: “It was not that the broad front strategy was wrong; the more basic trouble was that the
alliance had not given Eisenhower enough troops to
carry it out safely.”19 The front was indeed broad as
described by Eisenhower: “We were disposed along
a line which, beginning in the north on the banks of
the Rhine, stretched 500 miles southward to the bor-
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der of Switzerland.”20 Despite the growing shortage of
front line Soldiers, Eisenhower felt obliged to maintain pressure on the Germans, particularly with the
operations in progress by the 12th Army Group. This
meant that Patton’s operations in Lorraine would continue, as well as Hodge’s abortive attempts to take the
Hürtgen region. To continue the pressure in these areas, the Allied command had to stretch the 12th Army
Group’s center. Thus, there developed on the right
flank of the 1st Army what some have called a “ghost
front,” a minimally manned quiet area situated along
the German and Luxembourg border.
The “ghost front” was indicative of a shortage of
American ground units on the continent and, to further complicate the American position, the U.S. Army
was without any reserves in the European Theater other than the XVIIIth Airborne Corps, composed of the
82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions. One might question whether this corps was actually a SHAEF reserve,
as has been claimed, or more accurately Eisenhower’s
elite airborne troops that were refitting after Operation
MARKET GARDEN and preparing for another drop.
To compensate for the personnel shortages in the 12th
Army Group, Bradley had to stretch his VIIIth Corps
to continue the initiative on the northern and southern
flanks of the 12th Army Group. As he described it:
We would stretch Middleton [Troy Middleton’s VIII
Corps, Hodges First Army] as taut as we dared thus
the Ardennes was deliberately thinned to thicken the
winter offensive.21

Though he was a cautious and conservative commander, Bradley saw no problem with stretching
his center so thin. Troy Middleton, commander of
the VIIIth Corps, expressed concern about his badly
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extended divisions. Bradley told him, “Don’t worry
Troy, they won’t come through here.”22 He explained
his assessment by telling Middleton:
when anyone attacks he does it for one of two reasons.
Either he’s out to destroy the hostile forces or he’s going after a terrain objective. Neither objective could be
attained in the Ardennes, for nowhere were we more
thinly dispersed than across the wooded front and nowhere in the length of the allied line was a sector more
devoid of industrial resources, transportational facilities and worthwhile terrain objectives.23

Bradley’s stated rationale betrays a tactical mindset, an inability to see beyond the immediate battlefield and think on operational terms. According to his
own comments, he only mentally surveyed the battlefield about 20 miles to the rear of the Ardennes lines.24
Bradley did not seem to be unnecessarily concerned
with his lack of strength in his center, opposite of the
Ardennes. From October to December, he was focused
on the 1st Army’s actions in the Hürtgen Forest and
3rd Army’s advance into Lorraine. Though after the
Ardennes, Bradley would claim that he had taken a
calculated risk by stretching Middleton’s center so
thin, in reality his actions and his own words indicate
that his analysis of the battlefield dismissed any real
risk to the 12th Army Group’s center.25
Thinning the VIIIth Corps’ center required Soldiers to cover about 88 miles of front line. In early
December, the major elements in Middleton’s Corps
were two veteran divisions, the 4th and 28th Infantry Divisions—both of which were refitting after the
Hürtgen—the green 106th Infantry Division, and elements of the new 9th Armored Division. At that time
a division front was generally about 8 miles. In the
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VIIIth Corps center, the 28th Infantry Division’s front
was about 25 miles.26 Eisenhower, despite his desire
to maintain the broad front, expressed his concern
on several occasions about the thin front opposite
the Ardennes. On one occasion, he stated, “the badly
stretched condition of our troops caused constant concern, particularly on Bradley’s front.”27 Bradley did
attempt to address Eisenhower’s concerns about this
area on several occasions. Once he even purportedly
conducted a wargame for Eisenhower of a possible
incursion into the Ardennes.28 After indicating on the
map the limits of any possible German incursion, he
assured Eisenhower of the remoteness of such an advance and stated:
Why, even if the Germans were to bust through all the
way to the Meuse (which Bradley felt that he could
hold), he wouldn’t find a thing in the Ardennes to
make it worth his while.29

While Eisenhower felt he had to trust the judgment
of a valued subordinate, he was clearly concerned
about the badly extended VIIIth Corps Ardennes
front.30 Perhaps Carlo D’Este best summarized the error in Allied thinking when he stated:
The German Counteroffensive in the Ardennes would
turn out to be the latest example of the principle
learned and relearned the hard way by the Allies in
World War II: Expect the unexpected. . . . Thus, it
should not have not come as the surprise it did that,
with Allied operations at a standstill and the Third
Reich on the verge of invasion from both east and
west, Adolf Hitler elected to gamble the fate of Germany on a last ditch attempt to salvage the war by a
sudden lightning thrust through the Ardennes.31
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D’Este’s comments also highlight another problem.
Allied commanders failed to recognize that the dominate force in military operations in December of 1944
was none other than Hitler.32 Since the Allied landings
on June 6, 1944, Hitler had sought to take the war to the
Allies through offensive operations. Against all sound
military advice, he had attempted to do this with his
ill-fated Mortain offensive that only weakened German forces. Still, the concept of a new offensive never
left Hitler’s mind. Unless he could inflict a punishing
blow on the Allies, Hitler could not conclude any type
of peace that would be favorable to Germany. As a
consequence, on August 19, even as German armies
were falling back in disarray through France, Hitler
told the Chief of Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW)
Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of the Army
Staff General Walter Buhle, and Minister of Armament Albert Speer that in November, when Allied Air
Forces cannot operate, German military forces must
be prepared to move 25 divisions to the west and take
the offensive. So began the planning for the Ardennes
Offensive or, as the U.S. Army referred to it, the “Battle of the Bulge.”
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Source: Hugh M. Cole, The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge, Washington, DC: Chief of Military History, 1965, p.53.

Map 8-1. The Western Front: December 15, 1944.
Hitler’s Surprise Offensive.
Before conveying unnecessary criticism on the Army’s leadership for being surprised on December 16,
1944, it is important to consider that Hitler’s plan did,
in fact, violate conventional military wisdom. The Allies were on the offensive, they had dominance on the
battlefield, and American and British forces were obviously in the process of preparing for a final push into
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Germany. Conventional wisdom would have called
for the Germans to hold their limited reserves for
staging counterattacks against major U.S. offensives
toward the Rhine, Ruhr, or the Saar Rivers. This was a
logical assumption, considering the losses suffered by
the Wehrmacht, and would have been the likely course
of action by a professional officer corps, either German or American. Allied leaders knew that Hitler had
appointed Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt,
an experienced professional German General Staff
officer, to become German Commander in the West.
Allied military leadership assumed that the Germans
would follow traditional military wisdom. The major
error in this assumption was that Rundstedt was not
actually the dominant force in German military operations, Hitler was. 33
The failure to understand Hitler’s role in military
affairs was one element of another problem facing the
Western Allies, a number of major shortfalls in intelligence gathering and analysis. Since the beginning
of the European Campaign, the Allies had two very
significant advantages in intelligence gathering. First,
on a daily basis they could use information obtained
from ULTRA to discern at least some of the German
military capabilities. ULTRA gave Allied intelligence
analysts access to OKW messages, German Kriegsmarine message traffic, and the ability to decipher the
state railway system’s (Reichsbahn) messages. The railway information provided detailed intelligence concerning the of transportation of military assets and the
state of the economy. ULTRA did not tell the Allies
everything about German intentions, but it did consistently disclose solid order of battle information.
Secondly, from June to early September, the Allies had innumerable human intelligence (HUMINT)
resources from the citizenry in occupied France,
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Belgium, and Holland. As the European Campaign
successfully liberated these areas, HUMINT sources
quickly dried up. By the fall of 1944, Allied units were
on the German border, which meant that very limited
HUMINT was available. Adding to the drought of
HUMINT sources, there was an underestimation of
the German Army’s capabilities, across the front. For
example, Brigadier General Edwin Sibert, Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters, 12th Army Group,
made such an underestimation when on December
12, 1944, less than a week before the German offensive, he reported that “it is now certain that attrition
is steadily sapping the strength of the German forces
on the Western Front, and that the crust of defense is
thinner and more vulnerable than it appears on our
G-2 maps or to the troops in the line.”34 Obviously,
Sibert had not been in the Hürtgen in November or
December to personally observe this “thin crust” or
the weakening of German forces. At the same time,
the 21st Army Group G-2 developed a similar conclusion about German capabilities. The 1st Army’s G-2
reports were sometimes better, but these reports and
the G-2 himself were at best erratic concerning their
analysis of German capabilities.35 The overall intelligence problem in Europe was that the G-2 reports
reflected the opinions and analysis that the leadership
wanted to see, rather than what they needed.
For a strategic offensive, the plan that Hitler had
instructed his staff to develop was an excellent concept, that is, if resources had been available to accomplish it. Hitler selected an offensive plan to attack
through the Ardennes region with 28 divisions and
drive through Belgium to the port of Antwerp. This
would drive a wedge between the British 21st and
the American 12th Army Groups. Once this wedge
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separated the two armies, the German Army could
inflict casualties on the British reminiscent of levels
of World War I. Hitler hoped that this would set the
stage for separate peace negotiations with the Western
Allies. Once the Allies and Germany concluded this
peace, the German Army could turn its full strength
on the Russians who were the main and most dreaded
adversary. Senior German commanders, however,
lacked the necessary resources for such an offensive.
Rundstedt later stated, “If we had reached the Meuse,
we should have got down on our knees and thanked
God—let alone tried to reach Antwerp.”36
Given the problems with the offensive, two experienced generals, both of whom had impeccable National Socialist credentials and were directly involved in
the operation, argued against the offensive. Waffen-SS
General and long time Hitler associate “Sepp” Dietrich opposed the offensive into the Ardennes, and Walter Model, one of Hitler’s favorites, reportedly stated,
“This plan hasn’t got a damned leg to stand on.”37
Worried about squandering their dwindling resources, Rundstedt, in cooperation with Model, proposed
the small solution where a double-wing envelopment
would occur east of the Meuse River and pinch off
as many as five American divisions. Hitler was adamant. The Ardennes offensive would be executed as
planned, but the date of execution was moved from
December 1 to December 16.38 The forces mustered
for the Ardennes were impressive. The 5th and 6th
Panzer Armies were the main maneuver elements on
the battlefield. The German 7th Army, positioned on
the southern shoulder of the advance was a force designed to protect the left flank of the German advance,
since planners expected a thrust into this flank by Patton’s 3rd Army once the offensive was in motion. The
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6th Panzer Army, under the command of Dietrich,
was the heaviest force and it was the main effort of the
offensive since it was on the shortest axis of the advance routes to Antwerp. Composed of six divisions
and a panzer brigade, over half of this force should be
regarded as elite units. Dietrich’s Army had several
elite units. Dietrich could rely on the 1st SS Panzer Division, the 12th SS Panzer Division, the 3rd Parachute
Division, and the 150th Panzer Brigade. Both of the SS
divisions had 22,000 men each and possessed the latest German equipment.

Source: U.S. Army Center of Military History.

Map 8-2. This map clearly shows the overall objectives for the Ardennes Offensive and for each of the
three German armies.
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The 5th Panzer Army was on a longer avenue of
advance and was not the main effort. It did have excellent resources. It was composed of seven divisions,
including three panzer divisions, the 2nd, the Panzer
Lehr, and the 116th. All of the divisions had excellent
reputations. Its commander was General der Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel, one of Germany’s best
known armor officers. The 5th Panzer had important
objectives for the campaign, such as securing the road
net which led to the city of Bastogne, a key transportation node. The main effort, as shown by the employment of heavy SS divisions, clearly involved the
6th Panzer Army. General Eric Brandenberger’s 7th
Army, had limited assets, with no armored divisions,
limited firepower, and few mechanized assets.
Like a page out of Montgomery’s Operation
MARKET GARDEN, German units designated for
the Ardennes offensive had little time to prepare for
the attack due to secrecy. It was not until November
6, 1944, that the chiefs of staff of the 7th Army, and
the 5th and 6th Panzer Armies, the key maneuver elements for the operation, were called in and briefed for
the offensive.39 German Army commanders received
briefings on December 2 and division commanders did
not receive notification until the end of the first week
in December.40 Subordinate commanders did not receive their briefs until a few days before the offensive
began. Such late notification was hardly a formula for
success, but since secrecy was crucial, security necessitated last minute notification. When commanders
were briefed for the offensive and the role of their
units, they were told that the most important factors
for the operation would be “first-SURPRISE, and next-
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SPEED!”41 For this offensive to succeed, both were necessities. In planning the operation, planners assumed
that German forces would have about a week in which
weather would make it extremely difficult for Allied
tactical air to interdict German movements.
Neither the commander nor the headquarters staff
of the 12th Army Group had any idea of what was
about to hit Middleton’s VIIIth Corps in the Army
Group’s center. On the eve of the German offensive,
the 12th Army Group commander had again renewed
his fixation on the Roer Dams that, by December, had
been determined to be a bona fide objective. Thus, on
December 13, on orders from Bradley, Hodges began
an attack to seize Schwammenual and Urftalsperre.
These targets were decisive points for the Roer Valley dam system. The attack seemed to be going well.
However, on the next day, the attack bogged down.
In conducting the attack, the Vth Corps commander,
Gerow, employed two divisions. Bradley and Hodge’s
eyes were on the Vth Corps and its actions, not the
VIIIth Corps. On the evening of December 15, Wehrmacht leaders had positioned 20 German divisions to
strike the 99th, 28th, and 106th Infantry Divisions in
a classic surprise attack.42 When Hitler launched his
offensive in the early morning hours of December 16,
he began the largest ground campaign fought by the
U.S. Army in World War II, the “Battle of the Bulge.”
The Bulge: Initial Phases.
With weather restricting air power, it looked as
though the German Army had a chance for at least
limited success with their offensive. To be successful,
the German offensive Wacht am Rhein (Watch on the
Rhine) had to accomplish two important objectives.
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First, German forces had to achieve surprise across
the American front. Second, once the Germans caught
their foe unaware, assault companies had to dislodge
the American defenders from their positions along
Skyline Drive and reach the far side of the Clerf River.
This task seemed feasible because as it turned out the
German estimates that American defenses contained
only a thin crust of resistance were correct. Once the
attacking German units broke through the defenses,
speed was critical in order to accomplish all remaining objectives. If German units moved rapidly, then
they could reach their objectives before Allied air
commanders could react, and ground defenses could
be reinforced. The ability of German forces to reach
Antwerp depended on these factors and a good deal
of luck. Supplies to support the German attack were
definitely short, and waging combined arms operations, particularly using tactical airpower which had
been so important in early German victories, was conspicuously absent.
When the German attack struck, the Allied senior
leadership at Army level and above was short of readily available reserves for a rapid response. On December 16, Bradley was not even at his headquarters. As
discussed earlier in this chapter, the pressing problem confronting all Allied commanders by the late
fall was a shortage of infantrymen. This issue caused
Bradley to leave his headquarters at Luxembourg City
and travel by road to Paris to plead for more infantry
replacements. Additionally, Eisenhower was getting
his fifth star, and Bradley wanted to attend the promotion ceremony for his old West Point classmate. In
short, for the first day of the German offensive, Bradley and Eisenhower were not aware of the crisis that
was emerging in the 12th Army Group’s center. For
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Bradley and Eisenhower, December 16 was generally a pleasant day, culminating with Eisenhower’s
promotion. At dusk, SHAEF G-2, Major General Kenneth Strong, interrupted the generals to inform them
that the Germans had attacked and had penetrated
American lines. Neither initially seemed concerned
with the report, and it was not until late in the evening that Eisenhower and Bradley left their relaxed
and celebratory atmosphere and went to the situation room. Bradley looked at the map and quickly assessed that the Germans were staging a spoiling attack. He speculated that the Germans had hoped to
discourage his attack toward the Roer dam system.
Eisenhower, looking at the map was much more perceptive. He snapped, “that’s no spoiling attack,” and
immediately recommended to Bradley that Middleton
needed to have two armored divisions for reinforcements. Eisenhower suggested to Bradley that he use
the 7th Armored Division from the U.S. 9th Army and
the 10th Armored Division from Patton’s 3rd Army.
When Bradley expressed considerable concern about
Eisenhower’s recommendation, Eisenhower overruled Bradley with obvious impatience.43
At the front lines, the senior commander most affected by the German attack was Hodges. His G-2 had
given increasingly ominous warnings about German
capabilities, but the intelligence official did not initially indicate that the Ardennes was an area for concern. These estimates, caused Hodges some concern,
and on December 13, Hodges asked Bradley to give
him two additional divisions for Middleton. Bradley
turned down Hodges’ request.44 Despite his uneasiness prompted by his G-2’s reports, on December 16
Hodges was preoccupied with the Vth Corps’ attack
into the Roer Dam area. When news of the Ardennes

325

German attack reached his headquarters, he refused to
cancel the Vth Corps attack. It was not until December
17, that Hodges and his headquarters staff began to
realize how serious the situation facing the 1st Army
was.45 On the first day of the offensive, it was business
as usual for the 1st Army, another attempt to secure
the Roer Dam complex.
As the situation worsened for the American Army,
two senior officers quickly emerged that exhibited a
solid understanding of the battlefield, Eisenhower
and his old colleague, Patton. Patton was the earliest
senior commander to understand what could happen
in the Ardennes. The 3rd Army G-2, Colonel Oscar
Koch, was perhaps one of the best intelligence officers in the European theater.46 Patton required Koch
to track the buildup of any significant enemy armored
formations, even outside his area of responsibility. In
early December, he reported that there were eight to
nine German armored divisions out of the line; in addition, he identified some parachute and Panzergrenadier units which could not be located. Koch became
very concerned about the potential for a counterattack.47 Patton came to share this concern and even earlier in late November noted in his diary that Bradley
and Hodges were making a serious mistake by leaving
Middleton’s units static in the Ardennes for so long.48
Koch, through hard work, had made Patton aware of
the problem in Middleton’s area.49
Eisenhower had repeatedly expressed concern to
Bradley about the thin coverage in the Ardennes area.
He had expressed this on several occasions, but in
many respects, Eisenhower was a victim of his own
strategy. The broad front strategy and his desire to
keep the Germans under pressure, at least in selected
areas, resulted in the thin center of Bradley’s com-
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mand. There were additional troops for Europe in the
“pipeline,” but they had not yet arrived in the theater.
His concern increased shortly before the attack when
Major General Kenneth Strong, chief of intelligence
for SHAEF, became concerned about the German
buildup and warned Eisenhower about a possible
attack in the Ardennes sector. After addressing this
assessment, Strong, at the insistence of Bedell Smith,
briefed Bradley for 45 minutes. Bradley told Strong
that he had considered the possibility of such a German move and that he had units designated to cover
such an eventuality. Thus, having warned Bradley,
Eisenhower saw no reason to intervene.50 To his credit, late on December 16 when Bradley again dismissed
the gravity of the situation, Eisenhower immediately
took command. For the remainder of the Ardennes offensive, Bradley was, at best, on the margins of the
American response. As the “Bulge” developed, due
to Bradley’s center caving in, German units drove a
wedge between American units in Bradley’s left and
right flanks. Since Bradley’s headquarters was positioned in Luxembourg, the German effort separated
him from his 1st and 9th Armies, making communication tenuous. German units wrecked or compromised
much of the wire network. German communications
and intelligence analysts could eavesdrop on American radio transmissions. Consequently, Bradley had
difficulty in controlling his northern armies.
The deteriorating situation called for a high-level
session, and Eisenhower, clearly in command, ultimately called for one, but not until December 19. In the
meantime, the leadership to counter the most serious
German attack during the European Campaign was in
the hands of junior grade officers and senior enlisted
personnel. Without them, in the days from December
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16 to 20, the German threat could have been far more
serious, the German successes more striking. Several
notable cases illustrate this point. In the area of the
main effort, the green 99th Infantry Division held terrain that was on the right flank of the heaviest force
assembled by the Germans for the offensive, the 6th
Panzer Army. The 99th, a part of Gerow’s Vth Corps,
had only been in the line since November. Given the
stagnation of positions at that time in the war, it had
not been involved in any major operations.
As a battalion of the German 3rd Parachute Division moved up the road near the little Belgian town
of Lanzerath, they encountered the Intelligence and
Reconnaissance (I&R) platoon of the 394th Regiment
from the 99th Infantry Division. Commanded by a 20year old lieutenant, Lyle Bouck, the I&R platoon’s 17
men, after surviving the preparatory shelling in their
foxholes overlooking the Belgian village, engaged
the German paratroopers with small arms fire. With
nothing heavier than a .50 caliber Browning machine
gun in their inventory, Bouck and his small band of
Soldiers held their position until the latter part of
the afternoon, exacting a horrible toll on the advancing Germans. One author states that the Americans
caused over 50 percent casualties on their foes.51 The
most serious casualty inflicted on the Germans was on
the time schedule for the German 3rd Parachute Division. For a day, 18 men had deprived the Germans
of the use of the important Lanzerath Road and had
deprived the 3rd Parachute Division of what it needed
most, speed. This was a significant accomplishment
for a small group of Soldiers, who held at all costs.
In the center of the U.S. positions was another
green division commanded by Major General Alan
Jones. This division had two of its RCTs forward of the
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main U.S. line, with some of the companies occupying
bunkers that were once a part of the German Siegfried
Line. When Manteuffels’ 5th Panzer Army launched
its attack, elements of his 18th Volksgrenadier Division conducted a classic double-wing envelopment,
thereby bagging Jones’ 422nd and 423rd RCTs and
setting them up for destruction. Over the following 3
days, the Germans pounded these two units until they
finally surrendered on December 19. The surrender
of these two RCTs was the largest single surrender
of U.S. troops since the fall of the Philippines, indeed
an embarrassment to the U.S. Army. One of the division’s RCTs, however, remained ready to resist, the
424th. This unit was joined by Combat Command B of
the 7th Armored Division, led by a newly promoted
Brigadier General Bruce C. Clarke. Recognizing his
inability to command, Alan Jones relinquished command of the remnants of his division to Clarke, an
officer junior in rank and seniority. Clarke, though junior, was an energetic officer, and he created an ad hoc
defense force centered on the Belgian town of St. Vith.
Like Bastogne further south, this town was a road
junction that was extremely important to the Germans
since they needed paved roads for their mechanized
forces. With Clarke’s hard-nosed determination, the
ad hoc force succeeded in denying the Germans the
necessary westward road network.
Further south of the Luxembourg town of Hosingen, two companies of the 28th Infantry Division sat
astride the important north and south roadway known
as Skyline Drive. Situated essentially in the center of
Manteuffel’s advance route toward the key road junction of Bastogne, Germans surrounded both companies, K Company of the 110th Infantry Regiment and
B Company of the 103rd Engineer Regiment, shortly
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after dawn on December 16. Manteuffel had his lead
units strike after midnight. At dawn, German units
were bypassing Hosingen. Much like at Lanzerath
and St. Vith, because the companies defended the road
net, Manteuffel’s lead division, the 26th Volksgrenadier
Division, had to take this town. From December 16
through the morning of December 18, the Germans
gradually reduced the defensive perimeter held by the
two companies. With heavy casualties and virtually
no ammunition, the two companies held out until 9:00
am on December 18, when they had to surrender.52
Although German units had bypassed Hosingen, they
had to capture it because it dominated the road network. The American companies exacted heavy casualties from the attacking German regiments, but like
Bouck’s 394th Infantry Regiment I&R platoon, the
greatest casualty they inflicted on the Germans was
on their time schedule. At Hosingen, the German
divisional commander recognized and even personally congratulated the two company grade officers for
their bravery.
At Lanzerath, Hosingen, St.Vith, Baraque De Fraiture, and many other locations, from December 16 to
19, small unit actions deprived the Germans of the
speed that they needed to accomplish their offensive
objectives. For example, as Manteuffel sought to have
his panzer units in Bastogne by late December 16 or,
at the latest, early on the 17th. They did not reach the
outskirts of Bastogne until early December 19. The
26th Volksgrenadier Division commander Generalmajor
Heinz Kokott emphasized the need for speed and the
necessity of taking Bastogne when he said:
Success or failure of the entire operation depends on
an incessant and stubborn drive westward and north-
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west. The forward waves of the attack must not be delayed or tied down by any form of resistance. . . . If at
all possible Bastogne should fall on the second day of
the offensive or at least be encircled by then. 53

The German Offensive Stalls.
As the Battle of the Bulge was developing, the
Germans were unable to achieve the necessary speed
to advance first to the Meuse and then to Antwerp.
Again, speed was necessary so the German spearheads could reach their objectives before the overcast
cleared and the Allies could organize air and ground
reinforcements to counter the German offensive. The
response to the German attack by U.S. Army platoons,
companies, and regiments deprived the Germans of
the rapid advance they desperately needed to make the
offensive a success. Initially, the American response
to the German attack came from small units scattered
over the front since communications between higher
headquarters were chaotic at best. Furthermore, for
the first few days of the offensive, higher headquarters had difficulty in determining what was occurring
on the front lines.
What was not immediately obvious to the American Army, due to the surprise and the shock of the
initial attack, was that the German Army had lost
many of the capabilities that made it so successful in
earlier campaigns. Hitler never really seemed to appreciate the role that combined arms operations had
in the German victories of 1939-42. In France, the Low
Countries, and the Russian Steppes, German tactical
aircraft dominated the airspace, strongly and effectively supporting German units in contact with Soviet
forces. Similarly, German artillery was very impor-
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tant from 1939 through the campaign into the Hürtgen. However, during the Battle of the Bulge, when
weather allowed, the Allied air forces totally dominated the airspace; and even though there were still
many experienced German artillery units, there was a
critical shortage of ammunition.54 German leadership
had made Tiger and Panther tanks available to tank
units in increasing numbers, but experienced crews
and fuel were in short supply. Even in locations like
Lanzerath, Belgium, where Lyle Bouck and his platoon had achieved so much, it was obvious that the
young German paratroopers from the 3rd Parachute
Division were poorly trained in basic tactics. In short,
German military forces had been at war too long, and
experienced soldiers and aviators were in limited supply, as were many basic materials of war. As the days,
even weeks, of the offensive continued, it would become obvious that the German Army was expending
its last fresh units, but as Christmas 1944 approached,
this eventuality was far from obvious.
Eisenhower, as ground component commander,
had begun his response to the sudden German offensive shortly before midnight on December 16 when he
overruled Bradley and ordered the 7th and 10th Armored Divisions to assist in the defense effort. On the
following day, with Bradley’s encouragement, he set
the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions in motion to
shore up the American position. Bradley also asked
Patton what he was able to do to assist. With a response beginning to emerge, Eisenhower announced
his intention to launch a counterattack as soon as possible. With this goal in mind, he ordered Devers to
stop all of his offensive operations and lengthen the
6th Army Group’s line, so that Bradley’s 12th Group’s
lines could be shortened. To firm up his plans for a
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counterattack, Eisenhower called for a meeting of his
senior commanders at Verdun, France, on December
19. Senior officers in attendance were Bradley, Devers,
Patton, Bedell Smith, Arthur Tedder, and Eisenhower.
Absent was Montgomery who sent a representative,
his Chief of Staff, Major General Frederick (“Freddy”)
Guingand.
As the meeting began, Eisenhower was grim faced,
but he told all present that they should regard the German counterattack as an opportunity. After all, the
Germans had emerged from their defensive mode and
they were out in the open, vulnerable to attack. Patton
totally agreed and added, “Hell, let’s have the guts to
let the sons of bitches go all the way to Paris. Then
we’ll really cut ‘em up and chew ’em up.” After the
laughter had subsided, Eisenhower stated, “George,
that’s fine. But the enemy must never be allowed to
cross the Meuse.” Continuing, Eisenhower directed
that once the German drive had culminated, Patton,
under Bradley’s overall command, was to launch the
counterattack. Eisenhower told Patton to attack with
at least six divisions and then asked when he could
start. Patton quickly responded, “as soon as you’re
through with me.” Then, the SHAEF commander
asked, “When can you attack?” Patton responded,
“The Morning of December 21st with three divisions.” Eisenhower was clearly irritated and responded, “Don’t be fatuous, George.”55 In fact, Patton was
deadly serious. His staff had been working on plans
to counter a German attack shortly after enemy forces
penetrated the American lines. Koch had likely started Patton thinking about possible responses with his
briefing on December 9, where he showed the general
that German units appeared to be concentrating opposite Middleton’s Corps.56 Once Eisenhower’s meeting
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was over, Patton phoned his headquarters and gave
the code word that would result in what was one of
his most spectacular accomplishments; stopping his
army and turning a part of it 90 degrees to attack the
German flank.
From December 19-20, Eisenhower announced
two significant decisions that would affect the course
of the Battle of the Bulge. The first, at Verdun he
placed Patton in charge of an attack into the German
left flank. Patton was still under Bradley’s command,
but nonetheless it was his counterattack. The second
and more surprising decision was for his 12th Army
Group commander. Eisenhower called Bradley on December 20. He informed his old friend that the 1st and
9th Armies, now geographically separated from their
12th Army Group commander by the German Bulge,
were going to be placed under the command of Montgomery until the Allies could reduce the threat of the
German bulge. By December 20, command relationships on the Western Front had changed substantially.
Montgomery’s 21st Army Group had expanded in
terms of terrain and the number of armies. Devers’ 6th
Army Group had also expanded, and the 12th Army
Group, for all practical purposes, was defunct, other
than Bradley’s “supervision” of Patton’s counterattack. No one recognized this better than Bradley.57
Bradley never cared much for Montgomery, and after December 20 that dislike increased substantially.
Much more, the stage had also been set for a renewal
of Montgomery’s disagreement with Eisenhower
over strategy. Montgomery’s main concern regarded
Eisenhower’s overextension of his span of control, i.e.,
serving as both Supreme Commander and ground
component commander.
Again, as had happened at the Falaise Gap and in
the discussion of driving deep toward the Seine River
334

to cut off the mass of the western German Army, the
question quickly emerged about what would be the
appropriate orientation of Patton’s attack. The “Bulge”
had resulted in the formation of a classic salient into
the American line, and a logical military option would
have been to conduct an attack at the base of the salient from the north and south and pinch off the German units, setting them up for destruction. This was
clearly Patton’s preference, but as the general noted,
“that isn’t the way those gentlemen up north fight.”58
With the execution of classic double-wing envelopment, there were innumerable problems despite the
desirability of such a maneuver. When the 101st Airborne Division moved into Bastogne, Belgium, on the
early morning hours of December 19 and became surrounded, there was the obvious need to relieve this
beleaguered light division. Map 8-3 clearly shows that
Bastogne was in the center of the Bulge, not the base.
It was also illogical to consider having the 101st Airborne Division withdraw from Bastogne, even if they
could, because it was a vital road junction. Any withdrawal, without outside assistance, would have been
difficult. Besides, by December 24, the stand by the
101st, the “Battered Bastards of Bastogne,” was providing a psychological boost for the American Army
that could find few, if any, victories in that first week
of the German offensive.59
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Source: Dwight Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, Garden City,
NY: Doubleday and Company, 1948, p. 364.

Map 8-3. Allied Counteroffensive Against the
Bulge.
A Crisis in Command.
A second constraint that worked against envelopment was the nagging manpower issue. Since insufficient numbers of American troops meant that the
broad front could not be adequately manned, there
was a real concern that American units did not have
sufficient power to hold the shoulders of the contested
area and conduct a double-wing envelopment. There
were Soldiers available in the continental United States
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(CONUS) and even in England, but that hardly mattered since they were not immediately available on
the battlefield.60 Additionally, the initial German offensive strength was not known, and the force shown
by the Germans in the first week came as a shock to
the American Army. Thus, the question was, did the
U.S. Army have the strength to surround more than 20
German divisions and then destroy them?
Finally, there was the question that if a decision
was made to encircle the German force and elements
of Patton’s 3rd Army struck the base from the south,
who would command the northern pincer? Obviously,
it would have to be composed of elements from Montgomery’s enlarged command. Giving Montgomery
such a task and his role in countering the Ardennes offensive was yet another problem for Eisenhower. Up
until the time that Eisenhower transferred the command of American units north of the Bulge to Montgomery, the Bulge had been an American operation,
an American concern.61 Now it was an Allied one.
When Montgomery was given authority over the
1st and 9th Armies, he attacked the problem with energy and his cocky self confidence. Finding the disorganization and gloom that seemed to permeate the 1st
Army Headquarters and its commander, Montgomery initially wanted to relieve the exhausted Hodges.
After hinting this possibility to Eisenhower, the latter
politely expressed his confidence in Hodges’ capabilities.62 Since alliance politics made it unwise for a British field marshal to relieve a senior American general,
Montgomery quickly found Hodges to be competent
to handle the situation. Nonetheless, as described by
one of his own British officers, Montgomery descended on 1st Army Headquarters like “Christ come to
cleanse the temple.”63 He began the process of reorganizing the American front and almost immediately
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began to talk about a counterattack. Looking at his potential assets, he logically sought Collins to spearhead
this move.
Conversely, as time elapsed, Montgomery’s actions become difficult to explain. He wanted to counterattack, but seemed to want some type of validation
that the Germans had, in fact, culminated their attack
before he struck. Montgomery recognized Collins' aggressiveness on the battlefield but, with his meticulous
nature, he wanted to pull him and his Corps out of the
line for reorganization and refitting prior to any offensive action. Eisenhower stewed about what he regarded as Montgomery’s inaction. When he received
word on December 27 that Montgomery was finally
considering offensive operations, he could only say,
“Praise God from whom all blessings flow.”64 On December 28, Eisenhower was able to meet Montgomery
and to discuss plans, hoping to gain a commitment
from him on when he would launch his counterattack.
A commitment from the Field Marshal proved to be
elusive, even though Patton had his attack well under way and Bastogne had been relieved on December 26. Montgomery appeared to be proceeding at a
relatively slow pace. He was still waiting for one more
big German push, for the shattered 1st Army to be reorganized, and for some reserves to be built up in the
1st Army area. Eisenhower, however, wanted a rapid
response. He was impatient and indicated that if the
Germans did soon resume their offensive, Montgomery must launch his attack on January 3. In the midst
of a rather tense meeting and as Eisenhower was feeling the weight of command, Montgomery elected to
bring up the issue of ground component command.
He wanted permanent control of the 12th Army
Group, resuscitating the argument that had started
in September about the need to have a single ground
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component commander. Eisenhower and Montgomery met in private, without staffers, but when it was
over, it was clear that the meeting had been a burden
for the SHAEF commander. On December 30, 2 days
later, relations between the two reached a crisis.
Montgomery precipitated the crisis by sending
a message to Eisenhower that simply enraged the
SHAEF commander. Montgomery again pressed his
point that he needed permanent control of both Army
groups and indicated that if Eisenhower did not agree,
additional failures could result.65 For the case of Allied
unity, it was indeed fortunate that there was a peacemaker in the wings. Montgomery’s Chief of Staff Major General Francis “Freddy” de Guingand, an officer
well liked by his American peers, sensed that a crisis
was about to erupt. Taking great personal risk, given
the weather, he flew to Eisenhower’s headquarters to
patch things up. Guingand’s worst fears were realized
when he found that Eisenhower had already drafted
a message to Marshall stating that conditions between
he and Montgomery had reached a crisis and that he
could no longer work with the Field Marshal. Simply,
either Montgomery or Eisenhower would have to go.
Horrified by the news, Guingand asked Eisenhower
for time to resolve the dispute. Eisenhower allowed 24
hours for resolution.66
In actuality, Montgomery would likely have to go.
The same rationale that determined the final decision
about who would be SHAEF Commander meant that if
Marshall and the Combined Chiefs of Staff took Eisenhower’s ultimatum seriously, Montgomery’s position
was tenuous. The American Army had the preponderance of troops on the ground; American industry
was supplying a substantial amount of the war effort;
and in all, America had the resources to conclude the
war in all theaters. This made any decision extremely
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unlikely that Eisenhower could be required to step
aside since he had, by this time, achieved tremendous
popularity among the troops and across the nation.
However, at the same time, the British press had also
canonized Montgomery for his victories in North Africa and in Europe. How could he be relieved?
Guingand had 24 hours and, to his credit, he used
it well. He convinced Montgomery that Eisenhower
was asking for his relief and that he would likely ask
for Field Marshal Alexander as a replacement. A deflated Montgomery let Guingand write the message
to Eisenhower, apologizing and asking Eisenhower to
tear up his message of December 30. Guingand averted the crisis, although relations between the two for
the remainder of the war were rocky at best.67 Eisenhower was, nonetheless, frequently perturbed with
Montgomery during the last week of December and
the first week of the New Year, due to Montgomery’s
slow and measured buildup in preparation for a counter attack. Montgomery’s perceived caution, wanting
to ensure that the German advance had culminated,
was not what Eisenhower wanted. He sought a rapid
and decisive action comparable to that provided by
Patton. Instead, he got one delay after another. Montgomery would not launch his counterattack until
January 3, 1945. When the attack from the north was
initiated, it proceeded more slowly than Patton’s brilliant 90-degree turn of his 3rd Army elements. In fairness, one should acknowledge that Collins’ advance
from the north did suffer some significant disadvantages. For example, in executing their counterattack,
1st Army elements were up against the heaviest and
best equipped German force.68
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Ardennes: The Closing Phases.
By January 3, the Allied response around the perimeter of the Bulge was finally in motion. The German Army, despite its initial tactical successes, had
stalled. Though it was not immediately obvious to
Allied soldiers on the ground, the German attack
had been in trouble from the onset. Their key vulnerabilities were a lack of fuel and a lack of adequate air
support. Even if they had captured the major U.S. fuel
dumps, fuel supply was one of the German Army’s
“Achilles heels.” Mechanized units were critical for
the speed they needed, but they simply did not have
the necessary fuel to keep their advance in motion.
Even as the Allied response was proceeding, beginning with Patton’s attack, the Allies would have to
contend with two additional complementary German
offensives. In the initial planning for the Ardennes
offensive, the likelihood of a flank attack by the 3rd
Army was recognized by the German planners. As
a result, the Germans devised a ground offensive in
the region focused on Alsace, France. German officers
designated this operation, NORDWIND, which was
designed to relieve the pressure on the German spearheads that were trying to reach Antwerp. Devers’ 6th
Army Group was responsible for countering Operation NORDWIND. In many respects, this was not an
easy task because, when the Ardennes offensive was
launched, Devers had been required to extend his
group’s boundary northward in order to allow Patton’s 3rd Army to withdraw divisions and make its
90-degree turn. This extension of Devers’ line caused
his 6th Army to cover a front close to 200 miles. To
complicate the 6th Army Group’s task, part of its force
was composed of Free French units, which were not
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up to American training or capabilities. Devers, like
12th Army Group, was also suffering from a shortage
of replacements.
Devers was fortunate that German officers did not
impose the same secrecy level for Operation NORDWIND as it did for the Ardennes offensive. Since late
November, intelligence indicators pointed to the possibility of a German attack. Devers and Eisenhower
had the opportunity to plan for a likely second offensive. By Christmas Eve 1944, a German attack
seemed a certainty, the only question being when. The
Germans answered that question on New Year’s Eve
when, without any artillery preparation, the Germans
attacked.
With some seven infantry and three panzer divisions for the assault and a follow-on force of some
three to five additional divisions, the German Army
launched Operation NORDWIND. For the first 5 days,
they pressed the American and French troops hard as
anticipated, and achieved some limited, if temporary,
tactical successes. Eisenhower, having determined the
Ardennes to be the greatest threat and with no additional divisions to give the 6th Army Group, had instructed Devers to surrender terrain to include falling
back to the Vosges Mountains for a better defensive
position. Surrendering the geography that Eisenhower suggested meant that an area of Alsace, possibly to
include Strasbourg, could revert to German control.
Militarily shortening the line made sense, although
Devers was unsure that this would be necessary; but
surrendering Alsace was yet another matter. Eisenhower made a logical decision, telling Devers to surrender ground, if necessary, but it ignored the French
mystique about Alsace and Lorraine. The issue of who
should control Alsace and Lorraine had originally
emerged following the Franco-Prussian War. In 1945,
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the issue was still alive. When the French discovered
that Eisenhower might shorten the line, inviting the
fall of Strasbourg, General Charles De Gaulle, leader of
the Free French, vehemently objected. He told Eisenhower that if he allowed the fall of Strasbourg, then
he, De Gaulle, would pull Free French forces out from
under Eisenhower’s command to save Strasbourg
from reoccupation by the Germans. Furthermore, De
Gaulle, as the new leader of France, sent messages to
both Churchill and Roosevelt, questioning Eisenhower’s judgment.
A second German offensive had caused another
disagreement in the Western Alliance. To resolve
the disagreement, Eisenhower and De Gaulle held a
meeting on January 3. Churchill and Alanbrooke also
attended the discussion. Eisenhower was under considerable pressure. The Bulge was still a bitter battle
for American troops, Montgomery was to launch his
attack on the same date, and 2 days previously on
New Year’s Day, the German Luftwaffe had launched
an attack on American airfields. The Luftwaffe officers
designed Operation BODENPLATTE to neutralize Allied tactical airpower. Largely ineffective, although
Montgomery’s personal Dakota aircraft was one of the
casualties, this action again proved the resilience of
the German armed forces, even at this late time in the
war. Two surprise attacks in a 2-week period were an
embarrassment for Allied forces. In the midst of all of
these crises, another Alliance problem emerged, this
time with the French.
The meeting between De Gaulle and Eisenhower
was a classic showdown between two strong willed
and influential leaders. In the course of the meeting,
both at times, lost their tempers and engaged in intense arguments. As the meeting concluded, however,
both Eisenhower and De Gaulle found the necessary
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compromises. De Gaulle, recognized the military
wisdom of Eisenhower’s initial decision, but he emphasized that the Allies could not surrender Alsace
and Lorraine. As an emotional event for France, the
liberation of Strasbourg had been second only to that
of Paris. Strasbourg and the Alsace-Lorraine area held
a special meaning for the French. The Germans had
wrested this territory from France in 1870 and again
in 1940. On this issue, the French would not negotiate or compromise. At the same time that Eisenhower
faced the possibility of disorder in France if he had to
order an evacuation from the Alsace-Lorraine area, he
found military justification for holding Strasbourg to
ensure the safety of his lines of communications.69 The
strength of the Alliance and its leaders were clearly on
display in this time of crisis.
German military forces had shown surprising resilience in the Ardennes with both Operations BODENPLATTE and NORDWIND. German military strength
was declining, but the Wehrmacht still flashed signs
of life. By January, the Germans had clearly lost the
initiative in the Ardennes and, without the key force
multiplier of surprise, coupled with a shortage of reserves, their success with Operation NORDWIND
would be fleeting at best. Granted, the “Battle of the
Bulge” would not end officially until January 28, many
German officers in higher command positions knew as
early as December 19 that the offensive had failed. Astute German military general officers like Rundstedt
and Model knew it never had a chance. German units
failed to achieve any of Hitler’s objectives, other than
to achieve surprise. Overall, the operation was unsuccessful. Hitler ordered the withdrawal of a number of
elite SS formations from the Bulge on January 8.
The same issues that disturbed critics of American
leadership in the early stages of the European Cam344

paign, i.e., tactical approach to warfare, became the
cause of additional criticism concerning the Allied
response to the Bulge. An overview of Allied operations shows that the Bulge reached its culmination on
December 23, but when that culmination was reached,
there were insufficient forces available to counterattack and begin the destruction of the German forces
in the salient, or as the Americans called it, the Bulge.
SHAEF reserve, if it was truly a reserve, consisted of
two light divisions (the 82nd and the 101st Airborne
Divisions), hardly suitable to contest the array of armored forces the Germans had in the expanding penetration. Patton created a suitable response force for
a southern arm of a pincer movement, but there was
not the same type of innovative leadership available
on the northern side of the salient to create a swift,
powerful pincer to complete the encirclement. Even
if Allied forces could execute a double-wing envelopment, it is unlikely that they would have had sufficient strength to hold the Germans and ensure their
destruction, given the unreliability of tactical air in the
December skies. Thus, in the end, once Bastogne had
been relieved on December 26 and Montgomery had
finally launched his attack on January 3, two arms of
a pincer movement began to proceed toward encirclement. The 3rd and 1st Armies, however, would not
join hands until January 16, and their juncture was at
Houffalize, Belgium, a location that was closer to the
center of the salient, rather than at its base. The Allied
response to erase the Bulge was more systematically
pressing it back to its pre-December 16 boundary,
rather than cutting it off.
The Ardennes offensive was the defining part of
the European Campaign for the American Army. Although Montgomery entered the battle on December
20 as a commander and brought with him some ele345

ments of the British Army, the Ardennes was largely
an American battle. It proved that the American Soldier and the squad, platoon, company, and regimental
leaders had learned and applied the art of war in a
winning way. Hit by an attacking force that achieved
total surprise, units on the ground showed maturity
and resilience in Battle of the Bulge. The battle was a
significant test for American forces because without
consistent air support, which had so dominated the
European Campaign, the American Army had to fight
head-to-head with the once mighty Wehrmacht. The
American Soldier clearly showed his competence.
The Battle of the Bulge, however, raised some serious questions about some of the American Army’s
leadership. In the Ardennes offensive, two trusted
commanders failed, Hodges and Bradley. For the first
few days of the offensive, Hodges seemed in shock
and was not at all in control of himself, let alone the
1st Army.70 Despite all of the arrogance and pomposity exhibited by Montgomery, it is not difficult to see
why he thought Hodges should be relieved from command. Bradley, though never in shock, in the weeks
prior to the German attack, denied the threat to his
center. Even when the attack occurred, he initially attempted to deny the crisis that faced American forces.
Eisenhower, however, who had expressed concern
about the 12th Army Group’s center on several occasions, quickly and decisively became the ground component commander by overruling Bradley on troop
dispositions before the day of December 16 was over.
He then mastered the crisis facing the American Army
by turning to a trusted old friend and an early practitioner of operational warfare, Patton, and entrusted
him with constructing the initial American response.
To address the crisis, Eisenhower effected a change in
command relationships.71 Eisenhower allowed Brad346

ley to remain the nominal commander, but in practice,
Patton and his staff organized and implemented the
southern wing of the 12th Army Group’s response.
Patton’s counterattack to the flank of the German offensive was his finest hour.72 The 12th Army Group
commander would not even lead his troops on the
northern part of the Bulge. Instead, Montgomery was
given the role of organizing the Allied response and
fighting the battle in that sector.
Eisenhower, despite his lack of any direct combat
experience, emerges as one of the most competent senior leaders in the crises of late 1944. However, he still
allowed some problems to fester. Granted, perhaps
he should have watched more closely and personally
intervened in the senseless Hürtgen Forest action. He
did not pay enough attention to the manpower drain
since it exacerbated the infantry replacement shortage facing the U.S. Army. Instead, he depended on
trusted associates, Bradley and Hodges. When the
crisis erupted on December 16, he quickly and decisively took charge of crafting the response. Whether
the readers agree with his choice of strategy or not,
Eisenhower was at least consistent. From the onset to
the end of the campaign, he persevered with his broad
front strategy.
From the standpoint of this analysis, one of the most
regrettable elements of the Ardennes Offensive, or for
that matter the European Campaign, was the inability
of the Western Allies to quickly and efficiently fulfill
one of Eisenhower’s key objectives, the destruction of
Germany’s armed forces. Within the Ardennes area
were elements of the German Army that Berlin could
not simply replace in terms of elite formations and experienced soldiers. The fighting in 1944 had already
been costly for the German Army. A Soviet summer
offensive had forced a collapse of Army Group Center
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and had blown a hole in the German defenses on the
Eastern Front. In this disaster, the Wehrmacht had already experienced the loss of about 25 divisions. Bagging a substantial amount of the forces in the Bulge
would have left a hole in the German line that would
have been impossible to plug.
In all likelihood, the Western Allies did not have,
on the continent, the available resources to capture or
destroy the German force in the Bulge. The Allies did
not have many commanders who were willing and
able to take the necessary risks to undertake an encirclement of German forces. Patton would have loved
the opportunity to attempt such a maneuver, but it is
highly unlikely that Montgomery would have done
so, at least in a timely fashion.73 Eisenhower wanted to
conduct such an operation, but Montgomery moved
far too slow to for such an aggressive maneuver.
Much like at Falaise and the Seine, the main body of
the German force was able to extricate itself, though
with heavy casualties.
In the end, the cost to the German Army was still
substantial. The Wehrmacht suffered from 81,000 to
98,000 casualties, depending on whose figures one
uses.74 Through either actual battle damage or abandonment due to lack of fuel, the Germans also lost between 600-800 tanks and assault guns. These armored
forces amounted to virtually half of the inventory of
the German units in the Ardennes. For the Luftwaffe,
the cost was even higher. In the Bulge, Operations
NORDWIND and BODENPLATTE cost the Luftwaffe
close to 800 aircraft, some 280 on New Year’s Day
alone. The destruction of these aircraft, together with
the accompanying loss of too many experienced pilots, meant the death of the Luftwaffe on the Western
Front. By the end of the Battle of the Bulge, the European Campaign was entering its final phases.
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CHAPTER 9
THE RUHR OR BERLIN
May I point out that Berlin is no longer a particularly
important objective.1
Dwight D. Eisenhower
March 30, 1945
Berlin was the prime and true objective of the AngloAmerican Armies.2
Winston S. Churchill

As January 1945 came to an end, and with it the
conclusion of the Ardennes campaign, the Western
Allies faced the challenge of reaching, then crossing,
the Rhine. By crossing the Rhine, the Allies would enter Germany therefore necessitating the destruction
of the German military. The weakened Wehrmacht
was still powerful enough to offer resistance, but that
power was rapidly being destroyed. In February, after
refitting from the bitter winter and the losses suffered
in the Ardennes, the Western Allies again began their
push to reach, and then cross the Rhine River. Once
the Allied forces crossed into the heartland of Germany, the Allied leadership had to come to grips with
what the focus of operations would be to destroy Nazi
Germany?
Reaching and then crossing the Rhine were not
new tasks for the Western Allies. When Operation
MARKET GARDEN was launched in mid-September
1944, its intended result was reaching, then crossing,
the Rhine. After American and British forces accomplished the crossing, the North German Plain would

359

be open for a rapid advance eastward that could result in the capture of Berlin. Operation MARKET
GARDEN died an embarrassing death, but in March
after the Allied forces crossed the Rhine the opportunity existed to resuscitate the drive for, and the capture of, Berlin. Such a rapid advance was possible due
to Allied efforts to solve the logistical problems that
had plagued them from August through early December 1944. Allied leaders used trucking, rail, and
other modes of transportation to ship supplies from
Antwerp, Belgium; Marseilles, France; and a logistical
center at Amsterdam, the Netherlands. The resource
limitations that crippled American and British forces
in their drive through the western occupied countries
were no longer as debilitating.
The Allied armies in the west had also grown
noticeably adding capability to achieve the original
goals of Operation MARKET GARDEN. By March,
the Western Allies had 2,553,000 American, British,
and Canadian troops poised to complete the destruction of Nazi Germany and its military forces. These
91 well-equipped, and supplied Allied divisions faced
a German Army whose resources, men, equipment,
and terrain diminished daily.3 American and Allied
efforts pressuring the Germans in the west was much
smaller than the Soviet efforts on the Eastern Front. By
January 1945, Moscow had opened a winter offensive,
and Soviet troops advanced on the Oder River in Germany. With the Soviet Army consisting of 555 divisions, it seemed unlikely that the depleted Wehrmacht
had any chance of stopping them. Josef Stalin pushed
the Germans with four massive fronts consisting of
almost four million soldiers. The Soviets relentlessly
sought a clearly defined goal, the capital of the Third
Reich—Berlin. As spring arrived, the question quickly

360

emerged: Was taking the German capital still a priority for the Western Allies?
Eisenhower had several options as he sought to
conclude the European Campaign. The Western Allies
could engage in a race with the Soviets to try to seize
Berlin, or the Allied effort could focus on dissecting
Germany into several pieces with a major effort that
would cut through the Third Reich. American and
British forces could make their move near Kassel and
separate Berlin from Munich, the headquarters of the
National Socialist movement. Through most of 1944,
Eisenhower had been consistent in stating that the
goal of the Anglo-American force should be to take
Berlin, but by February 1945, he no longer believed
that Berlin had any type of strategic importance for
the Western Allies.4 As he noted on March 31, “That
place has become, as far as I am concerned, a geographical location, and I have never been interested
in these.”5 On the other hand, directly in front of the
American 1st Army was the Ruhr industrial district, a
well-known center for the production of German war
materials. The AAF and RAF CBO had taken a toll
on the Ruhr’s industrial capacity, reducing production by 25 to 30 percent. The destruction of the area’s
transportation network had also reduced the resource
inflow and product outflow to and from the area, but
the reputation of the Ruhr as the German industrial
center still made it an objective of military value.6
There was an additional factor that added to the
value of the Ruhr River Valley: Over 300,000 German
troops were located in the area that stretched from the
vicinity of Bonn north to Essen along the Rhine River,
and to the east from Marburg to the German training
facilities at Paderborn. If American and British forces
could surround the Ruhr River Valley, then the Germans would lose the industrial basin of Western Ger361

many and over a quarter of a million men. Whether he
was aware of this or not, Eisenhower was recognizing
that the old Clauswitzian concept of the enemy’s capital being a center of gravity was not as relevant in 20th
century warfare as it had been in 18th and 19th century wars. Thus, Eisenhower could see little purpose
in subjecting the Western Allied armies to potentially
heavy casualties for terrain that had already been designated as being in the Soviet zone. 7 As a result, Eisenhower dropped the capture of Berlin as a priority. On
March 28, Eisenhower ordered the encirclement of the
Ruhr. His plan was to first capture the Ruhr and then
cut Germany in half on an east-west axis.
Eisenhower’s decision to allow the Soviets to capture Berlin, rather than British and American troops
was unpopular in London. Eisenhower did not consult Churchill or the senior British commanders about
this decision concerning the change of a major strategic objective. As was often the case, the Prime Minister
had his own ideas about the priorities for finishing the
war. In addition, Eisenhower’s staff sent the advance
route information for the 12th and 21st Army Groups,
once the Allies took the Ruhr, directly through the
American Military Mission in Moscow to Stalin, without coordination through the Combined Chiefs of
Staff or without informing Eisenhower’s British Deputy, Arthur Tedder. Churchill strenuously objected to
Eisenhower‘s direct submission of his plans to Stalin.
Conversely, Eisenhower saw no reason not to directly
communicate his plans to Stalin, since the Soviet leader was the commander of his nation’s military forces.
From Churchill’s perspective, however, Stalin was the
head of state and an increasingly worrisome dictator.
Churchill enumerated the reasons why Berlin
could not be left to the Soviets. In a message to General Eisenhower on March 31, he stated:
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I do not consider myself that Berlin has yet lost its
military and certainly not its political significance. The
fall of Berlin would have a profound psychological effect on German resistance in every part of the Reich.
While Berlin holds out great masses of Germans will
feel it their duty to go down fighting . . . while Berlin
remains under the German flag it cannot, in my opinion, fail to be the most decisive point in Germany.8

Of equal significance, Churchill, in a message to
U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt warned:
The Russian armies will no doubt overrun Austria and
enter Vienna. If they also take Berlin will not their impression that they have been the overwhelming contributor to our common victory be unduly imprinted
in their minds and may this not lead them into a mood
which will raise grave and formidable difficulties in
the future?9

Another issue that rankled British sensitivities was
Eisenhower’s planned reversion of the U.S. 9th Army
to 12th Army Group’s control, once the Ruhr was
taken. Loss of the 9th Army from British Field Marshal Montgomery’s command meant that the combat power of the 21st Army Group was diminished.
Thus, the 21st Army Group would lack the combat
power to make a dash for Berlin, even if allowed to
do so by SHAEF. In the eyes of the British leadership,
Eisenhower’s proposed shift from Berlin to an axis of
advance that would lead from the vicinity of Kassel
to Leipzig would mean that the smaller 21st Army
Group would be in a backwater sweeping along the
coastal areas and likely never even reaching the Elbe
River in Germany. The British felt that Eisenhower
relegated their forces to a secondary position in military operations.
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Eisenhower, however, had the backing of both the
American military and political leadership. There was
considerable logic to his position. As early as January, lead Russian units were some 40 to 50 miles from
Berlin, and by the second week of March, less than 30
miles from the capital. By early March, the Western
Allies had yet to cross the Rhine River. Additionally,
if the Germans were determined to defend their capital, then the American and British forces were sure to
suffer high casualties in the urban fighting that would
ensue. The American and British populace would find
taking heavy casualties at this time in the war distasteful. Since Allied leadership agreed to the postwar
boundaries, taking Berlin would require American
and British units to capture terrain and then return it
to Soviet control. The cost of capturing this territory
seemed far too high for a bit of glory. Thus in Eisenhower’s plan, American and British forces would stop
at the Elbe River, well before Berlin, and meet the Soviets at a clearly identifiable demarcation line. This
action would also avoid any problems with fratricide.
At the same time, Eisenhower understood the importance of alliance harmony, and worked to assuage
British sensitivities. In his message to Churchill on
March 30, he emphasized that he was not relegating
the British-Canadian force to a secondary role; rather
he was changing the axis of advance. Eisenhower also
emphasized the critical role British troops would have
in clearing the northern German ports, which were important for the Allies.10 Churchill seemed to feel more
at ease with Eisenhower’s intentions, but at the same
time, he replied the following day once again trying to
convince the Supreme Commander that the 9th Army
should remain with Montgomery’s 21st Army Group.
If Eisenhower did not make this move, then it would
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weaken operations. Churchill again made a strong
case to Eisenhower and Roosevelt that Berlin should
remain the focus of Allied operations. The Prime Minister’s insistence irritated the SHAEF Commander.
Eisenhower did not respond negatively to Churchill,
even though he often found the Prime Minister difficult. The alliance was too important.11
With new objectives and a new axis of advance, the
emphasis for the Western Allies was now on the 12th
Army Group and the operations planned by General
Bradley. According to his messages sent to Stalin and
Montgomery, Eisenhower’s plan was to:
(1) . . . encircle and destroy the enemy forces defending the Ruhr . . . by developing offensives around the
North of the Ruhr and from Frankfurt to Kassel until
the ring is closed. The enemy enclosed in this ring will
then be mopped up.12
(2) As soon as you (Montgomery) have joined hands
with Bradley in this Kassel-Paderborn area. . . . Bradley will be responsible for mopping up and occupying
the Ruhr and with the minimum delay will deliver his
main thrust on the axis Erfurt-Leipzig-Dresden to join
hands with the Russians.13

In many respects a fortuitous event happened on
March 7, the seizure of the Remagen Bridge. Elements
of the 12th Army Group crystallized Eisenhower’s
thinking and put Bradley in a position to have a stronger role in the push across Germany. The bridge’s
capture by 1st U.S. Army, still under the command
of General Hodges, was far ahead of their northern
peers. The 1st Army elements had crossed the Rhine
over the captured Remagen Bridge before Eisenhower’s plan was revealed on March 7. Given the Remagen
Bridge’s location, this meant that the 1st Army was al-
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ready posed to be the southern pincer of the proposed
encirclement.14
Nonetheless, the 21st Army Group was to have
an important role in the encirclement, the first potential major bag of German troops since the partially
successful episode at Falaise, France. Montgomery’s
preparations for the 21st Army Group crossing of the
Rhine were detailed or, according to his detractors,
laborious. While elements of Hodges’ 1st Army were
crossing the Rhine, Montgomery was in a preparation mode which, given the immense buildup would
have been difficult, if not impossible, to hide from the
Wehrmacht. Lieutenant General William H. Simpson,
the 9th Army’s commander, had urged an earlier attempt at crossing the Rhine. Montgomery was unwilling to do so without an extensive buildup. The intent
of Montgomery’s Rhine crossing operations, entitled
Operation PLUNDER, was to use over a quarter of a
million men to execute and exploit his crossing. Before the British started the crossing, Montgomery requested that Eisenhower provide him with 10 American divisions to ensure the success of his operation.
SHAEF denied the request. Preparatory fires began in
the middle of February with the RAF’s Bomber Command and the 8th Air Force pounding German targets.
In the second week of March, tactical air forces joined
the heavy bombers. Thus, Operation PLUNDER exhibited neither the spontaneity of the 9th Armored Division’s Remagen crossing or that of the 5th Infantry
Division from Patton’s 3rd Army on March 22.
Elements of the 21st Army Group began their
crossing on March 23 with considerable fanfare to
include the Prime Minister, Alanbrooke, and Eisenhower as spectators. Eisenhower was there since the
9th Army was a participant. By this time, the 12th
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Army Group already had two crossings secured.
Once Montgomery’s massive assault had succeeded,
his American units—Simpson’s 9th Army—were included in Eisenhower’s envelopment plan. The pincer
from 21st Army Group designed to move around the
Ruhr from the northwest was comprised of Simpson’s
forces. Bradley was slated to regain control of this
American unit after the Ruhr encirclement, but for all
practical purposes, the 9th was under his command
from the beginning of the operation. When the U.S. 1st
and 9th Armies joined hands at Paderborn, the 12th
Army Group consisted of 1,300,000 Soldiers, making
it by size alone the primary focus of operations on the
Western Front.15
In accordance with Eisenhower’s directive, the
group of armies from the north, essentially the 9th
Army, and the Allied forces in the south were to proceed toward the Paderborn-Kassel area, where they
were to link up. Allied forces were to envelope and
then isolate the Ruhr Valley.16 The Allied forces would
create a pocket bounded in the west by the Rhine River with the city of Cologne and Dusseldorf and the
smaller cities of Rüthen and Nuttlar in the east. Altogether, the potential pocket comprised almost 4,000
square miles and was 55 miles from north to south,
and 70 miles from east to west. Initially, Allied planners estimated that 150,000 German soldiers under
Model’s Army Group B were in the Ruhr Pocket.17
This intelligence calculation undercounted the actual
enemy strength; Army Group B contained more than
double the forces provided by the original intelligence
estimate.
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Source: The Author's Collection.

Map 9-1. The double envelopment concept for the
Ruhr as planned and executed.
Model’s Army Group B included remnants of
many German units. The 5th Panzer Army, which
had been troubling to the American Army in the Ardennes, was there, as was General Gustav von Zangen’s 15th Army. Forces from two corps of the German
1st Parachute Army were in the potential bag as was
the Headquarters of Army Group B. The effects of the
previous years fighting had weakened these units and
replacements and supplies were at best limited. The
German commander could have withdrawn 300,000
men before the Allied pincers closed. He could then
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have broken out of the pocket and linked up with
Army Group H in the north or Army Group G to the
south. However, Model did have a major constraint.
Hitler had ordered no retreats or surrender of German
territory to the Allies. In particular, Hitler wanted to
retain the Ruhr Valley, despite its reduced capacity.
Flexibility for commanders in the field was not in Hitler’s policies, particularly at this time in the war.
On March 29, Simpson ordered his 9th Army to advance toward Paderborn to meet elements of Hodges’
units. Hodges’ lead armored division, the 3rd, raced
ahead, rapidly eating up German terrain. The 1st
Army, like the 9th, would encounter some pockets of
determined resistance, but both pincers continued to
make steady progress. By this time, the U.S. Army had
veteran commanders and divisions highly capable of
executing this complex maneuver and enveloping the
enemy. For example, Major General William M. Miley’s 17th Airborne Division, with combat experience
in the Ardennes campaign and Operation VARSITY,
was a part of 9th Army’s force.18 Light forces, like the
17th Airborne Division, were not capable of delivering
the necessary punch that would enable the two armies
to link up. On April 1, Easter Sunday, elements of the
2nd Armored Division, a part of the 9th Army, and
the 3rd Armored Division from the 1st Army joined
hands at Lippstadt, only a short distance from Paderborn, thereby completing the encirclement of German
forces in the Ruhr Valley.
Model had expected that Hodges would, after
immediately crossing the Rhine, maneuver north
to Cologne or Dusseldorf. Protecting the Ruhr from
this threat was Model’s top priority. Though Hodges’
forces did take Cologne, he did not focus on cities
along the Rhine; rather, his attention was on Pader-
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born.19 After Model recognized Hodges’ intentions,
he attempted to slow or stop the American advance,
but his efforts came to naught. Simply, Model lacked
the necessary resources and, in addition, he lacked
the flexibility to maneuver, given the specificity of
Hitler’s orders. Model had forces from seven corps
that included elements of 19 divisions, but they were
surrounded and lacked adequate transport, fuel, and
air support to properly conduct operations.20 Simpson
and Hodges began to methodically destroy Model’s
divided resources.
The German military units in the Ruhr Valley
found themselves cutoff from all possible help. Allied armored forces and airpower maneuvered unhindered as the 1st and 9th Armies completed their link
up a short distance from Paderborn. A few weakened
Wehrmacht units did attempt to break out, but were
unable to do so. On April 1, the German 3rd Panzergrenadier Division could only muster four tanks to try
to breech the U.S. 415th Infantry Regiment’s defenses
at Medebach.21 Other German units tried to emulate
the 3rd Panzergrenadier Division’s attempt to escape,
but all failed. These weakened units could only wait
for the inevitable surrender. Simpson’s 9th Army was
assigned to clear the industrial northern areas of the
Ruhr while Hodges was assigned occupation of the
south.
Initially, some of Model’s formations resisted
surrender. Still, American Army units met a sea of
white surrender flags in German cities. The tightening encirclement of Model’s Army Group B reduced
the capabilities of his forces to stem the American
tide. Shortages of food, ammunition, and equipment
made surrender an attractive option for the Germans.
American units began gathering prisoners at the rate
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of 2,000 per day by the middle of April, up from 500
soldiers daily in late March.22 Commanders within
Army Group B pressed Model to surrender and to
end hostilities. He continued to refuse; a German field
marshal did not surrender. The 1st and 9th Armies
had almost divided the Ruhr Pocket by the first week
in April. Some German forces, especially Waffen-SS
units, continued to offer stiff opposition in cities. Earlier strategic bombardment efforts to curtail economic
efforts by the Allies inadvertently gave Army Group
B forces the opportunity to improve their defensive
efforts in the rubble. Despite these efforts, the defeat
of Army Group B became inevitable.
By April 14, all resistance ended north of the Ruhr
River, and the area was under control by the 9th
Army.23 The 1st Army had pushed into the southern
Ruhr and had separated the territory into two major
regions. Model could do nothing but wait. Model’s
staff and headquarters dissolved Army Group B to
avoid surrender on April 17. 24 The next day, all German resistance ended, and the remaining German
forces became prisoners. Model, true to his word, did
not surrender; he went into the woods and committed suicide. The American military effort “bagged”
317,000 prisoners, to include 25 generals and an admiral.25 The effort also allowed the Allies to liberate
forced laborers struggling to support the dying German economy and industry.
The Ruhr Pocket operation was, in many respects,
a milestone. Eisenhower had ordered a classic doublewing envelopment, and the U.S. 9th and 1st Armies
had executed it perfectly, destroying or capturing
the major German units which could have slowed
the Allied advance to the Elbe River. Obviously, the
Führer’s orders to hold the Ruhr against impossible
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odds and the weakened state of German troops in the
pocket helped Eisenhower to achieve his goal. Even
so, American commanders and their Soldiers had
learned the lessons of war very well. Though in no
way to denigrate the capabilities of the British soldier,
one could only wonder how long it would have taken
Montgomery, given his consistent tendency to engage
in lengthy preparations, to accomplish such a task.
Eisenhower’s decision to bypass the opportunity
to capture Berlin in lieu of the Ruhr was an extremely
astute move, despite all of the disagreements he had
to endure from his British colleagues, particularly the
Prime Minister. In light of the progress of the advancing Soviet forces in the east, it is highly questionable
whether the Western Allies could have reached the
Third Reich’s capital before the Soviets. Furthermore,
the experience of World War II clearly shows that
electing to fight in an urban area is ill advised, as the
experiences of Stalingrad, or for that matter, Aachen,
clearly demonstrate. It could have been even worse
for the British-American forces had they attacked Berlin, given the Western Allies tendency to use strategic
air assets to obliterate targets and thus convert them
into excellent defensive positions. Even after Monte
Cassino, Italy, the Western Allies seemed to ignore
this lesson.
What had occurred in the Ruhr pocket was clearly
important for Eisenhower’s plans, but at the same time,
the Third Reich was rapidly unraveling. Without the
fanfare and publicity of Montgomery’s Rhine crossing,
Patton’s 3rd Army had crossed the Rhine and rapidly
advanced across Germany, reaching the Czechoslovakian border and again bisecting Germany. Patch’s 7th
Army from the 6th Army Group did much the same,
driving across Bavaria and preventing the Germans
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from executing any attempt to further the war. The
U.S. 9th Army raced across the North German Plain.
By the middle of April, American forces had reached
the Elbe. The 1st Army’s success was likewise spectacular. Hitler’s Thousand-Year Reich was only days
away from its passage into the dustbin of history.
Eisenhower’s order to ignore Berlin and encircle
the Ruhr, coupled with his handling of the Battle of
the Bulge, indicate that he was a far better field commander than as implied by his critics. He was also
able to function exceptionally well as a commander of
a joint Allied force and was able to capably deal with
the multiple and often difficult personalities within
the Allied governments. Under his guidance, the priorities set by Marshall and the objectives set by Roosevelt, ultimately the end of the European Campaign,
were all in sight.
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS
This book is about a campaign, the European Campaign of World War II. It concerns how strategy and
operations affected this campaign. Before considering
either of these two subjects, one should first consider
the basis of the military strategy, the goals and objectives established by a nation’s leadership. The United
States in World War II gives the student of military
affairs an outstanding example of the national command authority determining the nation’s goals and
objectives. Beginning in late 1938, even before the
war began, the nation’s goals and objectives began to
emerge. At that time, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had expressed great concern about the aggressive acts perpetrated by Germany, Italy, and Japan.
His concern focused on German aggressive actions in
Europe. In a meeting at the White House, he instructed
the national and military leadership to begin producing weapon systems, initially aircraft, which would be
available to assist friendly powers in resisting aggression. With this goal in mind, his basic strategy was
to provide military equipment to democratic countries that faced aggression. Considering the mood of
the country, the President’s strategy was logical. As
the decade concluded, he had to consider additional
options to oppose Germany and Japan’s actions. But,
his goal and fundamental strategy, assisting nations
threatened by the Axis powers, did not waver.
Although his initial strategy provided the means
for potential victims of fascist aggression to resist
their powerful adversaries, such a strategy would
prove insufficient because the world situation contin-
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ued to degenerate. As it worsened, he first expanded the practice of aiding endangered countries with
such programs as the Lend-Lease Act of March 1941.
Again, this strategy of providing military assistance
to countries facing aggressors supported his goal. The
world situation, however, was so volatile that he and
his advisors soon realized that the supply of the weapons of war to U.S. allies would not be enough to halt
the Axis powers. Their aggression continually pushed
the United States closer to war. Thus, even while retaining the hope of avoiding direct American involvement in the war, the administration began expanding military forces. The passage of a peacetime draft
and the National Guard and Reserve mobilization in
1940 ultimately gave America a more robust military
force. Still, the nation’s leadership was not fully committed to war. Although both of these measures expanded the nation’s military, they were limited since
they were effective for only a year. The United States
was still struggling to develop a national consensus.
At this point, the President’s goal was still preventing
the expansion of fascist moves through assistance to
the threatened countries. Roosevelt’s leadership, seen
through his establishment of a clear objective and his
ability to stick with it, provides an excellent example
of solid executive leadership.
By 1941, the nation was rapidly being drawn into
active participation in the war. War plans, actual military strategies, were in desperate need of revision. On
several occasions Roosevelt had expressed his concern that the prewar plans were contingencies, not
detailed war plans. The prewar Rainbow Plans and
the AAF's AWPD/1 were available, but they did not
provide the necessary detailed basis for conducting a
war. The military leadership also foresaw the need for
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early planning and began the process of improving its
prewar plans. Brigadier General Leonard T. Gerow
created the first detailed plan when he ordered Wedemeyer to develop the “Ultimate Requirements Study,”
called by one author the “Victory Plan of 1941.” The
principles of how Wedemeyer outlined and created
the strategy provide a good model of how to think
about planning for war, no matter whether the war is
a short war, counterinsurgency, or a full-scale worldwide conflict.
Wedemeyer’s methodology for developing a war
plan began with attempting to clearly ascertain the
nation’s objective. He simply asked, “What is the national objective of the U.S.?” Reading all that he could
on the subject, Wedemeyer grasped the President’s
priorities, his intent, but he needed to develop a clear
objective statement for the basis of the plan. After considerable research he determined the objective was “to
eliminate totalitarianism from Europe and, in the process, to be an ally of Great Britain; further to deny the
Japanese undisputed control of the Western Pacific.”1
In this accepted objective, three statements stand
out. First, Europe was preeminent in any consideration of American involvement in war. Second, Great
Britain was an important element in Roosevelt’s plans.
Third, Japan was a concern, but it was not the primary
focus; rather it was a secondary effort in America’s
war plans. As Wedemeyer developed the Victory
Plan, some of the specific force structure assumptions
he made were incorrect, but the objective and priorities he developed were correct. He had captured Roosevelt’s intent, and the nation never wavered from
these stated objectives. As noted by the late Charles E.
Kirkpatrick, “the Victory Plan established the model
for modern strategic planning.”2 Although changes
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and modifications were made to Wedemeyer’s plan,
the central thrust of the strategy remained remarkably
constant. His example provides a great case study to
view the development of strategy in the context of
modern conflict.
This Victory Plan based on the Roosevelt’s priorities, in turn, directly led the nation to the planning for
and the execution of the European Campaign. National leadership must tie military strategy to the political
objectives of the state. As noted by Colin Gray, strategy becomes a bridge that links military capability and
forces to political purposes. In this case, it was done
well. Once the war began, Roosevelt strengthened his
objectives and perhaps clarified his intent. Eliminating totalitarianism meant the unconditional surrender
of America’s totalitarian enemies, not merely compelling the surrender of their military forces.
National leadership should develop and create
military strategies based on clearly stated and achievable objectives. Without achievable objectives and
strategies, which are within the means of a nation,
tactical, and even operational successes will come
to naught. The German experience in World War II
demonstrates what can happen if objectives and strategy are ill-conceived or unrealistic, or are beyond a
nation’s means. Here again, the United States was
fortunate. Despite a slow recovery from a worldwide
economic depression, it was perhaps at the height
of its industrial era. Such industrial power gave the
United States the means to wage war in two widely
separate theaters, as well as to assist Great Britain, the
Soviet Union, Nationalist China, and a host of other
minor players. Both factories and agricultural output
far exceeded what the nation needed to accomplish
Roosevelt’s objectives. Thus, the nation had what was
required in terms of the means, the resources for war.
380

Although the pre-conflict plans seemed reasonable
in Washington circles, they often had to be amended
or changed due to political reasons, the unexpected
action of the enemies, and actions by Allies in accordance with their national interests. Personalities,
both within American military circles as well as political leaders, had a decided effect on Allied plans
and strategies. For example, demands from Joseph
Stalin to open a second front to relieve pressure on
the Soviet Union dogged Roosevelt and British Prime
Minister Winston Churchill throughout the war and
helped make the European Campaign a virtual necessity. The concept of invading the continent of Europe
was decidedly a part of American plans, but Stalin’s
insistence on a second front made it even more important. Churchill’s concern about the Mediterranean, the
British interest in peripheral strategies, and their postwar interests were responsible for repeated attempts
at changing the plans and strategies of the Western
Allies. National political and military leaders had the
political backing, priorities, and service capabilities to
accommodate these various factors.
As a final and important element leading to a nation’s potential success, what military strategy did the
Allies adopt to achieve the objectives? The American
strategy centered on the engagement of the German
Wehrmacht and its destruction. This would be the
nation’s first priority; the Pacific Theater was to be
a secondary effort. Virtually from the onset, in Marshall’s mind, American forces would have to enter
the continent of Europe and engage and destroy the
German military on its “home turf.” In addition to
the efforts of American ground forces, the American
intrusion into Europe would also come from the air.
Naval forces would support combat sustainment, and
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Allied air forces would conduct a Combined Bomber
Offensive, an effort in the tradition of Italian General
Giulio Douhet, to bring German industry and the will
of its people, to their knees. The United States and its
military leadership never changed from these basic
principles, despite distractions from within and from
our major Western ally, the British. Roosevelt had to
accept some compromises to ensure that the coalition
of disparate Allies would hold together to fight Germany. Fears of a Japanese-conquered China, its incursion into India, and expansion throughout the Pacific
caused some American military leaders, notably naval
leadership, to question the primacy of a Europe first
strategy, but Europe first and the invasion of the European continent endured.
The question has been repeatedly raised by both
historians and students of military strategy and operations as to whether American and Western allied
operations in the European Campaign were directly
focused on the destruction of the enemy force. This intent of American strategy is evident, the destruction of
once mighty Wehrmacht, but were operations clearly
focused on the destruction of Germany’s military machine? One can provide repeated examples to show
that Allied operations sometimes seemed to center
more on the seizure of terrain and the taking of cities, a
charge that has been made by both Martin Blumenson
and Williamson Murray. One can wonder, even after
over 60 years, how anyone can explain, logically, the
Hürtgen Forest, an unbelievable slugging match that
hardly profited the American Army. Furthermore, it
will likely be debated into infinity as to why American
and British forces tarried so long in closing the Falaise
Gap in France; or why the Allies were unable to pinch
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off the Bulge, rather than just hammer German forces
back to their starting position. There were, in fact, few
examples in the European Campaign of the Western
Allies engaging in strategic or operational maneuver,
a type of warfare exhibited first by the Germans and
later by the Russians, who learned well from their adversaries.
Instead, on the ground, Western Allied armies
pursued Eisenhower’s favored broad front strategy,
the strategy of general advance. One can still ask the
question, did the Western Allies have the experienced
commanders on the ground in the early phases of
the campaign enabling them to conduct Cannae-type
operations (Second Punic War in Italy), where a military force enveloped and annihilated a foe?3 Certainly
American military doctrine did not include anything
comparable to what would later be called the operational art. In fairness, the concept existed, but the doctrine did not. One is left to wonder if critics of the war’s
conduct, i.e., the lack of operational thinking, realize
that although Eisenhower’s broad front strategy was
neither imaginative nor dashing, but it was a strategy
that the Germans were least able to handle. Faced by
the 500-plus Russian divisions on the Eastern Front,
and the Western Allies resources, the Germans were
simply unable to adequately handle all of the crises
that confronted their forces in the field.
Still, as the war reached its conclusion, Allied
forces finally concluded with a classic example of enveloping a major enemy force in what was called the
Ruhr Pocket. Prior to this episode, the Western Allies
seemed unwilling or unable to conduct such a maneuver. In the end, the German Army was destroyed, and
American and British units so completely defeated
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their opponents that there could never be the possibility of another “stab in the back” legend comparable to
1918 that could grow among German politicians and
officers.
American military strategy allowed Washington,
and ultimately London, and Moscow, to accomplish
their primary objective in World War II, the unconditional surrender of National Socialist Germany and the
destruction of its armed forces. The European Campaign, coupled with the overall history of World War
II in Europe, illustrates to students of military operations a very clear lesson. The adoption of achievable
objectives and strategies, both national and military,
are keys to a nation’s success.
Military strategy does not exist by itself, rather it
supports the political object of the war; and World
War II in general, and the European Campaign in particular, serves as a classic example. A student of World
War II can see the interplay of political objectives and
the impact that they had on strategy. The war was
conducted consistent with Carl von Clausewitz’s dictum that, “[s]trategy is the use of engagement for the
purpose of the war.”4
The relationship between military strategy and political purpose has not changed despite the passage of
over 60 years. Whether one believes in the theories of
Clausewitz, Henri Jomini, Sun Tzu, or countless other
strategists past and present, strategy and its development is a timeless art. Beliefs in particular military
theories, service agendas, claims for particular roles
and missions, doctrine, education, resources, leadership styles, and political realities molded many of the
military strategies before and shortly after America’s
entry into World War II. These same issues face political and military leaders today.
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One could say that in today’s world, strategy, both
national and military, must be more flexible. In World
War II, the chief vehicle to defeat Germany was military force. Conventional militaries squared off in the
air, on land, and at sea, to vanquish their respective
opponents. Although the nation must still have this
capability, the rise and importance of other elements
of power and the wider range of potential conflicts
raise questions as to the primacy of exclusive military
options. Events have forced strategists to adopt approaches that affect not only more coordinated joint
actions, but joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and
multinational aspects too. Strategy has become a complex mix of interactions between players. Technology
has advanced so much that military actions happen
with greater speed and can have unparalleled precision. Similarly, global media can take an innocuous
action and turn it into a pivotal event that changes the
character and direction of a conflict. Coupled with a
dynamic environment that forces national and military leaders to continually review their objectives,
policies, and resources, the potential for vast differences between strategy and political ends seem great.
Despite the introduction of higher technology and
a host of systems and organizations to ensure military
strategy supports national objectives and interests, the
problem of establishing achievable objectives and the
strategies to achieve them remains. Today’s environment may be more complex than the one American
Army leadership faced in the 1940s, but many of the
lessons from World War II remain significant. Leadership differences, differing national interests within an
alliance even as close as Britain and the United States,
and the upsets caused by unanticipated enemy reactions can all be seen through a study of the European
Campaign.
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This highlights the point that strategy, national and
military, has always been dynamic and likely always
will be. Possessing the flexibility and imagination to
respond to political changes are an absolute must for
military strategists. Few situations, if any, would dictate a fixed, set-piece strategy. What has changed is
the speed of communications and the reaction time to
the events that have an impact on a nation’s interests.
Still, practitioners and students of military strategy
have at least one consolation. Many of the problems
faced today and in the future most likely have never
been encountered before. However, not all is lost. A
study of military history sheds light on many present
issues and ones that a nation will face in the years to
come. Strategy and operations, like those covered in
this book on Allied operations in Europe, will always
be a dynamic activity. The impact of personalities, improved technology, differing agendas within an alliance, and differing interservice agendas will all force
changes in strategy, much as they did in World War
II. That the world, like war, has seen many changes
should be obvious, but the problem of creating a coherent strategy in order that a nation may protect
its interests and achieve its objectives still exists and
likely always will. A study of history cannot solve this
quandary, but it can provide important insights.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 10
1. Charles E. Kirkpatrick, An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Writing the Victory Plan of 1941, Washington, DC: U.S.
Army Center of Military History, 1990, p. 63.
2. Ibid., p. 123.
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3. In 216 B.C., the Carthaginian General Hannibal lured his
Roman opponent into a pocket, then closed the flanks and rear of
the pocket leading to the annihilation of the Roman force. The
name "Cannae" has since become synonymous in the study and
practice of the military art with envelopment and annihilation on
the battlefield.
4. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter
Paret, eds., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 177.
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APPENDIX I
DEVELOPING STRATEGY:
A LOOK AT THE OTHER SIDE
. . . they [The National Socialists] aimed at a reconstruction of German society and the German state on
the basis of conquest, annihilation, and subjugation.1
Michael Geyer

Over the years, some have criticized the inability
of American World War II military leadership to deal
effectively with the influence of President Franklin D.
Roosevelt or various Service chiefs, particularly Admiral Ernest King, for promoting their Service interests vice the development of a true joint or coalition
approach. Also criticized was British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill’s perceived ability to persuade
Roosevelt to ignore his military advisors and acquiesce
to British preferences. For those who find flaws with
the development of American wartime strategies, a
review of the problems faced by our major adversary
in developing and implementing strategy provides an
interesting perspective.
While Washington entered the post-World War I
era as a major though reluctant power in world politics, Germany entered the period as a defeated nation.
One writer succinctly noted, “Germany’s situation did
not permit a foreign policy with a military accent or
the development of any strategy that included the use
of armed forces.”2 After World War I, when America
was playing an important role in the arms limitation
talks and its military leadership was considering the
possibilities of a future war, Germany, the pariah
among the major powers, was simply trying to sur-
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vive. The first challenge for Berlin was the need for
stability; in 1918, this was not an easy task. The German Kaiser had abdicated and with that, the political
and social structure of Germany was in the process of
rapid and often chaotic change. In the 1920s, the German political leadership had to establish a new democratic government that, from the onset, had a myriad
of problems to resolve.
This task would not be easy because in 1920 Germany as a nation was only 50 years old. Granted, the
German states had existed for centuries, but a unified German nation-state had only existed since 1871.
Thus, it was in fact, much younger than the United
States, a country that many in Europe considered a
novice in international politics. Consequently, there
was a decided immaturity in the German nation and
many of its political systems. For example, the German
system was a curious blend of democracy and autocracy. From 1871 to 1918, the German chancellor, the
equivalent of a prime minister, served at the pleasure
of the Emperor, not Parliament. From 1871 to 1889,
Chancellor Otto von Bismarck dominated German
foreign policy and, to a large extent, military policy.
After Bismarck left office, Kaiser William II and his
key advisors developed foreign and military policies
through procedures used by most parliamentary systems.3 When World War I began, the military came to
dominate the affairs of state, and Germany essentially
became a military dictatorship.
When Germany unconditionally surrendered at the
end of World War I, a new democracy, the Weimar Republic, came into being, and the German government
resembled a parliamentary democracy. Conversely,
the new democratic government faced a number of
critical issues. Two issues in particular were galling
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to most Germans: the limited sovereignty permitted
by the Allies for the new German government and the
inability of Germany to defend itself. 4 Of considerable
importance to most citizens was the pressing need to
restore the economic wellbeing of the country. Above
all, there was general agreement within the new government, its political parties, and the populace, that
the Versailles settlement was an abomination that had
to be overturned.
Two important priorities faced the Weimar government and were in need of rapid resolution. The
preeminent issue confronting Weimar politicians was
the need to promote economic recovery, an elusive
goal for the new Republic. For the average citizen, the
economy was certainly the most important issue. The
cessations of territory demanded by the Allies severely affected the German economy. The Allied powers
gave the province of Posen, together with a corridor
to the sea, to Poland, and the German city of Danzig
was made an international city. Additionally, the
French government wanted German territories west
of the Rhine River totally and permanently demilitarized. The Saar River area was rich in mineral deposits
and coveted by France. The German government lost
control of the area because the Allied powers insisted
that the area should be under international control
for a period of 15 years. Following this period of foreign control, the people in the territory would hold
a plebiscite to determine whether permanent control
would become German or French. Under the terms of
the Versailles Treaty, three-fourths of Germany’s iron
resources and one-fourth of its coal was in foreign
hands.5 Allied powers also stripped Germany of all
of its colonies, which also amounted to a significant
financial loss. These factors, together with the inad-
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equate methods used by the Kaiser’s government to
finance the war, meant that Germany was in serious
financial straits. To further complicate the Weimar’s
problems, poor financial policies caused rapid inflation in the years from 1921 to 1923. Financial collapse
was inevitable.6 In 1923, these problems were further
exacerbated by the occupation of the German industrial heartland, the Ruhr Valley, by French and Belgian troops when the Germans failed to make their
required reparations payments.
With a sympathetic ear from the United States and
Great Britain, the Germans received some relief from
reparations payments. Throughout 1924 to 1929, Germany appeared to be on the road to recovery for the
first time since the end of the war. What choices the
Weimar government might have made, what course it
might have set for the people and their new democratic
government is difficult to say, because in October 1929
the Great Depression struck. The economic progress
made by the Weimar government evaporated almost
overnight. Thus, from October 1929 until 1933, economic issues related to mere survival were once again
the most crucial concern for many Germans.
A second major priority for the new German republic was the revision of the so-called Versailles
Diktat. The German government and people suffered
territorial losses in Europe, but the Germans were also
forced to: accept full responsibility for initiating the
brutal war that turned into a bloodbath for Europe;
relinquish all of their colonies; destroy their air force;
and surrender most of their navy. The army was limited to a mere shadow of its former self, truncated to
100,000 personnel, including an officer corps of only
4,000. This meant that Germany was simply unable to
defend itself from any external threats such as incur-
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sions from France or Poland, both of which were realistic threats, as the early 1920s would show. In reality,
the army only had the resources to handle missions
related to Germany’s internal security. The restoration of full sovereignty over German territory, like the
Rhineland and the Saar, remained an important issue
throughout the 1920s. The power to regain these territories and defend the nation from future incursions,
like those by France in 1923, rested in the hands of the
military. Further complicating the problem was the
fact that German military forces were not always in
good stead with the new German government, since
Socialist and Communist leaders regarded “militarists” with great suspicion.7 While some pragmatic
Social Democrats recognized the importance of a
strong military for defense and for the maintenance of
internal order, many Social Democrats were wary of
the military and its leadership. Julius Leber, a leading
Social Democrat, warned his party at a 1929 conference “that a republic in which there was an unbridgeable gulf between the armed forces and the working
class could not possibly survive.”8 Regrettably, the
citizens and their elected representatives ignored this
prophetic warning.
As the Weimar government faced repeated crises,
many of which were due to the economy’s poor state,
German military officers systematically studied issues
relating to the country’s defense. In short, the Army’s
leadership sought to understand what had gone wrong
in the operations of 1914 to 1918 resulting in stalemate
on the Western Front and the German defeat. The objective of these analyses was to determine how to defend Germany in the future. The German army held a
great deal of bitterness toward the Allies and toward
the new republic that agreed to the draconian terms of
the peace treaty.9 In the wake of its defeat that many
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soldiers refused to acknowledge or accept, the army
conducted its postwar reorganization and studies under Hans von Seeckt, Chief of the German Truppenamt
and head of the German Reichswehr.10
Seeckt was an intellectual and a man of refinement,
but at the same time, he was a military commander
with considerable field experience. During the Great
War, Seeckt had served on the Western and Eastern
Fronts. While on the Eastern Front, he was Chief of
Staff for the Armies under General August von Mackensen. The latter was likely one of the most competent
field commanders in the German Army during World
War I. 11 As head of the Reichswehr, Seeckt had two important goals: to develop a highly professional force
despite the strictures of the Treaty of Versailles and to
place a restored German army in the virtually semiautonomous role it held in the period from 1889-1918.
To facilitate this process, he commissioned studies,
previously mentioned, which were a very important
element in the process of restoring both the Germany
army and Germany’s traditional way of war.
The Reichswehr’s postwar studies concluded that
trench or positional warfare, as conducted on the
Western Front in 1914-18, was an aberration and
should be rejected as a basis for future wars. The German Army had initiated its World War I campaigns
on the Western Front with a war of movement or maneuver. Nonetheless, this now famous or infamous
large-scale single wing envelopment, the Schlieffen
Plan, had failed despite meticulous planning.12 Thus,
the war of movement, the Bewegungskrieg promoted
by the German officer corps, had bogged down in
1914 and became a Stellungskrieg, positional warfare.
The studies commissioned by Seeckt concluded that
the concept of using maneuver warfare on the tactical
and operational level was still valid and desirable for
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future warfare. Simply, in 1914 maneuver warfare had
been executed poorly, but the basic concept was still
sound. Seeckt himself was a strong advocate of waging
war within the tradition of Helmuth von Moltke (the
elder) and Alfred von Schlieffen, wars of movement
and encirclement. As one notable historian stated,
with good justification, Seeckt was a “restorer rather
than an innovator.”13 Thus, in the interwar years,
the German army’s leadership promoted a return to
wars of movement. Studies conducted by key German officers were well within the German tradition
of warfare in that they centered on the tactical level
through the operational levels of war, but they did not
include matters such as national military strategy or
national security policy. These military officers failed
to recognize that one of the major failings prior to the
outbreak of World War I was the erratic nature of the
Kaiser’s national security policy and the tendency of
German policymakers—particularly in the Kaiser’s inner circle—to exercise all too quickly, the military instrument of power.14 Seeckt sought to recreate an elite
professional force, which could avoid or counterbalance the excesses or the influence of both the extreme
right and left of the German political spectrum. Thus,
his plan was for an army and a professional leadership cadre similar to the pre-1914 Imperial Army. In
retrospect, Seeckt’s studies missed several important issues that put the Germans at a disadvantage
as compared to their future adversaries, the United
States and Great Britain. German military leadership
ignored three important areas: the need for the nation
to develop sound political and military strategies; the
importance of establishing workable joint and combined alliance headquarters; and the importance of
using alliance and coalition warfare as a force multiplier for its military efforts.
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Source: The Author's Collection.

Hans von Seeckt, Chief of the German Truppenamt
and head of the German Reichswehr.
These issues and failings were nothing new for
Germany. They had their origins in the Imperial era,
and officers continued to struggle with them in the
Weimar period. For example, once Otto von Bismarck
resigned from the role of Chancellor in 1889, consequently Germany lost a firm hand on the German tiller of state, at least in terms of developing achievable
objectives and a sound national strategy. Immediately
after the wars of unification in 1870, Bismarck had designed and exercised a system where Germany was a
hegemonic power on the European scene, but at the
same time avoided the appearance of being one. Thus,
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the German nation from 1871 to 1889 consistently exercised its power, pursued objectives that were within
its national interests, and attempted not to antagonize
its European neighbors, other than the French. Once
Bismarck left the Chancellorship, the country, under
new leadership, failed to wisely exercise its power in
Europe or, for that matter, throughout the world. National security policy and national military strategy
were jumbled and, at times, all but nonexistent.
In terms of developing coalitions and alliances that
would link Germany with countries that had common
goals and interests, Germany was politically, economically, and militarily far behind its potential adversaries. German leadership could attribute some of the issues to political immaturity or perhaps the failure to
recognize the additional power that strong alliances
provide. In the German Wars of Unification of 1864 to
1871, Prussia’s coalition partners had been some of the
German states that shared a similar cultural heritage
and at least some common interests. When Germany
went to war in 1914, it was a member of the Triple
Alliance. That alliance proved to be a dysfunctional
one. While the Germans had some common interests
with the Austro-Hungarian Empire, they shared little
in terms of common interests or goals with the Italians. A basic problem with their alliances was that
they tended to be military compacts rather than alliances based on mutually identified interests.15 This
became obvious when Italy failed to support their
German Allies and, within a year, the Italians bolted
and joined the British and French to wage war against
the Germans. Even working with their closest ally, the
Austrians, the Germans dealt with them in a haughty
and often condescending fashion. In short, in the first
2 decades of the 20th century, the Germans had an extremely poor record of working within alliances. Even
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after the war, studies that analyzed the conduct of the
war seemed to ignore this problem. This is surprising,
since Hans von Seeckt, the Chief of the Reichswehr, had
served as Chief of Staff to Generalfeldmarschall August
von Mackensen, perhaps Germany’s most accomplished alliance warfare practitioner.16
The Reichswehr officer corps, however, did not
all march in step with Seeckt. There were elements
within the Reichswehr, led by Werner von Blomberg
and Joachim von Stulpnagel—both of whom became
general officers— that wanted a mass popular army
rather than a professional elite, that could harness the
energies of German society. These advocates of the
Volkskrieg, the people’s war, attempted to promote
their concepts, particularly during the French occupation of the Ruhr Valley, when the German Army was
too weak to defend its territory. Another faction led
by Kurt von Schleicher and Wilhelm Groener took a
broader look at Germany’s problems, and their conclusions were perhaps the most realistic. Groener
postulated that Germany could not rebuild its military power unless it had a significant economic recovery.17 Thus, Germany’s priority had to be rebuilding
economic power, restoring the fragmented domestic
situation and, after these issues had been resolved, the
restoration of political power and influence. Nonetheless, in the end, Seeckt’s vision of a skilled professional force dominated military thought and planning, at
least within military circles.
Obviously, Seeckt’s preference for a professional
German army had its limitations, since it was so small
it could only serve as a cadre for a future force. With
the Versailles Treaty limiting the size as well as the
weapons systems of the Reichswehr, German officers
could only postulate about wars of maneuver. Only
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through the use of covert facilities, which were available to the Reichswehr as a result of the Treaty of Rapallo in Kazan, had limited development and exercise of
motorized units been possible.18 Seeckt’s vision was in
many respects limited, since it focused on operational
and tactical approaches to war, rather than a strategic
vision. Despite the implications of the various studies that had been conducted, Seeckt commissioned his
army to be a nucleus for the Wehrmacht, to function
with an operationally focused leadership, rather than
one that functioned at the strategic level.
Striking differences and similarities are evident
between Germany and the United States during this
period, as it relates to strategy and national defense.
After 1918, the American citizenry and the politicians
that represented them wanted to avoid another major war, within the National Socialist leadership and
certain elements of the German army there was actually an enthusiasm for war. In 1933, the militaries in
both countries were small and underfunded. In the
event of another war, both countries would have to
undergo a major economic mobilization of the manpower base. In the United States, force structure limitations were due to domestic politics and priorities,
whereas in Germany, external constraints imposed
by the Treaty of Versailles limited Berlin’s actions. In
1933, the United States was not prepared to expand
its military, whereas in the same period, the new German government under Adolf Hitler was anxious to
do so. Although the small but efficient Reichswehr had
diligently studied operational and tactical warfare in
the postwar era, the Germans were inadequately prepared for another war, since any type of national military policy strategy was problematic.
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Source: The Author's Collection.

Throughout the interwar period the German Army
was extremely short on mechanized equipment.
This photo from the late 1930s shows German
troops still using horse drawn equipment.
It is difficult to assess what type of national strategy or national military options might have been
developed by the new German government had the
Weimar Republic survived. Why, because the enduring theme of the Weimar government, in its 14 years
of existence, was crisis, it never really had the opportunity to adequately chart its political, economic, or
military future. Due to the Versailles Treaty, the Weimar government lacked the ability to forge a national
security policy and a foreign policy that allowed for
the exercise of military power. On the other hand,
from 1925 through 1929, the Weimar government was
somewhat successful in restoring the economy and in
regaining some national sovereignty. Unfortunately,
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the 1929 worldwide economic collapse drove the final
nail in Weimar Republic’s coffin. As a result of this
worldwide depression, Germans turned to the right
or the left rather than stay in the Weimar center, to
solve the problems of the nation. Thus, after a period
of political instability from 1929 to 1933, the National
Socialists assumed power. Although the National Socialist policies were ultimately negative for the world
in general, and the German people in particular, at the
time they seemed to offer solutions that could resolve
the numerous and challenging problems confronting
the German people.

Source: Jim Haley Collection.

Once the war started with the invasion of Poland
on September 1, 1939, Hitler increasingly wore
his military uniform, rather than party or
civilian clothing.
As the National Socialist era dawned, its national
strategy and military policy consistently migrated
into the hands of Adolf Hitler. Hitler was by no means
a traditional or a rational strategist, but from the end
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of January 1933 until 1945 he set clear objectives for
his movement, a factor that would ultimately provide
a quandary for German military leaders. Hitler served
as the undisputed leader of the National Socialist Party, the arbiter of its ideology, the head of state and, by
the end of the decade, its military leader. Hitler established early on in his political career the interests and
goals of his National Socialist movement and, once in
power, served as the undeniable author of German national strategy and foreign policy. His basic concepts
were reiterated numerous times in speeches throughout Germany, but they were fairly well outlined by
Hitler as early as 1924. In his rambling and poorly organized book, Mein Kampf, and his 1928 lesser known
“Second Book,” which was not made public until
long after World War II, Hitler clearly enunciated his
goals.19
After becoming Chancellor, Hitler immediately
called for the economic recovery of Germany, the elimination of the restrictions from the Treaty of Versailles,
full rearmament of Germany to include the restoration
of the German navy and air force, and the restoration
of territories taken from Germany at the end of World
War I. These goals strongly resonated with the German public because they had widespread acceptance
in Germany throughout the postwar era. What the
leadership of the German army, and for that matter
the leadership of the Western democracies failed to
recognize, was that Hitler’s goals went beyond what
some might regard as reasonable goals and objectives.
He espoused expansionistic goals for the new Germany that seemed limitless. While many observers
in Germany and in the Western democratic countries
regarded Hitler’s bombastic speeches to be little more
than propaganda and not realistic goals, they would
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soon learn that his plans for territorial expansion and
the elimination of Jews and Slavs were, in fact, real.
Thus, Hitler believed that it was in the national interest of Germany to have large tracts of land in the east,
as well some territory in the west for Lebensraum—living space—for the German people. In a 1930 speech
delivered to the students and faculty at Erlangen University, Hitler clearly stated his expansionistic goals,
by saying: “No people had more of a right to fight for
and attain control of the globe than the Germans.”20
Perhaps he understood that Germany, which is situated in the center of Europe and with a growing need
for raw materials and foodstuffs beyond its borders,
was in a vulnerable situation. Therefore, what critics
considered to be propaganda, Hitler’s consistent call
for the achievement of his goals and what he believed
to be in the national interest of Germany, in reality
formed the framework of the National Socialist world
vision. These goals, despite the ebb and flow of Germany’s military fortunes, were essentially the same in
1944 as those enunciated in 1924 when Hitler initially
penned Mein Kampf in Landsberg Prison.21
Hitler fully intended to achieve his national goals
through the use of the military element of power.
Hitler did not appreciate the advantages of using economic power, and he was impatient with negotiations
and political power. To Hitler, power was synonymous with military power, and not just the threat of
military power, but the actual employment of military
power. To achieve what he sought for a new Germany
required war, not just one war, but a series of wars
with no end. Initially, he duped the world’s major political leadership by putting aside his brown uniform
and wearing suits, top hats, and tails, and engaging
some of his adversaries in negotiations. Hitler moved
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with a degree of caution trying not to alarm the world
community, since Germany in the early 1930s was not
ready for any type of confrontation. For example, in
1934, Hitler signed a nonaggression pact with a nervous Polish government. In 1935, however, he threw
off all pretensions and announced that, despite the
restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, Germany would rearm. Hitler capped this action with an
introduction of compulsory military training for all
males and an expansion of the German navy, made
possible through a negotiated agreement with Great
Britain.22
The German armed forces welcomed its expansion with euphoria because the Reichswehr had two
important goals—expansion and rearmament. In this
regard, Hitler and the military leadership agreed. The
German military however, mistakenly assumed that
it could manage, or influence the policy of this new
regime similar to the strong role it played in manipulating the Kaiser in the period immediately prior to
the beginning of World War I. Unfortunately, the German military realized all too late that their post-1918
studies had focused largely on the expansion of the
German army coupled with the operational and tactical methodology necessary for succeeding in the next
war. What the German military could not have realized was that their new Chancellor had what seemed
to be almost limitless and expansive goals for the rapidly expanding German armed forces. As the 1930s
ended, it was Hitler, not the diplomats or the military
that would develop strategies for the new Germany.
How then were German military planners to prepare
for the struggles that were to come?
In the areas of tactics and operational thinking, the
German military forces were far superior than their
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competition. Seeckt’s army had determined to wage
the next war in the traditional German/Prussian
method, wars of movement. Wars were to be short
wars in which the army would focus on the decisive
defeat, if not annihilation, of the enemy force.23 The
talented Generalleutnant Ludwig Beck who served as
the Chief of the revived German General Staff from
1933-38 undertook the army’s preparation for war. In
1935, serious preparations began to move Germany
from its post-1918 state of defenselessness to an ability
to first defend itself and then to wage offensive war.
A plan dating from December 1933 sought to address
these objectives by expanding the size of the Reichswehr
from a 100,000-man army consisting of seven infantry
and three cavalry divisions to a total of 21 divisions by
March 1938.24 In August 1936, a second phase of the
German rearmament plan emerged with goals set for
the building of an army consisting of 36 infantry divisions, three armored divisions, three light divisions,
a single mountain division, and a cavalry brigade.
These goals were not achieved by the target date of
1939, because all branches of the German armed forces
faced a significant problem that was foreign to American military planners; limited raw materials necessary
for war.
Germany had gotten its start as a modern industrial state in the 1880s, at least in part due to the abundance of coal deposits which, together with iron ore,
were the building blocks of the early industrial age.
Iron ore was available to Hitler through Sweden, but
aluminum, oil, and rubber were not readily available
in the greater German Reich. As the age of the National Socialist sponsored military expansion dawned,
Germany’s significant natural resource was still coal.
Within the borders of the Reich, there were insufficient
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deposits of iron ore and inadequate supplies of oil,
both prerequisites for an army waging modern wars
of movement. From almost any perspective, Germany
lacked the necessary raw materials for war, especially
if foreign powers cut Germany off from international
markets. A bellicose Germany, with insufficient natural resources, could in the event of war, face a situation comparable to 1914-18 where both its military
and mercantile fleets were bottled up in the North
and Baltic Seas. This is in stark contrast to the United
States that had more than adequate resources. Nonetheless, the Germans designed a 5-year rearmament
plan that Berlin adopted in August 1936. The German
army was prepared to engage in defensive operations
through this period, but it was not prepared to wage
offensive war until 1940. The planning assumed that
Germany would likely face a two-front war. Given the
restrictions that the Allies had imposed by the Treaty
of Versailles and the lack of raw materials necessary
for a modern war, a 5-year period to prepare for offensive war was hardly adequate, something the military
leadership understood. Hitler, however, refused to be
bound by logical thinking or reasonable restrictions.
This problem affected more than the German army’s buildup, it affected the other services, especially
the navy. When Hitler became Chancellor in 1933, the
German navy was hardly competitive with the other
major powers. It had flourished under the Kaiser who
had stated that “[o]ur future lies on the water, the
trident must be in our hands.”25 The Imperial era naval power had allowed Berlin to exploit its colonies
in Africa, the Pacific, in China, and to show the flag
throughout the world. With the defeat of 1918 and
the restrictions imposed by Versailles, German naval
strength after World War I was hardly a shadow of
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its former self. Germany was allowed to keep eight
obsolete pre-dreadnought class battleships, eight
light cruisers, and 32 destroyers and torpedo boats.
The German submarine fleet was totally disbanded.
In 1933, rebuilding the German navy to its 1914 level
would be a monumental challenge.
The truncated interwar German navy, populated
by many former Imperial naval officers who had remained as active members of the service pressed Hitler in 1933 to start a naval construction program. From
1892 to 1918, the Imperial Navy’s nemesis was the
British navy. In the mid-1930s however, the immediate threats to National Socialist Germany were France
and Poland. Since Hitler’s initial expansion focused
on the continent, Britain was not presumed to be an
immediate adversary until a decade later. Groβadmiral
Erich Raeder, the Navy’s commander in chief, initially
pushed for parity with France and 50 percent parity
with the Royal Navy.26 Obviously, such efforts would
have required a massive naval buildup even though
Germany was still in the grips of the depression and,
at the same time, faced with competition for resources by the other services. Thus, the leadership of the
Kreigsmarine had the task of fighting both the army
and the Luftwaffe for resources and at the same time
constructing a formidable naval force with a severely
restricted shipbuilding industry. Given the limited
industrial and economic capability of the Germans in
the mid 1930s, the Kreigsmarine faced the prospect of
going to war as an underequipped and undermanned
service if war came too soon.
Before any naval expansion could begin, Germany
had to find a way to eliminate the restrictions imposed
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by the Versailles Treaty. Negotiations with the British
resulted in the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of
1935 that helped to resolve this problem. This agreement allowed Germany to buildup to 35 percent of the
Royal Navy’s battleship tonnage. The rationale given
for a larger British fleet was Britain’s need to protect
its colonial empire. Germany, on the other hand, had
lost its colonies and only needed sufficient surface
ships for duty in the Atlantic. With this new authority, Raeder began expanding the German navy, but he
believed that in the next war fleets would again engage each other on the high seas with capital ships.
With his concepts of naval warfare rooted firmly in
the tradition of the old Imperial Navy, he promoted
a high seas fleet mentality. Some German Naval leaders believed they could ensure parity with the British
by expanding U-boat construction, but they were in
the minority as were those officers who appreciated
aircraft carrier based warfare.27
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Source: Author’s collection.

Groβadmiral Erich Raeder, Commander-in-Chief
of the German Navy and a strong supporter of the
large fleet Navy. Note that Raeder wears his Nazi
party membership badge on his military uniform.
Complementing the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, Hitler believed that political agreements or even
an alliance with Britain might avoid or delay a direct
confrontation with the British before the German navy
was adequately prepared to do so. Raeder and the rest
of the Kreigsmarine leadership fully trusted Hitler’s
assurances that there was no intent to become confrontational with Britain in the immediate future, or
at least until the entire German military obtained the
427

appropriate trained and equipped forces.28 Despite his
assurances, as early as the Czechoslovakian crisis, Hitler enthusiastically prepared to conduct his first campaign that seemed likely to include the use of military
force. A military campaign seemed necessary because
he wanted not only to bring the Sudeten Germans
home to the Reich, but to also destroy Czechoslovakia. The possibility of war, prompted by Hitler’s highrisk strategy, long before Germany was prepared to
engage in conflict forced some of the German military
leaders to protest, including the resignation of Beck in
the summer of 1938.
While some regard the Czech crisis as Hitler’s masterpiece of diplomacy and coercion, the Führer later
defined it as one of his great mistakes. He believed
the resolution of this crisis deprived him of his first
military campaign where he could achieve a desired
goal, the destruction of Czechoslovakia,29 despite
the fact that none of his forces, particularly the navy,
seemed ready for war. Interestingly, many key German military leaders, including Raeder, Blomberg,
Seeckt, and many others, whose cultural roots were
firmly planted in the Imperial era, thought the resurgent German military would have the autonomy for
planning and the development of strategy much like
the old army had during the Imperial era. From the
onset of his Chancellorship, however, Hitler clearly
intended to dictate the military’s priorities and dominate Germany’s strategy. The logical sequential planning and budgeting necessary to accomplish his goals
seemed beyond the dictator’s grasp.30
Raeder’s initial assumption that Hitler would, in
fact, give the Kriegsmarine the necessary time to rebuild was a dream. Nonetheless, only months before
Germany initiated its attack on Poland in January
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1939, Hitler approved a long-range plan for the fleet’s
expansion. This Z-Plan called for the completion of 10
battleships, two aircraft carriers, three pocket battleships, three battleship cruisers, five heavy cruisers,
13 light cruisers, 47 destroyers, and 194 U-boats by
1947.31 Upon the completion of this plan, the Kreigsmarine would be able to contest even the Royal Navy’s
dominance of the seas. See Table Appendix I-1.
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Ship Category

1939

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

Final
Target

Battleship Type H

-

-

-

-

2

6

6

6

6

6

Battleship Types Gneisenau
and Bismarck

2

2

3

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

Pocket Battleships (a)
Type Deutschland

3

3 2(b) 1(c)

3

3

3

3

3

3

Battleship Cruisers Type P

-

-

-

-

3

3

8

8

10

12

Aircraft Carriers

-

1

2

2

2

2

2 3(d)

4

8

Heavy Cruisers

2

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

Light Cruisers Type M(e)

-

-

-

3

3

4

5

8

12

24

Scout Cruisers

-

-

-

2

6

9

12

15

20

36

22

25

36

41

44

47

50

53

58

70

Torpedo Boats

8

18

27

35

44

54

64

74

78

78(f)

U-Boats-Atlantic

34

52

73

88

112

133

157

161

162

162

Coastal

32

32

32

32

33

39

45

52

60

60

-

-

6

10

16

22

27

27

27

27

Destroyers

Special Purpose

(a) Armament of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau to be upgraded
1941-42.
(b) Scheer to be converted-1941.
(c) Graf Spee and Deutschland to be converted-1942.
(d) First two carriers to be followed by smaller type.
(e) Five light cruisers of Köln and Leipzig class, plus
(f) Twelve torpedo boats of Möwe and Wolf class, from 1942
to be relegated for training purposes.
Note. In the interests of clarity, all training, experimental, and
auxiliary craft (such as motor minesweepers and motor torpedo
boats) have been omitted from the table. Their planned production figures adhered to the general pattern and are of little historical importance.32

Table Appendix 1-1. The "Z-Plan" Long-Term
Production Plan
for the German Navy, 1939-47.
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In the Z-Plan, Raeder and his planners assumed
that war with Britain would occur no earlier than
1945. Unfortunately, war began when German military units crossed the Polish border on September 1,
1939. Hitler hoped for limited opposition to this aggression, but his assessment proved erroneous when
Britain and France declared war against Germany
2 days later. In 1939, the Kreigsmarine was forced to
confront two major powers on the high seas with only
a fraction of the Z-Plan requirements. In September
1939, the surface fleet had no modern battleships or
aircraft carriers, and it only had two battle cruisers,
three pocket-battleships, two heavy cruisers, six light
cruisers, and 34 destroyers and torpedo boats, and a
few pre-dreadnought battleships.33 The German navy
operated only 57 submarines, a figure that included
several training boats. On the other hand, the Royal
Navy could outgun the German forces with 15 battleships and battle cruisers and six aircraft carriers. In
addition, the French also possessed a large fleet, which
further added to the Kriegsmarine’s woes.
The German navy was unprepared for major naval
operations against either the French or the Royal Navy.
The Kreigsmarine could not conduct extensive surface
operations to support a major conflict at least in part
due to an ill-prepared industrial base and an economy
not yet mobilized for war. The existing German high
seas fleet was a mere shadow of its 1914 level, and
the limited size fleet would never be able to produce
a significant threat to the Allied military or merchant
marine fleets. The German navy’s first aircraft carrier
could not be completed due to shortages of both workers and raw materials, as well as inter-service rivalry. 34
When the German navy did venture out of its Baltic
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lair, the Allied navies relentlessly hunted its ships like
the Bismarck and the Tirpitz. Surface vessels had to
restrict themselves to conducting mostly raiding actions, not the direct fleet confrontation that Raeder assumed would happen. Instead, as the war continued,
German naval operations would have to concentrate
on submarine activities to threaten the Allied sea lines
of communications. Yet, even in this infamous activity, the Kriegsmarine was unprepared due to possessing an insufficient number of U-boats that would be
necessary to strangle its adversaries. German records
indicate that on September 1, 1939, the Kriegsmarine
had 57 U-Boats commissioned, only 45 of which were
fully serviceable. When the war broke out, only 19
were in a standby position in the North Atlantic.35
The Kreigsmarine never achieved its ultimate vision
of building a robust force and subsequently challenging the Royal Navy. The Allies were able to out-resource and out-build the German navy and ultimately
to dominate the sea lanes. Its basic problem was not
a lack of planning or vision on the part of its leaders,
but rather the problem was attributable to Germany’s
master strategist, Hitler, whose plans and policies defied logic and ignored resource limitations. Without
major surface, and later U-boat opposition, the Allies
were able to blockade Germany and prevent it from
receiving vital raw materials and foodstuffs. Allied
control of the seas facilitated the supply of the Soviet Union with critical resources, the curtailment of
Axis capabilities in North Africa, and enabled major
amphibious operations in the Mediterranean and, of
course, the invasion of Europe on June 6, 1944.
While the Versailles Treaty restricted German naval development, it prohibited the existence of an air
force. The treaty did allow civilian and commercial
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air activity as well as sport flying clubs, but not military air activities. The 15-year prohibition on military
airpower initially proved to be a considerable problem for the fledgling Luftwaffe. German engineers and
manufacturers would need time and resources to produce technologically advanced aircraft. The depression of the 1930s and competition with the army and
the Kriegsmarine for limited resources for defense production also initially hindered aircraft development.
Once the creation of a new air force was authorized, German air power advocates much like their
ground war colleagues, were faced with an immediate objective; protecting the borders of the Reich,
rather than projecting power. This was a difficult, if
not impossible task, for when Hitler assumed power,
no branch of the German military had the capability
to defend Germany’s borders. Nonetheless, when the
creation of the Luftwaffe was authorized, this was its
first mission. The Luftwaffe’s main objective was to assist in deterring the French and Polish military from
waging a preventative war against Germany.36 France
had become more secure and thus less threatening to
Germany as a result of the completion of the Maginot
Line, which was constructed between 1929 and 1932,
but it remained suspicious of its eastern neighbor’s intentions. However, Polish intentions remained a concern for Germany throughout the mid 1930’s.
As the German air arm began expanding, the leadership of the Luftwaffe at the strategic level was a serious
problem. While the German navy had a professional
career naval officer to lead its reconstruction, the commander in chief of the Luftwaffe, wearing a second hat
as the Air Minister, was Hermann Göring. One of Germany’s air heroes from World War I, Göring seemed
to offer multiple advantages as leader of the air arm.
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With his military record, his experience as a member
of the Reichstag, and his position as Minister President
of Prussia, he had both military and political credentials. Göring, however, was a victim of his excesses,
including an addiction to drugs, and by 1939, it was
doubtful that he could even fit in a cockpit like that in
which he had achieved so much fame in 1918.

Source: Jim Haley Collection.

Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring,
Commander-in-Chief of the German Air force, and
a former pilot who had long ago lost touch with the
needs of military aviation.
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Despite his reputation as a World War I ace,
Göring’s experience in the air was dated. In these later
years, Göring the politician had a tendency to promise
results, which neither he nor his air service could deliver. Faced with the virtual absence of a German Air
Force from 1918 to 1933, he first supported a policy of
numeric rather than qualitative superiority over Germany’s opponents.37 He was also an advocate for the
tactical focus of the air force. Some German air leaders
however, observed and promoted the need for other
than tactical capabilities for the fledgling air force.
Walter Wever, the first Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe
from 1933 to 1936, was a strong advocate of a comprehensive air power doctrine that included the development of a strategic bomber force. Even though
he was a former infantry officer who appreciated the
ground support role of the Luftwaffe and their needs
to neutralize, if not destroy, the enemy’s air power,
he believed that the Luftwaffe also required a strategic
bombardment capability.38 Wever’s premature death
while still in office stalled the development of a German strategic bomber fleet.39
Beyond the issues of leadership and mission, the
Luftwaffe suffered from two additional problems. The
Reichswehr’s Truppenamt, under the firm direction of
Seeckt, conducted the immediate postwar studies,
synthesizing the lessons learned from World War I.
These studies found that wars of maneuver, using a
combined arms approach, could prevent a positional
war like that of 1914 from occurring in the future. Combined arms for this type of warfare required the Luftwaffe to support ground troops. That the Wehrmacht
was so proficient in combined arms operations, so
dominating the air space over Europe in the early part
of the war, is clear evidence that they learned these
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lessons well. At the same time, a review of the types of
aircraft produced between 1939 to 1940 shows that the
Luftwaffe’s primary objective at its inception was first
air superiority, closely followed by close air support
and interdiction missions to support ground operations. Thus, the early Luftwaffe depended on a force of
dive-bombers, medium bombers, and fighters. These
initial designs were excellent airframes for the short
term, but as early as the Battle of Britain, the short
range of fighter aircraft and the limited bomb loads
carried by medium bombers posed a serious problem
for the Luftwaffe. These problems demonstrate both a
continental and tactical approach to airpower, from
which the Luftwaffe, despite its early successes, would
never recover.
This short-term tactical approach was strongly
supported by Hans Jeschonnek the fourth Chief of
the Staff of the Luftwaffe who served in that capacity from early 1939 until mid 1943.40 A World War I
army officer schooled in the traditional German way
of war, Jeschonnek assumed that wars fought by Germany’s military forces would be short and intense
actions, and that virtually all air resources would be
committed during times of conflict.41 German pilots
from operational, training, and test units would all
be called upon to fight the war; Luftwaffe officials did
not hold back any assets in these short intense wars.
Jeschonnek failed to invest in training and long-term
planning, which ultimately had a negative impact on
the Luftwaffe’s performance and future.42 Under Jeschonnek’s administration, emphasis was given only
to combat aircraft in all training and procurement decisions.43 Luftwaffe planners relegated reconnaissance
and transport aircraft to a secondary priority. Since
they were planning for short wars in Western Eu-
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rope, the Luftwaffe’s leadership failed to make a leap
forward in technology, permitting their service to develop longer-range aircraft and in sufficient numbers
to meet the demands of an expanding and long war. It
was not until well after 1940 that designers attempted
to analyze the latest trends and technologies affecting
airpower; too late to change the course of the Luftwaffe’s first aerial failure, the Battle of Britain.44 German ground operations could call on dive-bombers
and fighter aircraft to support operations, but they
were merely an extension of long-range artillery.45
In essence, the Luftwaffe entered World War II as
a force designed primarily to support ground operations. Germany’s initial victories over Poland, France,
Norway, Belgium, and the Netherlands gave the
military leadership confidence in its combined arms
strategy, often erroneously called Blitzkrieg strategy.46
Jeschonnek seemed to have delivered the right force
to the fight. They did, in fact, have the correct force for
a short, tactical, continental campaign, but not a long
global conflict. The AAF, in contrast, had developed its
strategy under AWPD/1 based primarily on the strategic bombardment concept. With this strategy, hardly
a short war approach, America could win a conflict by
the destruction of economic targets. The AAF recognized that the United States would ultimately conduct
an amphibious invasion of Europe and would need
sufficient tactical air forces to support Allied ground
operations. As a result, the AAF did develop a series
of pursuit aircraft to protect many of the U.S. bases,
overseas and domestic, as well as to provide support
for ground operations. Geography also played a role
because the large geographic distances over which
the United States would have to project power; and
America’s industrial capacity allowed American air
leaders to plan for different types of aircraft.
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The Luftwaffe did have advocates, even after Walter Wever’s early demise, for strategic bombardment
campaigns, but neither the Luftwaffe’s bomber or pursuit force could fight over long distances. The Luftwaffe’s force of short-range fighters, dive-bombers,
and a limited medium bomber force could not support simultaneous operations. The force was not capable of conducting sustained bombardment against
industry or economic targets that supported British
and Soviet military forces. Germany’s limited mobilization of military industries, its continental approach
to the air war, and the competing demands from the
other services forced it to abandon its ambitious plans
for longer-range aircraft in the late 1930s.47
The Battle of Britain demonstrated the first major
crack in the Luftwaffe’s armor. The German air force
failed to obliterate the RAF and achieve air superiority
to allow for the planned invasion of England, Operation SEALION. The failed German attempts to achieve
air superiority ensured that its bombardment campaign against British industrial and civilian targets
would also fail. Consequently, German military operations continued to evolve from that of a lightning
campaign designed to knock England out of the war,
to a more complex, broader effort against the Soviet
Union. The easy German military victories from 1939
through 1940 gave Berlin a false sense of superiority
that allowed its leaders to ignore the need for, or at
least slow the acquisition of, a second generation of
aircraft.
The German military establishment, but especially
the Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe, both of which were
capital intensive forces, faced seemingly endless problems as they attempted to wage Hitler’s wars. The
Luftwaffe was constantly confronted with the lack of
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basic resources, particularly petroleum. Long-range
planning was nonexistent, since Hitler refused to be
constrained by the advice from his military leaders.
Complicating this factor, from the onset, the German
economy reflected the short war philosophy. Building complex weapon systems required a well-trained,
organized armament industry, which initially Germany did not possess. At the start of World War II in
1939, Germany devoted 21.9 percent of its industrial
workforce to its war effort. By 1940, it accelerated its
commitment to 50.2 percent and crept up to 61.0 percent in 1943.48 Worker productivity in the armament
industry, from 1940 to 1942, actually declined starting
in 1939.49 Adolf Hitler commented that the economy
had been “mismanaged” despite the change by 1939
to a global war footing, and he was correct.50 What he
failed to acknowledge was that he was a large part of
the problem specifically due to his inability to logically and sequentially plan for Germany’s future.
A remarkable turnaround in worker output productivity occurred from 1943 to the end of the war,
despite aerial bombardment and a maritime blockade. By 1944, work productivity in the arms industry
increased by 60 percent per worker compared to the
productivity averages in 1939. Other industry showed
similar improvements. Steel, petroleum products, synthetic rubber, iron ore, and coal output all increased
significantly from 1939 to 1943. At least some of the
progress in war production was due to the addition
of resources and factories from numerous occupied
countries. While production increases forestalled the
Wehrmacht’s demise, it was too little and too late. Pressure from Allied attacks from the west, south, and east
started to take its toll by the fall of 1944 as economic
capacity slowly degraded through the loss of large
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blocks of occupied territory, and ground and aerial attacks.
By this stage in the war, the many poor decisions
made by German leaders helped to seal the nation’s
fate. German leaders needed to adapt and change to
another generation of weapons and tactics. However,
changes in weapon systems were expensive and time
consuming to produce, test, train, acquire, and field.
Fighting a broad, two-front, campaign spelled disaster for the Luftwaffe, because it could not adequately
replenish itself and compete against the other services
for resources. The dedication of the workforce and the
bravery of the Luftwaffe’s pilots could not overcome
inadequate Luftwaffe planning and an overall flawed
strategy.
Limited resources were a serious problem for the
German armed forces, but competition among the various branches of service for resources proved to be a
cutthroat parochial situation that accelerated throughout the war and consequently diminished the impact
that the available resources could have produced. For
example, Hermann Göring was a consummate empire
builder and, although he often overextended himself
and the Luftwaffe, he consistently raided the other services for force structure and missions. Thus, in 1938 he
was able to wrest control of German army paratroopers to make them a Luftwaffe asset for the remainder
of the war. In 1942, he created the Hermann Göring
Panzer Division, clearly a ground unit that nonetheless belonged to the Luftwaffe’s force structure. In the
same year, the Luftwaffe began creating field divisions,
infantry units created by and for the Luftwaffe command that competed with the army for missions and
equipment. Göring was also able to retain control of
proposed naval aviation, even though it deployed
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on naval vessels. His control of aviation for carriers
was, to say the least, detrimental for Raeder’s plans
to deploy a functional aircraft carrier as early as 1941,
when Raeder informed Hitler that the Graf Zeppelin
was 85 percent complete. Göring reported that aircraft could not be made available for the carrier until 1944. To meet the Kriegsmarine’s needs, he offered
ME 109Es, an aircraft that had been used in the 1940
Battle of Britain and which was being phased out of
the Luftwaffe’s first line inventory.51

Source: The Author's Collection.

Photo of Waffen-SS
The battle for resources and force structure grew
to include nonmilitary elements as well, and made
the competition for resources between the U.S. armed
services look like child’s play. As expansion of the
armed forces proceeded in the late 1930s, the SS, led
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by Heinrich Himmler, a pseudo military commander,
formed Waffen-SS divisions. First, Himmler created
infantry units, but subsequently the SS fielded panzer
divisions. Through their performance in the Russian
Campaign in 1941-42, SS units earned Hitler’s respect.
Their expansion continued in 1942-44, at least some
of which was possible by recruitment through various
ethnic German communities in southern and Eastern
Europe. Their reputation and Hitler’s distrust of the
traditional German military, particularly after the July
20, 1944, attempt on his life, meant that for the 1944
Ardennes Offensive, “Sepp” Dietrich, an SS general
officer, would lead the main effort. Two heavy SS Panzer divisions dominated the main assault force.
All of these failures in planning were symptomatic
of a larger problem faced by Nazi Germany; the Third
Reich functioned in an administrative morass which
was of Hitler’s making. Critical thinking, national
strategy, long-range planning—if there was any—and
military priorities, were all supervised or determined
by Hitler. The epitome of German military efficiency,
the General Staff, had begun preparations for war in
1935, and for the next 2 years, it worked to develop
plans and strategies as Germany’s ability to defend
itself increased. At the end of 1937, Hitler called into
question the military’s strategies and the plans for
the systematic buildup and deployment of German
troops. Thus, rather than strategies, Germany would
have to contend with essentially spontaneous military
opportunities, which would produce what today’s
military might call crisis action planning: the 1939 invasion of Poland led to the invasion of France, the Low
Countries, Denmark, and Norway; and the spring
1940 campaigns led to the air campaign against Great
Britain; the lack of success with Britain ushered in Bar-
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barossa, the attack against the Soviet Union. Where
was the strategy and planning with all of this? There
was none. One war led to another, one campaign led
to further opportunities. Granted, Hitler had a vision
for a Europe dominated by Germany, but to say that
he had a plan, a strategy, for the conquest of Europe, is
inaccurate. Systematic strategy formulation and war
plans died a quick death sometime in 1938. German
leadership could not resuscitate the effort in the prewar or wartime era.52
For the Third Reich, there would never be a General Marshall, Major Wedemeyer, or any type of victory plan. With this chaotic method of administration,
National Socialist Germany tended to function more
like a group of interrelated fiefdoms, rather than a
hierarchical dictatorship. A lack of resources, chaotic
leadership, bitter competition within and between the
services, and poor, if not nonexistent, planning meant
that even though Germany seemed well prepared for
war, it was in fact, merely better prepared than its adversaries at that time.
The skeptic might ask if their economy and their
strategy were so tenuous, how was it that they did so
well in dominating military campaigns from 1939-42.
The logical answer is, beginning with Hitler’s assumption to power in 1933, Germany relentlessly prepared
for war. In Hitler’s mind, this was not preparation to
defend National Socialist Germany, but rather preparation to wage war. At the same time, the German army
had studied and digested the lessons of World War I
perhaps better than any other major power, thereby
putting Germany ahead of the other nations particularly in terms of combined operations and maneuver
warfare. While Hitler’s military forces were diligently
preparing for war, the U.S. Government focused on
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domestic politics and domestic woes. Washington
was expending neither funds nor intellectual energy
on defense. Britain too, was bemoaning the loss of a
generation on the fields of Europe as was evident by
Chamberlain’s attempts at avert war over Czechoslovakia The Soviet Union, despite the enormity of its
army, was in turmoil with repeated purges that struck
the Soviet Army’s leadership with a vengeance. In
short, in 1939 the Germans had the initiative, and they
were far better prepared than their adversaries. The
absence of an achievable set of objectives, a strategy to
achieve them, and a strong economic base to support
the war effort, meant that in the end, these advantages
would be squandered.
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APPENDIX II1
TO SUPREME COMMANDER ALLIED
EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
12 February 1944
1. You are hereby designated as Supreme Allied
Commander of the forces placed under your orders
for operations for liberation of Europe from Germans.
Your title will be Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force.
2. Task. You will enter the continent of Europe and,
in conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and
the destruction of her armed forces. The date for entering the Continent is the month of May, 1944. After
adequate Channel ports have been secured, exploitation will be directed towards securing an area that will
facilitate both ground and air operations against the
enemy.
3. Notwithstanding the target date above, you will
be prepared at any time to take immediate advantage
of favorable circumstances, such as withdrawal by the
enemy on your front, to effect a reentry into the Continent with such forces as you have available at the
time; a general plan for this operation when approved
will be furnished for your assistance.
4. Command. You are responsible to the Combined
Chiefs of Staff and will exercise command generally
in accordance with the diagram at Appendix. [See the
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original for the Appendix and the associated diagram].
Direct communication with the U.S. and British Chiefs
of Staff is authorized in the interest of facilitating your
operations and for arranging necessary logistic support.
5. Logistics. In the United Kingdom the responsibility for logistics organization, concentration, movement, and supply of forces to meet the requirements
of your plan will rest with British Service Ministries
so far as British Forces are concerned. So far as U.S.
Forces are concerned, this responsibility will rest with
the U.S. War and Navy Departments. You will be responsible for the coordination of logistical arrangements on the continent. You will also be responsible
for coordinating the requirements of British and U.S.
forces under your command.
6. Coordination of Operations of other Forces and Agencies. In preparation for your assault on enemy occupied Europe, Sea and Air Forces, agencies of sabotage,
subversion, and propaganda, acting under a variety of
authorities, are now in action. You may recommend
any variation in these activities which may seem to
you desirable.
7. Relationship to United Nations Forces in other areas.
Responsibility will rest with the Combined Chiefs of
Staff for supplying information relating to operations
of the Forces of the U. S. S. R. for your guidance in timing your operations. It is understood that the Soviet
Forces will launch an offensive at about the same time
as OVERLORD with the object of preventing the German forces from transferring from the Eastern to the
Western front. The Allied Commander in Chief, Medi-
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terranean Theater, will conduct operations designed
to assist your operations, including the launching of
an attack against the south of France at about the same
time as OVERLORD. The scope and timing of his operations will be decided by the Combined Chiefs of
Staff. You will establish contact with him and submit
to the Combined Chiefs of Staff your views and recommendations regarding operations from the Mediterranean in support of your attack from the United
Kingdom. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will place under your command the forces operating in southern
France as soon as you are in a position to assume such
command. You will submit timely recommendations
compatible with this regard.
8. Relationship with Allied Governments—the re-establishment of Civil Governments and Liberated Allied Territories and the administration of enemy territories. Further
instructions will be issued to you on these subjects at
a later date.
ENDNOTES - APPENDIX II
1. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Report by The Supreme Commander
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